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Faith in the power and righteousness of retribution has taken over the American criminal justice system. Approaching punishment and responsibility from a philosophical perspective, Limits of Blame takes issue with a criminal justice system that aligns legal criteria of guilt with moral criteria of blameworthiness. Many incarcerated people do not meet the criteria of blameworthiness, even when they are guilty of crimes. The author underscores the problems of exaggerating what criminal guilt indicates, particularly when it is tied to the illusion that we know how long and in what ways criminals should suffer. Our practice of assigning blame has gone beyond a pragmatic need for protection and a moral need to repudiate harmful acts publicly. It represents a desire for retribution that normalizes excessive punishment. Kelly proposes that we abandon our culture of blame and aim at reducing serious crime rather than imposing retribution. Were we to refocus our perspective to fit the relevant moral circumstances and legal criteria, we could endorse a humane, appropriately limited, and more productive approach to criminal justice.--

From 1879 to 1881 Western Ireland suffered a famine that left one million people in a state of destitution. To assist the starving, impoverished farming communities that were scattered across the region English Quaker and philanthropist James Hack Tuke successfully pitched the Tuke Emigration Scheme to the UK government in 1882, lasting through 1884. While historians of Irish immigration have recently begun to research famines other than the Great Famine, very few have delved more deeply into this particular scheme. Of those who have, including Christine Kinnealy and Gerard Moran, analysis has been limited to the perspective of Ireland and thus far only the unpublished research of Margaret Lynch of Cleveland, Ohio's Irish American Archives Society has delved into the American view of the scheme. While the mission and reports of Tuke and his governmental committee are well documented, investigating the reality of immigrant experiences in the United States requires more effort. Using a database of state and federal biographical records in tandem with Tuke's sailing manifests, statistical analysis of the status of immigrants can be completed. This research paper along with a complementary ArcGIS Cascade virtual exhibit focuses on one sailing of the Tuke Emigration Scheme, that of the S.S. Canadian in April 1884, uses such analysis to demonstrate that while the scheme was certainly successful in establishing new connections and trends in four particular regions of the United States in later Irish-American immigration as driven by Tuke, in reality it only aligned with Tuke's more specific vision to a degree. Through a combination of passenger data, the writings of Tuke and his committee, local historical records of Cleveland, Ohio; the Pennsylvania coal mining region; western states; and Holyoke, Massachusetts, and additional source material, the impact and realities of Tuke's scheme in the United States is revealed.

This paper outlines the forest policy and decision-making framework in Newfoundland, including the history of the forest industry, and changing tenure arrangements, legislation, social values, labour markets, and forest conditions. Notably, forest policy objectives have shifted from a narrow focus on wood fibre growth and extraction to policies embodying a more diverse suite of objectives, including ecosystem-based management and inclusive public participation. The central questions of this paper revolve around the responses of forest managers and decisionmakers to this dynamic context: What is the current forest policy framework, and how (and why) has this changed over time? How does forest management and decision-making align with forest policy, and what are implications of gaps? Who is making decisions about forests and forestry in Newfoundland, who is benefiting from these decisions, and who is excluded?

Cover -- Title -- Copyright -- Dedication -- Contents -- Editor's Foreword -- Preface -- Part I: Fundamental Ideas -- 1. Four Roles of Political Philosophy -- 2. Society as a Fair System of Cooperation -- 3. The Idea of a Well-Ordered Society -- 4. The Idea of the Basic Structure -- 5. Limits to Our Inquiry -- 6. The Idea of the Original Position -- 7. The Idea of Free and Equal Persons -- 8. Relations between the Fundamental Ideas -- 9. The Idea of Public Justification -- 10. The Idea of Reflective Equilibrium -- 11. The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus -- Part II: Principles of Justice -- 12. Three Basic Points -- 13. Two Principles of Justice -- 14. The Problem of Distributive Justice -- 15. The Basic Structure as Subject: First Kind of Reason -- 16. The Basic Structure as Subject: Second Kind of Reason -- 17. Who Are the Least Advantaged? -- 18. The Difference Principle: Its Meaning -- 19. Objections via Counterexamples -- 20. Legitimate Expectations, Entitlement, and Desert -- 21. On Viewing Native Endowments as a Common Asset -- 22. Summary Comments on Distributive Justice and Desert -- Part III: The Argument from the Original Position -- 23. The Original Position: The Set-Up -- 24. The Circumstances of Justice -- 25. Formal Constraints and the Veil of Ignorance -- 26. The Idea of Public Reason -- 27. First Fundamental Comparison -- 28. The Structure of the Argument and the Maximin Rule -- 29. The Argument Stressing the Third Condition -- 30. The Priority of the Basic Liberties -- 31. An Objection about Aversion to Uncertainty -- 32. The Equal Basic Liberties Revisited -- 33. The Argument Stressing the Second Condition -- 34. Second Fundamental Comparison: Introduction -- 35. Grounds Falling under Publicity -- 36. Grounds Falling under Reciprocity -- 37. Grounds Falling under Stability.