Suchergebnisse

Die moderne Volkswirtschaftslehre erachtet es in der Regel als wünschenswert, dass Menschen frei entscheiden können wie sie leben möchten, wie sie ihre Zeit einteilen und welche Kaufentscheidungen sie treffen. Solche Entscheidungen sollte jede und jeder alleine auf Basis ihrer und seiner Vorlieben und Präferenzen tätigen, so dass davon ein möglichst hoher Level an Zufriedenheit, oder Nutzen, resultiert. Philosophen wie John Stuart Mill, die die ökonomische Denkweise bis heute beeinflussen, haben allerdings schon früh darauf hingewiesen, dass die Freiheit eines Menschen dort aufhören muss, wo die Freiheit eines anderen Menschen beginnt. Die normative Finanzwissenschaft beschäftigt sich mit solchen Fällen der Staatstätigkeit. Dies sind Fälle in denen es aus ökonomischer Sicht wünschenswert ist, dass eine Regierung, als Repräsentantin des Volkes in einer Demokratie, bestimmte Handlungen verbietet und unter Strafe stellt, durch Steuern oder Subventionen Anreize für wünschenswerte Handlungen einführt, oder Eigentumsrechte schafft. Die vorliegende Dissertation beschäftigt sich mit eben solchen Fällen, in denen die Freiheit des Einzelnen an ihre Grenzen stößt. Das Interesse liegt dabei auf der Untersuchung von prosozialem und antisozialem Verhalten unter Anwendung von verhaltens- und experimentalökonomischen Methoden. Diese Dissertation verfolgt also zwei Hauptzwecke. Der erste Zweck ist es, neues Wissen über intrinsische Motivation von prosozialem und antisozialem Verhalten zu schaffen. Der zweite Zweck besteht darin zu untersuchen, ob und warum bestimmte Institutionen, wie Transparenz von Handlungen und Bestrafungsmechanismen, dabei behilflich sein können, antisoziales Verhalten zu reduzieren. ; Today's discipline of normative public economics investigates cases in which it is desirable for society, represented by the government in a democracy, to intervene with actions of agents in markets and other affairs in the public domain. Classic examples span from the passing of criminal laws by the legislative, the enforcement of such laws via crime detection and prosecution (Becker 1968), the introduction of incentives in the form of taxes and subsidies to steer behavior (Pigou 1920) to the definition of property rights (Coase 1960). This dissertation provides new inquiries into the behavior of individuals in cases in which their actions interfere with the liberty of others. More specifically, the aim of this dissertation is to provide new behavioral economic insights into individual and group decision making of pro-social, voluntary giving (and sharing) of resources to others on the one hand and especially anti-social acts of taking and stealing from others on the other hand. In this spirit, my dissertation serves two major purposes. First, it provides new insights for behavioral economic research, for instance on the motivation of individuals to steal from a group and other individuals. Second, it answers questions of practical importance, for instance, concerning the consequences of institutions like transparency, peer punishment and criminal prosecution.

The 2021 pandora papers show that many wealthy individuals and even politicians use shell companies to hide their fortunes. In order to fight international personal tax evasion, the Common Reporting Standard (CRS) was implemented and it helped governments to collect USD 85 billion already. USD 182 billion are still missing from the government budget because of personal tax evasion. The individual implementation strategies of CRS compliant countries can endanger the effectiveness of the Automatic Exchange of Information (AEOI). Several loopholes are used to circumvent the CRS. There are amendments possible which increase the effectiveness by improving the implementation strategies and closing the loopholes. The enforcement of the CRS should become stricter by removing financial institutions' licenses to operate in cases of non-compliance. Beneficial ownership registers should increase transparency regarding investments and securities. Within the current momentum of international tax legislation, the CRS compliant countries may leverage the USA into signing the CRS as well. The USA could in turn demand a more effective CRS before signing it.

Climate change is a significant obstacle for farmers in the least developed countries like Afghanistan and adaptation support is exceptionally scarce. This paper provides evidence on the impact of the agriculture-related external support on farmers' adaptation to climate change in the Central Highlands of Afghanistan. To this end, we collected primary data from 1434 farmers whom we interviewed across 14 districts in Bamiyan, Ghazni, and Diakundi provinces. We employ quasi-experimental econometric methods, including an endogenous switching regression analysis, to estimate the treatment effects on various adaptation-related outcomes. We find significant impacts of support interventions on the use of improved types of seeds and farmers' access to irrigation water. Further impacts on the risk of flood, economic and financial as well as government and institutional adaptation constraints appear to be significant, but sensitive to the existence of unobserved factors. We conclude that farmers perceived changes in the climate, and most of them tried to adapt by employing measures available to them. The impact of external support has been partially effective in addressing immediate and short-term farming challenges related to climate change and extreme weather events. They, however, have not been effective in treating long-term fundamental climate change-related risks. Based on our analysis of the past treatments and farmers' self-reported priorities, we provide a list of policy recommendations for adaptation to climate change in farming communities in Afghanistan.

Wir diskutieren Ergebnisse einer Studie über die Akzeptanz und Effektivität kognitiver und moralischer Nudges am Beispiel von Standardeinstellungen und sozialer Information. Unsere Studienteilnehmenden ordnen diese beiden Dimensionen von Nudges unterschiedlich ein. Im Fokus des Beitrags stehen neben den Wirkmechanismen der Nudges auch Unterschiede in gesellschaftlichen und persönlichen Zielen, in denen die Nudges angewendet werden sollen. Die Teilnehmenden unserer Studie bevorzugen moralische Nudges fürgesellschaftliche Ziele und kognitive Nudges für persönliche Ziele. Daraus leiten wir wichtige Konsequenzen für die Nutzung von Nudges als Politikmaßnahme ab. Wir kommen zu dem Ergebnis, dass von unseren Studienteilnehmenden kognitive Nudges als effektiver angesehen werden als moralische Nudges. Die Akzeptanz solcher Nudges unterscheidet sich allerdings je nach Ziel. ; We discuss the results of a study on the acceptance and effectiveness of cognitive and moral nudges using defaults and social information as examples. Our study participants classify these two dimensions of nudges differently. In addition to the choice mechanisms of nudges, this article also focuses on differences in social and personal goals in which nudges are to be applied. Our result is that moral nudges are preferred for social goals, whereas cognitive nudges are preferred for personal goals. From this we derive important consequences for the use of nudges as policy measures. Our results show that cognitive nudges are considered more effective by our study participants than moral nudges. However, the acceptance of such nudges differs according to the goals.

Abstract
Following the 2007–8 global food crisis, agricultural producers have invested in large tracts of land in developing countries. We investigate how the arrival of large-scale farms changes inter-personal trust and reciprocity, important components of social capital, in traditional villages. We elicit trust and reciprocal behaviour in villages that lie near large-scale farms and compare them with villages at a distance. Our data reveal greater trust in villages close to large-scale farms. Reciprocity is more frequent after farm employment. These results are likely driven by communal coping and reputation building. A natural field measure shows that trust correlates with public good sharing.

Understanding what determines the truth-telling of economic agents towards their regulator is of major economic importance from banking to the management of common-pool resources such as European fisheries. By enacting a discard-ban on unwanted fish-catches without increasing monitoring activities, the European Union (EU) depends on fishermen's truth-telling. Using a coin-tossing task in an artefactual mail field experiment with 120 German commercial fishermen, we test whether truth-telling in a baseline setting differs from behavior in two treatments that exploit fishermen's widespread ill-regard of their regulator, the EU. We find, first, that fishermen misreport coin tosses more strongly to their advantage in a treatment where they are faced with the EU flag, and, second, that misreporting is consistent with behavior in other hidden tasks. We also find some supportive evidence for our first result in a conceptual replication with 1200 UK citizens who voted 'leave' in the Brexit referendum. Our findings imply that lying is more extensive towards an ill-regarded regulator and that policy needs to account for this endogenously eroding honesty base.

Understanding what determines the extent to which economic agents tell the truth to their regulating authority is of major economic importance, from banking to environmental protection. To this end, we examine truth-telling of German commercial fishermen in an artefactual field experiment. Their regulator, the European Union (EU), has recently enacted a ban on discarding unwanted fish catches to the sea, without yet increasing monitoring activities. The regulator thus depends on fishermen's truth-telling, while standard economic theory predicts substantial self-serving dishonesty. Using a coin- tossing task, we test whether truth-telling in a baseline setting differs from behavior in two treatments that exploit fishermen's widespread ill-regard of the EU. We find that fishermen misreport coin tosses to their advantage, albeit to a lesser extent than standard theory predicts. Misreporting is stronger among fishermen in a treatment where they are faced with the EU flag, suggesting that lying towards their ill-regarded regulator is more substantial. Yet, some fishermen are more honest in a control treatment where the source of EU research funding is revealed additionally. Our findings imply that regulators can influence truth-telling behavior by means of their regulatory approaches and communication strategies.

The ongoing global financial crisis has been preceded by a steady rise in global current account imbalances. Recently, in the course of the global recession, global imbalances have declined, albeit without having disappeared completely. As the outlook for global growth gets brighter, it is important to be aware of the possibility of again arising global imbalances in the future, since many of the structural reasons for the foregoing build up of imbalances remain largely in place. This is particularly important against the background of a close relationship between the global imbalances and the financial crisis. Important steps that would help to avoid the reoccurrence of unsustainable global imbalances and contribute to stabilize the global economy in the medium run are a tighter regulation of financial markets, the strengthening of the role of the IMF in monitoring global capital markets, and the development of social security systems and financial markets in emerging economies.

A growing literature in economics seeks to explain why people remain poor. Classical theories explained the persistence of poverty with constraints that are external to an individual such as market imperfections and coordination problems. Recently economists explored the role of aspiration failures as an internal constraint in escaping from poverty. Aspiration failures occur when individuals fail to make investments because of too low or too high aspirations. Aspirations are formed through own experiences, but also by the achievements of individuals one can observe. Individuals living in po...

A growing literature in economics seeks to explain why people remain poor. Classical theories explained the persistence of poverty with constraints that are external to an individual such as market imperfections and coordination problems. Recently economists explored the role of aspiration failures as an internal constraint in escaping from poverty. Aspiration failures occur when individuals fail to make investments because of too low or too high aspirations. Aspirations are formed through own experiences, but also by the achievements of individuals one can observe. Individuals living in po...