Suchergebnisse

This book is a comprehensive study of cooperation among the advanced capitalist countries. Can cooperation persist without the dominance of a single power, such as the United States after World War II? To answer this pressing question, Robert Keohane analyzes the institutions, or "international regimes," through which cooperation has taken place in the world political economy and describes the evolution of these regimes as American hegemony has eroded. Refuting the idea that the decline of hegemony makes cooperation impossible, he views international regimes not as weak substitutes for world government but as devices for facilitating decentralized cooperation among egoistic actors. In the preface the author addresses the issue of cooperation after the end of the Soviet empire and with the renewed dominance of the United States, in security matters, as well as recent scholarship on cooperation

Facing globalization, the challenge for political science resembles that of the founders of the United States: how to design institutions for a polity of unprecedented size and diversity. Globalization produces discord and requires effective governance, but effective institutions are difficult to create and maintain. Liberal-democratic institutions must also meet standards of accountability and participation, and should foster persuasion rather than rely on coercion and interest-based bargaining. Effective institutions must rely on self-interest rather than altruism, yet both liberal-democratic legitimacy and the meaning of self interest depend on people's values and beliefs. The analysis of beliefs, and their effect on institutional outcomes, must therefore be integrated into institutional analysis. Insights from branches of political science as diverse as game theory, rational-choice institutionalism, historical institutionalism, and democratic theory can help political scientists understand how to design institutions on a world- and human-scale. (American Political Science Review / FUB)

In den internationalen Beziehungen sollte eine Unterscheidung zwischen der spezifischen und diffusen Reziprozität gemacht werden. Spezifische Reziprozität bezieht sich auf den Austausch gleicher Werte zwischen bestimmten Partnern oder genau definierten Abkommen. Diffuse Reziprozität stellt die Gruppe von Partnern gegenüber dem einzelnen Akteur in den Vordergrund. Normen und Pflichten sind als Regularien wichtig. Weder spezifische noch diffuse Reziprozität liefern ein perfektes Konzept für eine gegenseitige, vorteilhafte Kooperation. Institutionelle Innovationen, z.B. im internationalen Handel, können jedem beteiligten Akteur einige Vorteile nehmen, schützen jedoch vor den spezifischen Belastungen. (SWP-Bmt)