Suchergebnisse

Abstract
In scholarly debates as well as in public discourse, Georgia is often reduced to being one of the states "in-between" Russia and the European Union (EU), and part of a "contested neighbourhood". The breakaway region of Abkhazia is usually not even credited with that, being treated as a mere appendage to Russia. In this special issue we challenge such approaches by analyzing the forging of Georgia's and Abkhazia's strategic paths as much more complex processes than are often assumed. In a context defined by the crisis in Russia–West relations, we explore actorness and agency – in the case of Georgia, within the strategic triangle of Georgia, the EU and Russia; in the case of Abkhazia, within the Abkhazia–Georgia–Russia triangle. Our aim is to expand the scope of analysis in two directions: first, by exploring what actors are shaping Georgia's and Abkhazia's strategic orientation, and second, by examining how these actors operate and interact in forging these entities' strategic paths.

De facto states – unrecognized secessionist entities that eke out a living on the margins of the international system – are often heavily dependent on external patron states for economic aid and investment. When the parent state – the state that the de facto state seeks to break away from – responds to the secessionist attempt by imposing sanctions or economic blockades, this further exacerbates such dependency. Moreover, due to their lack of international recognition, de facto states often have limited opportunities to engage with the outside world beyond the patron and the parent state. However, closer examination of one such de facto state, Abkhazia, reveals that de facto states can enjoy some bounded independent economic agency. Abkhazia's maneuvering between Russia as "patron," Georgia as "parent state," and the wider international community (here exemplified by the EU) in the sphere of trade and economic interaction has important implications for de-facto state conflict transformation. ; publishedVersion

What opportunities and trade-offs do de facto states encounter in developing economic ties with the outside world? This article explores the complex relationship between trade and trust in the context of contested statehood. Most de facto states are heavily dependent on an external patron for economic aid and investment. However, we challenge the widespread assumption that de facto states are merely hapless pawns in the power-play of their patrons. Such an approach fails to capture the conflict dynamics involved. Drawing on a case study of Abkhazia, we explore how this de facto state navigates between its "patron" Russia, its "parent state" Georgia, and the EU. The conflict transformation literature has highlighted the interrelationship between trust and trade – but how does this unfold in the context of continued nonrecognition and contested statehood? Does trade serve to facilitate trust and hence prospects for conflict transformation? With Abkhazia, we find scant correlation between trust and trade: in the absence of formal recognition, trade does not necessarily facilitate trust. However, the interrelationship between trade, trust, and recognition proves more complex than expected: we find less trust in the patron and more trade with the parent than might have been anticipated. ; publishedVersion

This project aims to provide a menu of innovative ways in which the international community can engage with all sides in the four so-called "frozen conflicts" - protracted conflicts on the territory of the former USSR that include the Karabakh, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transdniestria conflicts. (…) The aim of engagement is to improve the prospects for comprehensive resolution of the conflicts by improving security, economic, and social conditions for all populations in the conflict zones. (…) The conflicts form a spectrum that cuts across all the OSCE baskets: security, economics and the human dimension. On one end of the spectrum is the Transdniestria conflict, with calm and steady relations between Chişinău and Tiraspol enabling a relaxed security environment and extensive economic and social interchange. At the other end is the Karabakh conflict, with a permanently tense security situation and little or no economic or social contact (...). (OSCE Network/Pll)