Suchergebnisse

Hauptbeschreibung: Die hier abgedruckten Beiträge lassen sich in drei große Themengruppen einordnen. In der ersten Themengruppe mit den Arbeiten von v. Weizsäcker, Beckenbach und Hanappi stehen theoretische und normative Grundsatzfragen der Evolutorischen Ökonomik im Vordergrund. Wie können normative Bewertungen vorgenommen werden bzw. wie kann "Fortschritt" definiert werden, wenn man - wie in der Evolutorischen Ökonomik - der neoklassischen Wohlfahrtsökonomik grundsätzlich kritisch gegenübersteht? Dies ist eines der zentralen Probleme, mit denen sich die Evolutorische Ökonomik seit langem ause

Abstract
The EU Data Act proposal (DA) seeks to introduce new rights for the users of internet of things (IoT) devices regarding access, use and sharing of the data generated through their use of these devices. This paper presents the results of a first analysis of the effectiveness of this 'user rights' mechanism from a 'law and economics' perspective. It concludes that the DA will not achieve its objectives of (a) empowering the users of IoT devices (especially the consumers), (b) unlocking large amounts of IoT data for innovation (for IoT-related services and across sectors), and (c) contributing to a fair sharing of the value from the generated IoT data. Although the DA correctly identifies the main problem arising from manufacturers' technical design of IoT devices, which grants them exclusive de facto control over the generated IoT data, its proposals for solving it are not close to being sufficient: (1) The proposed user rights mechanism suffers from manifold serious problems which will make it weak and largely ineffective (insufficient scope of data; lacking technical interoperability; high transaction costs, especially through the need for a negotiated contract with FRAND conditions; unclarity regarding data markets). (2) Also, the option for users to gain more control over the use of the IoT data, which operates through the requirement that the data holders can only use the IoT data on the basis of a contract with the users, will not work due to unsolved serious market failure problems in B2C situations. Therefore, all the rights to use the IoT data will end up with the data holders (and leave the consumers with only these weak user rights). The main reason for this negative assessment of the DA is its overemphasis on the protection of the exclusive de facto control position of the data holders. However, it is very doubtful whether in the case of IoT devices, whose price can cover the costs of data generation, any general incentive problem for investing in data-generating IoT devices exists. Therefore, a far-reaching rebalancing in favor of easier and increased data sharing and user empowerment is necessary, especially for enabling more innovation in the data economy.

The debate about the economic power of large tech firms has led to the insight that due to the key role of personal data on large digital platforms competition and privacy issues are deeply intertwined. This leads also to a complex relationship between competition law and data protection (or privacy) law, and—also from an economic perspective—the need for policy-makers to take into account the interplay between both legal regimes. This article analyzes current discussions about (1) how to integrate privacy effects into traditional competition law and (2) the far-reaching reform discussions about taming the power of the large tech firms, for example, the Digital Markets Act in the European Union or the new antitrust discussion in the United States, with respect to the question whether and to what extent they take into account this interplay between competition policy and data protection (or privacy) law. It is surprising that also the second reform discussion, which directly intends to target the power of the large tech firms, does not take into account sufficiently this interplay and the ensuing need for a more collaborative approach between these policies. Therefore, the opportunities of developing a more effective joint strategy for achieving better both competition and privacy are still missed.

Through the application of the technological solution of the "extended vehicle" con-cept the car manufacturers can capture exclusive control of the data of connected cars leading to serious concerns about negative effects on competition, innovation and consumer choice on the markets for aftermarket and other complementary services in the ecosystem of connected and automated driving. Therefore a controversial policy discussion has emerged in the EU about access to in-vehicle data and the connected car for independent service providers in the automotive industry. This paper claims that this problem should be seen as part of the general question of the optimal governance of data in the ecosystem of connected and automated mobility. The paper offers an overview about this policy discussion and analyzes this problem from an economic perspective by using a market failure analysis. Besides competition problems (esp. on markets for aftermarket and other services in the connected car) also market failures in regard to technological choice (extended vehicle vs. interoperable on-board application platform) and information and privacy problems ("notice and consent" solutions) can emerge, leading to the question of appropriate regulatory solutions. The paper discusses solutions through data portability, data rights, competition law, and recommends a sector-specific regulatory approach.