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Abstract
Developing and emerging market economies have increased their debt exposure to China in recent years. Despite its initial promise, many borrowers of Chinese loans face difficulties in meeting these loan obligations. Under what circumstances do Chinese borrowers in debt distress turn to the International Monetary Fund (IMF)? Our starting point is that Chinese loans are tied into projects that promise to generate sufficient revenue to repay these loans. We expect that governments turn to the IMF for bailout funding when a severe shock erodes the value of the underlying loan collateral, requiring mobilizing revenues and implementing austerity measures. Without alternative financing options, the IMF becomes the most viable option to weather financial distress. We expect governments to accept a 'whatever-it-takes' number of loan conditions. Using cross-country time-series analysis for up to 162 countries between 2000 and 2018, we show that defaults on Chinese debt trigger IMF programs only when a country experiences a severe adverse shock. Countries tapping the IMF also accept a greater number of loan conditions. From a policy perspective, current financial distress in borrowing countries underscores the urgency to design and deploy targeted governance reform measures beyond program safeguards and loan conditions to mitigate the built-up of macro-financial vulnerabilities, independent of where the money is coming from.

AbstractCentral bank independence (CBI) solves the time inconsistency problem faced by policymakers with respect to monetary policy. However, it does not solve their underlying incentives to manipulate the economy for political gains. Unable to use monetary policy, and often limited in their ability to use fiscal spending, governments can resort to financial deregulation to generate short‐term political benefits. We show qualitatively and quantitatively that governments systematically weaken financial regulations in the aftermath of CBI, and that the effect of CBI is separate from an ideological shift toward liberalization. Our findings suggest that the growing financialization of the economy experienced by many countries over the last few decades is partly a by‐product of central bank independence.

AbstractThis paper tests the existence of political credit cycles, the positive comovement between credit and elections. While several single‐country studies point to the existence of this relationship, the link between electoral cycles and credit expansion has seen little exploration at the multicountry level. Using a comprehensive dataset covering bank and non‐bank credit in 165 countries from 1960 to 2013, we show that both government and private credit significantly increase in election years. This finding suggests the possibility that politicians use not only fiscal and monetary policy to court voters, but also implement credit policies such as interest rate subsidies and tax breaks for debt to enhance credit growth. We also find that a higher degree of financial openness weakens the frequency and magnitude of political credit cycles; yet, the conditional effect of financial openness is stronger for developing countries than developed economies.

PurposeThis paper inquires into the root causes of global imbalances from an international trade perspective. The purpose of the paper is to establish a conceptual framework that links financial market governance, international trade and financial market integration, and to derive implications for the global financial crisis.Design/methodology/approachIn order to analyze global imbalances, the paper draws on a theoretical Heckscher‐Ohlin‐Samuelson international trade model, in which it compares two open economies, solely differing in their financial market governance structures. Building on these findings, the paper extends the analysis to the role of financial market frictions in propagating global imbalances into excessive lending in high‐income economies.FindingsTo that extent, it argues that global imbalances are due to impasses in international production. This paper argues that countries seeking to suppress real appreciation have engaged in financial repression, which has, via financial globalization, translated into excessive expansion of financial service sectors in flexible market economies.Research limitations/implicationsIn order to derive a tractable framework, the abstract from inter‐temporal aspects and from an in‐depth analysis of financial modelling issues. Owing to the static nature of the set‐up, the analytic link between global imbalances and the global financial crisis is intuitive.Practical implicationsGiven that differences in national financial market governance influence the direction of international capital and trade flows, it argues for more international policy coordination in preventing future crisis.Originality/valueThe unique feature of the contribution is that it links financial market governance and international trade to international financial market integration in a tractable theoretical framework.