THREE CROSS-SECTIONAL DATA SETS FOR THE HOUSE ARE ANALYZED FOR 1973 TO 1978. CONCLUSIONS ARE: (1) POLITICAL SUPPORT FOR ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION HAS REMAINED STABLE; (2) THE EAST IS THE AREA MOST SUPPORTIVE; (3) CLEAR PARTISAN DIFFERENCES EXIST; (4) THE MOST IMPORTANT FACTOR IS IDEOLOGY; AND (5) SUPPORT IS STRONGEST IN URBAN AND SUBURBAN CONSTITUENCIES.
John McCain won a comeback victory against great odds in the 2008 Grand Old Party presidential multicandidate race without a frontrunner. He capitalized on the winner-take-all Republican rules that awarded all of the delegates of a state to the candidate coming in first, even if winning by only a small plurality. Although he trailed several Republicans in money raised and in positive media coverage, he overcame these constraints by a strong leadership message that led to early primary victories. In the end, McCain won 25 of the 41 primaries. Unlike his 2000 campaign, he courted Republican identifiers and ran ahead of both Romney and Huckabee. He was strong among Independents and moderates and trailed only slightly behind Huckabee and Romney among conservatives. McCain was second to Huckabee among evangelical voters and was quite dominant among those voters who were not evangelicals. Ironically, McCain had the highest candidate support from Republicans disillusioned with President Bush. On candidate traits, McCain led on experience, being decisive, and electability. He ranked third behind Huckabee and Romney on "shares my values." On issues, McCain led on the most salient issue, the economy, and also dominated on Iraq and terrorism, although Romney had an edge on immigration. McCain's victory underscores that a winning candidate in a multicandidate primary need not be highest or first among all demographic groups, issues, or candidate traits. A winner, however, must be competitive on many factors and dominant on some of them to assure victory. In 2008 John McCain did so and was truly the comeback kid in presidential politics.
ABSTRACTThe Revenue Act of 1978 was basically a tax policy written in Congress and supported by a broad coalition of moderate and conservative Democrats uniting with Republicans. This coalition was precipitated by ideological differences within the Democratic Party and between the President and Congress over the tax cut's size and primary beneficiaries. Ideological divisions in Congress are such that building a majority coalition for liberally‐oriented tax‐cut and tax‐reform legislation is difficult. Party and ideology were both salient in the Kemp‐Roth vote in each chamber and also in the Gorman amendment vote in the House. In the Senate, the relationship between party and tax cut benefits was unimpressive, although a modest relationship emerged between ideology and the latter.
The Revenue Act of 1978 was basically a tax policy written in Congress & supported by a broad coalition of Democrats & Republicans. This coalition was precipitated by ideological differences within the Democratic Party & between the President & Congress over the size & primary beneficiaries of the tax cut. Ideological divisions in Congress often preclude building a majority coalition for liberally oriented tax cut & tax reform legislation. Party & ideology were both salient in the Kemp-Roth vote in each chamber, & in the Corman amendment vote in the House. In the Senate, the relationship between party & tax cut benefits was unimpressive, although a modest relationship did exist. 2 Tables. Modified HA.
Bivariate tabulations uncover relationships between the high rates of change in and high rates of unemployment and the percentage of states experiencing gains in the U.S. House Democratic percentage vote during the period 1958-1974. Efforts to establish linear relationships between these unemployment measures and either the percentage of the Democratic vote or the interelection change in the Democratic vote produced null results. The failure to discover consistent and meaningful relationships through these modes of analysis suggests that the political impact of unemployment may not be linear. Reasons are advanced as to why unemployment, while not unimportant, appears to have been less potent in more recent elections than previously assumed.
