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The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is struggling in its attempts to address the threat of anthropogenic climate change and create an effective international climate agreement. A substantial part of the problem is consensus decision-making within the Convention. Majority voting is a potential alternative which is already being discussed within the UNFCCC. A comparative analysis of consensus and majority voting suggests that majority voting is superior in terms of both efficiency and effectiveness by allowing for quicker decision-making and semi-global approaches to a climate agreement (termed here as "Critical Mass Governance"). This paper aims to investigate how majority voting could be implemented in the UNFCCC and to consider politically feasible and effective approaches to voting arrangements for the Convention. There is a legal opportunity to introduce voting through adoption of the draft Rules of Procedure, but this faces political opposition. A type of Layered Majority Voting with larger majorities for financial and substantial matters is considered to be the optimal approach in balancing political feasibility and effectiveness. For now, voting is not politically feasible for the UNFCCC, but could be introduced into future bodies or treaties under the Convention.

The issue of US ratification of international environmental treaties is a recurring obstacle for environmental multilateralism, including the climate regime. Despite the perceived importance of the role of the US to the success of any future international climate agreement, there has been little direct coverage in terms of how an effective agreement can specifically address US legal participation. This article explores potential ways of allowing for US legal participation in an effective climate treaty. Possible routes forward include the use of domestic legislation such as section 115 (S115) of the Clean Air Act (CAA) and the use of sole–executive agreements, instead of Senate ratification. Legal participation from the US through sole–executive agreements is possible if the international architecture is designed to allow for their use. Architectural elements such as varying legality and participation across an agreement (variable geometry) could allow for the use of sole–executive agreements. Two broader models for a 2015 agreement with legal participation through sole–executive agreements are constructed based upon these options: a modified pledge and review system and a form of variable geometry composed of number of opt-out, voting-based protocols on specific issues accompanied by bilateral agreements on mitigation commitments with other major emitters through the use of S115 and sole–executive agreements under the Montreal Protocol and Chicago Convention ('Critical Mass Governance'). While there is no single solution, Critical Mass Governance appears to provide the optimum combination of tools to effectively allow for US legal participation whilst ensuring an effective treaty. Policy relevance This article provides some recommendations on how to create an effective, legally binding treaty that allow for US legal participation without Senate approval. Given the recent election of a Republican majority in the US Senate and Congress, increasing willingness of the President to utilize his executive powers, as well as a strong shift in negotiations to appease US interests, the insights of this research are timely and relevant to delegations and other United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) actors. It will also be of use to domestic US actors involved with climate policy by illustrating how to allow for effective and sustainable US multilateral engagement that bypasses domestic political gridlock.

The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is struggling in its attempts to address the threat of anthropogenic climate change and create an effective international climate agreement. A substantial part of the problem is consensus decision-making within the Convention. Majority voting is a potential alternative which is already being discussed within the UNFCCC. A comparative analysis of consensus and majority voting suggests that majority voting is superior in terms of both efficiency and effectiveness by allowing for quicker decision-making and semi-global approaches to a climate agreement (termed here as "Critical Mass Governance"). This paper aims to investigate how majority voting could be implemented in the UNFCCC and to consider politically feasible and effective approaches to voting arrangements for the Convention. There is a legal opportunity to introduce voting through adoption of the draft Rules of Procedure, but this faces political opposition. A type of Layered Majority Voting with larger majorities for financial and substantial matters is considered to be the optimal approach in balancing political feasibility and effectiveness. For now, voting is not politically feasible for the UNFCCC, but could be introduced into future bodies or treaties under the Convention.

The issue of US ratification of international environmental treaties is a recurring obstacle for environmental multilateralism, including the climate regime. Despite the perceived importance of the role of the US to the success of any future international climate agreement, there has been little direct coverage in terms of how an effective agreement can specifically address US legal participation. This article explores potential ways of allowing for US legal participation in an effective climate treaty. Possible routes forward include the use of domestic legislation such as section 115 (S115) of the Clean Air Act (CAA) and the use of sole–executive agreements, instead of Senate ratification. Legal participation from the US through sole–executive agreements is possible if the international architecture is designed to allow for their use. Architectural elements such as varying legality and participation across an agreement (variable geometry) could allow for the use of sole–executive agreements. Two broader models for a 2015 agreement with legal participation through sole–executive agreements are constructed based upon these options: a modified pledge and review system and a form of variable geometry composed of number of opt-out, voting-based protocols on specific issues accompanied by bilateral agreements on mitigation commitments with other major emitters through the use of S115 and sole–executive agreements under the Montreal Protocol and Chicago Convention ('Critical Mass Governance'). While there is no single solution, Critical Mass Governance appears to provide the optimum combination of tools to effectively allow for US legal participation whilst ensuring an effective treaty. Policy relevance This article provides some recommendations on how to create an effective, legally binding treaty that allow for US legal participation without Senate approval. Given the recent election of a Republican majority in the US Senate and Congress, increasing willingness of the President to utilize his executive powers, as well as a strong shift in negotiations to appease US interests, the insights of this research are timely and relevant to delegations and other United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) actors. It will also be of use to domestic US actors involved with climate policy by illustrating how to allow for effective and sustainable US multilateral engagement that bypasses domestic political gridlock.

The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is struggling in its attempts to address the threat of anthropogenic climate change and create an effective post-Kyoto international climate agreement. One substantial part of the problem is con-sensus decision making within the Convention, which effectively gives every party a veto over the process. Majority voting is one potential alternative which is already being dis-cussed within the UNFCCC. A comparative analysis of consensus and majority voting sug-gests that majority voting is superior in terms of both efficiency and effectiveness since it is a better consensus-builder, a speedier decision making process and provides opportuni-ties for a semi-global approach to international climate policy. The objective in this paper is to investigate how majority voting could be implemented in the UNFCCC and to consider politically feasible and effective approaches to voting arrangements for the Convention. Implementing majority voting in the Convention faces legal, political and institutional ob-stacles. While it has growing support from some states, others remain staunchly opposed, with concerns over voting on financial matters being particularly sensitive. A type of Lay-ered Majority Voting with larger majorities for financial and substantial matters is consid- ered to be the optimal approach in balancing political feasibility and effectiveness. A weighted voting system differentiated on the basis of mitigation commitments, vulnerabil-ity and population (Common but Differentiated Voting) is proposed as an ideal approach. Despite these possibilities a change in decision making will likely require a crisis to cata-lyse the necessary political will and break the current path dependency that has been built around consensus.

AbstractThe international governance of artificial intelligence (AI) is at a crossroads: should it remain fragmented or be centralised? We draw on the history of environment, trade, and security regimes to identify advantages and disadvantages in centralising AI governance. Some considerations, such as efficiency and political power, speak for centralisation. The risk of creating a slow and brittle institution, and the difficulty of pairing deep rules with adequate participation, speak against it. Other considerations depend on the specific design. A centralised body may be able to deter forum shopping and ensure policy coordination. However, forum shopping can be beneficial, and fragmented institutions could self‐organise. In sum, these trade‐offs should inform development of the AI governance architecture, which is only now emerging. We apply the trade‐offs to the case of the potential development of high‐level machine intelligence. We conclude with two recommendations. First, the outcome will depend on the exact design of a central institution. A well‐designed centralised regime covering a set of coherent issues could be beneficial. But locking‐in an inadequate structure may pose a fate worse than fragmentation. Second, fragmentation will likely persist for now. The developing landscape should be monitored to see if it is self‐organising or simply inadequate.

The international governance of artificial intelligence (AI) is at a crossroads: should it remain fragmented or be centralised? We draw on the history of environment, trade, and security regimes to identify advantages and disadvantages in centralising AI governance. Some considerations, such as efficiency and political power, speak for centralisation. The risk of creating a slow and brittle institution, and the difficulty of pairing deep rules with adequate participation, speak against it. Other considerations depend on the specific design. A centralised body may be able to deter forum shopping and ensure policy coordination. However, forum shopping can be beneficial, and fragmented institutions could self-organise. In sum, these trade-offs should inform development of the AI governance architecture, which is only now emerging. We apply the trade-offs to the case of the potential development of high-level machine intelligence. We conclude with two recommendations. First, the outcome will depend on the exact design of a central institution. A well-designed centralised regime covering a set of coherent issues could be beneficial. But locking-in an inadequate structure may pose a fate worse than fragmentation. Second, fragmentation will likely persist for now. The developing landscape should be monitored to see if it is self-organising or simply inadequate.