Cover -- Half-title -- Title page -- Copyright information -- Table of contents -- Acknowledgements -- List of abbreviations -- Introduction -- The theoretical framework and research design -- The outline of the book -- Notes -- 1 A history of UN peacekeeping -- The UN and the maintenance of international peace and security -- The first generation: UN peacekeeping 1947-87 -- The first period: UN peacekeeping from 1947-56 -- The second period 1956-67 -- The third period 1967-87 -- The second generation: UN peacekeeping from 1988 to 2014 -- The first period 1988-95 -- The second period 1995-99
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This paper examines the discussions on peacekeeping in the United Nations during the 1980s and up to the disintegration of the Soviet Union. It demonstrates that the call for wider implementation of UN peacekeeping operations and for the broadening of their functions began in the final stages of the Cold War. This was not a result of a shift in the policies of the Western powers or the work of the UN Secretariat; rather, the major source of change was an alliance between Western states which were veterans in contributing to peacekeeping operations and Eastern European states led by the Soviet Union. These two groups of states identified a need for multifunctional United Nations peacekeeping operations as the appropriate instrument for dealing with conflicts in the new world order of the 1990s. Many UN member states supported the new ideas which suited their myriad interests, albeit with reservations on several new functions of the operations. Therefore, with the end of the Cold War the international community found in peacekeeping the most uncontested instrument available to maintain international peace and security.
The study aims to unpack the concept of unofficial normalization and how it can facilitate the resolution of interstate conflicts. Drawing on Kriesberg's typology of conflict management strategies as constructive or destructive, we define constructive unofficial normalization as a new type of coengagement reward inducement in the context of United Arab Emirates (UAE)–Israel relations. Disciplined configurative and heuristic modes of case study analysis are employed. The paper argues that unofficial relations between the UAE and Israel in the decades preceding the Abraham Accords in 2020 was a necessary element in the transition from conflict management to conflict resolution.
Purpose This study delves into the transformation of UAE-Israel relations, which transitioned from a long-term rivalry to a formal peace agreement in 2020. It aims to uncover the multifaceted elements that influenced both nations' pursuit of bilateral negotiations, with a special emphasis on the role of unofficial collaboration.
Design/methodology/approach Employing a case study approach, the research traces the evolution of the UAE-Israel ties, mapping their progression from covert collaborations to public accords. This exploration is set against a backdrop of political, economic, and societal factors that have historically characterized the broader Israel-Arab conflict. Real-world dynamics and theoretical constructs are analyzed in tandem to derive comprehensive insights.
Findings Key drivers for the transformation of UAE-Israel relations included the threat from Iran, internal disturbances, economic stresses, and the strategic advantages of discreet diplomacy. Exogenous catalysts like the Covid-19 pandemic and Israel's annexation plans in 2019-2020 played pivotal roles, capitalizing on pre-existing covert collaborations and shared regional interests. Constructive strategies, notably inducements, effectively reshaped their adversarial relationship. The resultant U.S.-mediated agreement conferred strategic, security, economic, and diplomatic benefits to both parties. Importantly, the potency of conengagement conflict management strategy, especially when bolstered by exogenous factors and growing mutual interest, emerged as a game-changer in terminating longstanding rivalries.
Originality/value This study offers a unique perspective on Israel-UAE relations, emphasizing the significance of covert engagements, inducements, and the innovative conengagement strategy in conflict resolution. By examining a relationship devoid of direct armed conflict, the research underscores the interplay of economic, political, and societal factors in reshaping rivalries. This case study serves as a testament to the potential for transformative change in enduring disputes when the right conditions and strategies align, supplementing conventional perspectives and offering valuable implications for policy and mediation initiatives in the Middle East.
This paper explores the differences in the content of commentary reports that the United Nations (UN) addressed to Islamic countries in the Stereotypes section. A significant association was found between types of violations and the level of the state's economic development. For high-income level countries, the commentaries addressed social perceptions violations. For low-level income countries, the commentaries focused on physical practices violations. Hence, the Islamic character of the country was found to be a minor factor in comparison with the state level of development. The UN's approach to gender stereotypes in low-income countries involves simplification and reduction, as it treats the symptoms rather than the causes.
AbstractThe article discusses the question of why and how the normalization between the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Israel took place and managed to evolve into a peace agreement. It offers an additional explanation to the neorealists' scholarly and commonly accepted argument: that it was only the behavior of the revisionist state of Iran that was the motive for signing the peace agreement between the two states. Furthermore, the article argues that the normalization of relations began in 2004 and could have materialized owing to the UAE's neoliberal foreign policy of focusing on soft power cooperation. It suggests the UAE's internal interests of status, stability, and empowerment, which were incorporated in the Vision 2021 plan, were translated into a foreign policy of international cooperation rather than one of military involvement and alliances. The UAE's long‐term strategy reveals a dual neorealist and neoliberal foreign policy with a tendency toward the latter. The neoliberal foreign policy of soft power cooperation attracted the UAE to Israel and, through these shared interests, built trust and eventually led to normalization between the two states. The study covers three periods of the UAE's foreign policy strategy during the development of the normalization process. It begins with the tension between the neoliberal and neorealist strategies from 2004 to 2009, then looks at the increase in tensions between 2010 and 2018, and ends with the focus on the neoliberal foreign policy strategy in 2019–2020.
