Suchergebnisse

This study is designed to analyse the constitutional institution of national defence and related legal regulation and to reveal problems of legal regulation. The problems of legal regulation of national defence analysed in the research are linked by a fundamental question: what is the content of the rules forming the constitutional institution of national defence, which define the subjects of national defence and measures of national defence assigned to them by the Constitution, that determines the ordinary legal regulation of national defence? With regard to the aforementioned fundamental problem issue, the paper will aim, in particular, to analyse the concept of national defence in the broad and narrow sense, also examines the constitutional basis for the use of the armed forces as the military means of national defence. It is also analysed what state authorities take decisions on issues of national defence, first of all, on armed defence of the State, imposition of martial law or announcement of mobilisation, and how they share this authority among themselves. Also, how the democratic principle of civilian control over servicemen and paramilitary state institutions determines the distribution of responsibility for national defence between civilian and military national defence institutions. It is analysed the constitutional grounds for the universal obligation to do military service and the problems of constitutionality of some provisions of the Law on National Conscription in connection with exemption from the obligation to do military service and postponement of military service and suggests ways to solve them. Finally, it is analysed the constitutional content of the right to resist as one of the national defence measures.

This study is designed to analyse the constitutional institution of national defence and related legal regulation and to reveal problems of legal regulation. The problems of legal regulation of national defence analysed in the research are linked by a fundamental question: what is the content of the rules forming the constitutional institution of national defence, which define the subjects of national defence and measures of national defence assigned to them by the Constitution, that determines the ordinary legal regulation of national defence? With regard to the aforementioned fundamental problem issue, the paper will aim, in particular, to analyse the concept of national defence in the broad and narrow sense, also examines the constitutional basis for the use of the armed forces as the military means of national defence. It is also analysed what state authorities take decisions on issues of national defence, first of all, on armed defence of the State, imposition of martial law or announcement of mobilisation, and how they share this authority among themselves. Also, how the democratic principle of civilian control over servicemen and paramilitary state institutions determines the distribution of responsibility for national defence between civilian and military national defence institutions. It is analysed the constitutional grounds for the universal obligation to do military service and the problems of constitutionality of some provisions of the Law on National Conscription in connection with exemption from the obligation to do military service and postponement of military service and suggests ways to solve them. Finally, it is analysed the constitutional content of the right to resist as one of the national defence measures.

Actions by Egyptian Defense Minister on July 3rd, 2013 raised a question on what sort of means secure democratic military control and whether a democratic state can limit and control the use of force in a democratic manner. For this reason, in comparison with constitutional provisions of other states that embody different forms of government, this article analyses the constitutional status of a state leader as a head of military forces that was infixed in the Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt of December 26th, 2012, and also what constitutional fundamentals existed for Egyptian Defense Minister to perform actions on July 3rd, 2013, or to prevent these actions from materializing. The process that at the moment is in action in Egypt is an important test for democracy, which up until now the state has been having trouble to pass. When looking at the state government system provisioned by the Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt of December 26th, 2012, it becomes clear that the Constitution lacks more visible balance of power, which in turn creates the lack of democracy. Various military councils and military forces are equal to other three state powers (legislative, executive and judicial), but in a democratic country, military institutions of the state cannot be ascribed to state government institutions and furthermore have a priority over them. On the contrary, military state institutions must be liable to civil state institutions and must be controlled by them, and their decisions must be based on decisions by civil state institutions. Actions by Egyptian Defense Minister on July 3rd, 2013 were performed in breach of constitutional provisions that were set by the nation to live in accordance with, and this Constitution was validated in a referendum. According to the Constitution, Defense Minister is not the Protector of the Constitution; furthermore, no right is provisioned for him to terminate the validity of the Constitution. The Egyptian Constitution does not provide the Defense Minister with a right to dismiss the President of the Republic from the office and to appoint a constitutional jurisdiction judge to a temporary President office. What is more, it was possible to solve a political crisis apparent in a country and to avoid breaches of the Constitution by implementing other constitutional means (noconfidence, impeachment or election institutions). ; Liberalios demokratinės valstybės kariauja, kad apsaugotų fundamentalią valdymo formą nuo užpuolimų, ar tai būtų valstybės, besivadovaujančios skirtingais konstituciniais principais, ar teroristinės organizacijos, ketinančios sunaikinti jos integralumą1. Tačiau visuomeniniai neramumai pačios valstybės viduje ir galiausiai 2013 m. liepos 3 d. Egipto gynybos ministro veiksmai iškėlė klausimą, o kokios priemonės užtikrina demokratinę kariuomenės kontrolę, ar demokratinė valstybė gali apriboti ir kontroliuoti ginkluotųjų pajėgų panaudojimą demokratiškai. Valstybės vadžios institucijų galių pasiskirstymas (valdžių padalijimo principas) pirmiausiai įtvirtinamas konstitucijoje. Šiame straipsnyje, lyginant su kitų valstybių, įkūnijančių skirtingas valdymo formas, konstitucinėmis nuostatomis, analizuojamas 2012 m. gruodžio 26 d. Egipto Arabų Respublikos Konstitucijoje įtvirtintas valstybės vadovo, kaip vyriausiojo ginkluotųjų pajėgų vado, konstitucinis statusas ir konstituciniai pagrindai, kuriais 2013 m. liepos 3 d. turėjo vadovautis Egipto gynybos ministras.

Social unrest on the interior of the country (like actions of Egyptian Defense Minister on July 3rd, 2013 against the President of the Republic, Syrian Government actions against the participants in civil uprisings) raised the question on what means ascertain democratic military control or whether a democratic state can limit and control the use of the armed forces in a democratic way. This scientific research tries to analyze in a comparative aspect the constitutional status of the Head of the state, as the Commander-in-Chief of Military Forces, and Defense Minister in various countries with different types of government, as well as their capabilities to use the military forces. Means by the democratically elected state government to control military forces and to stop their illegal use is also analyzed.