Frontmatter -- CONTENTS -- ONE. Contemporary Politics and the Perpetuation of Inequality -- TWO. An Inescapable Plutocracy? -- THREE. Public Preferences and Economic Inequality -- FOUR. Elections and the Inequality Trap -- FIVE. Partisan Convergence and Financial Deregulation -- SIX. Polarization and Policy Stagnation -- SEVEN. Can We Escape the Trap? -- ACKNOWLEDGMENTS -- NOTES -- REFERENCES -- INDEX
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Explaining income inequality -- The distributional force of government -- Political conflict over "who gets what?" -- Party dynamics and income inequality -- Macro policy and distributional processes -- Putting the pieces together : who gets what and how -- Distribution, redistribution, and the future of American politics.
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I address the functioning of the U.S. governing system by analyzing distributional outcomes from 1947 to 2000. The key question is whether public policy influences distributional outcomes. The macropolitics model and power resource theory suggest that left policies should equalize the distribution of income. I utilize single equation error correction models to assess the impact of policy on income inequality through two mechanisms—market conditioning and redistribution. Since nearly every government action influences markets in some way, I examine policy in the aggregate rather than focusing only on policies explicitly designed to redistribute income. The analysis indicates that policy influences inequality through both mechanisms, with left policy producing more equality. The results are consistent with power resource theory and strongly support the macropolitics model. Furthermore, I find that market conditioning is as important as, and works in tandem with, explicit redistribution.
Analyses of the U.S. governing system indicate that national policy is influenced by public opinion, and this is interpreted as representation. Not as much is known aboutwhether policy systematically influences societal outcomes. In fact, some analyses suggest that there is little connection between policies and the outcomes these policies seek to produce. This article seeks to determine whether such a connection exists for income inequality. Although connections should exist, various views of the policymaking process cast doubt on the prospect. Measures of government's equalizing influence and aggregate policy are created for 1979-1996, and time series regression is used to test the connection between the two. Even in the presence of controls for economic and demographic factors, policy liberalism produces greater government redistribution. When assessed in light of earlier research, these results indicate that shifts in public opinion lead to important changes in the way government influences society.
In: Political research quarterly: PRQ ; official journal of the Western Political Science Association and other associations, Band 68, Heft 3, S. 428-442
This paper examines how financial deregulation and the partisan underpinnings of deregulation shaped the path of income inequality in the United States. Using time-series data from 1914 to 2010, we assess the effect of partisan politics on financial deregulation and, in turn, the effect of deregulation on income inequality. We find that financial deregulation has generally declined when Democrats attain more power in Washington and that deregulation has contributed to rising inequality. We also learn that the partisan effect on deregulation has diminished since the early 1980s, suggesting that one way partisan politics has contributed to the recent rise in inequality is related to convergence on matters of financial deregulation. We explore several potential explanations for this post–1980 partisan convergence, finding evidence supporting the idea that globalization, the increasing availability of credit, and shifts in campaign finance were contributing factors.
Tackling inequality has become a clarion call for politicians on both the right and the left. But in order to address the problem, we need to have better insights into how the current levels of economic equality became so entrenched. In new research which examines nearly 100 years of data, Nathan J. Kelly and Eric Keller find that financial deregulation has contributed to America's dramatic shift toward greater income concentration. They write that for most of the 20th century, Democratic control of the Senate made financial regulation more likely, but that from the 1980s, onwards, partly due to growing campaign contributions from the financial sector, the party converged with the Republicans' neoliberal enthusiasm for deregulation.
In: State politics & policy quarterly: the official journal of the State Politics and Policy section of the American Political Science Association, Band 14, Heft 4, S. 389-413
AbstractResearch shows that when the more liberal Democratic Party controls the national government, unemployment is lower, but whether liberal state governments are associated with lower unemployment has not been examined. We argue that more left-leaning governments in the U.S. states have the same preference for and willingness to use government to reduce unemployment, but that the greater resource and policymaking constraints that the states face during economic downturns limit their ability to shape unemployment to economic growth periods. We find evidence for these arguments in an analysis of the U.S. states for the period of 1975–2010. Specifically, when economic growth is low, liberal state governments are associated with increases in unemployment rates similar to or even somewhat higher than conservative governments, but when growth is moderate to high, liberal state governments are associated with greater-than-expected reductions in unemployment. We also provide some evidence that different state spending decisions between liberal and conservative state governments may explain these patterns.