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In 2014, Indonesia inaugurated as president the former Governor of Jakarta, Joko Widodo, or "Jokowi," raising public expectations for reform especially among people outside the powerful political and business elite circles. It is uncertain to what extent, and how, the new government will achieve his reform agendas. Moreover, a relatively weak economy and declining civil liberties may pose an additional challenge, despite Jokowi's avowed commitment to structural reforms and good governance.

Since the onset of the financial crisis in 1997, political developments in the two largest Muslim-majority countries in Southeast Asia - Malaysia and Indonesia - have emphasized a recurrent theme that has lingered in both countries after independence: the uneasy relationship between Islam and nation building. It is, however, the markedly contrasting nation-building processes in the two neighboring countries that present a fundamental challenge to our conventional thinking on the relationship between Islam and nation building. Conventional wisdom contends that Islam is unfit to form the foundations of a modern nation-state that transcends parochial religious sentiments. The Indonesian case seems to confirm this claim: Islam did indeed prove to be a divisive force, reinforcing religious-oriented parochial sentiments. The rise of inter-religious hostility and violence, moreover, suggests that huge discrepancies in the people's perception of their national vision still remain. The Malaysian case, on the other hand, demonstrates that Islam can be compatible with the process of modern nation building. Despite undergoing a powerful surge of Islamisation, both at the state level as well as in society, Malaysia has witnessed a steadily growing "national" consciousness in the past decades. This paper seeks to explain this cross-national variation in outcomes by examining the way in which Islam has been embedded in the two respective states' projects of nation building. It draws special attention to the ideological dispositions of the states' leaders, and locates these in the political as well as socio-economic spheres. In doing so, the paper argues that the position of Islam in each state's project of nation building - whether it was appropriated inclusively or exclusively - has played an important role in bringing about the diverging outcomes of national development.

Since the onset of the financial crisis in 1997, political developments in the two largest Muslim-majority countries in Southeast Asia - Malaysia and Indonesia - have emphasized a recurrent theme that has lingered in both countries after independence: the uneasy relationship between Islam and nation building. It is, however, the markedly contrasting nation-building processes in the two neighboring countries that present a fundamental challenge to our conventional thinking on the relationship between Islam and nation building. Conventional wisdom contends that Islam is unfit to form the foundations of a modern nation-state that transcends parochial religious sentiments. The Indonesian case seems to confirm this claim: Islam did indeed prove to be a divisive force, reinforcing religious-oriented parochial sentiments. The rise of inter-religious hostility and violence, moreover, suggests that huge discrepancies in the people's perception of their national vision still remain. The Malaysian case, on the other hand, demonstrates that Islam can be compatible with the process of modern nation building. Despite undergoing a powerful surge of Islamisation, both at the state level as well as in society, Malaysia has witnessed a steadily growing "national" consciousness in the past decades. This paper seeks to explain this cross-national variation in outcomes by examining the way in which Islam has been embedded in the two respective states' projects of nation building. It draws special attention to the ideological dispositions of the states' leaders, and locates these in the political as well as socio-economic spheres. In doing so, the paper argues that the position of Islam in each state's project of nation building - whether it was appropriated inclusively or exclusively - has played an important role in bringing about the diverging outcomes of national development.

The rising antagonistic attitudes and tension between the Malay majority and ethnic and religious minorities in Malaysia since 2007 is intriguing because it has occurred when society experienced an unprecedentedly large-scale and assertive multi-ethnic pro-democracy movement. This article argues that precisely these assertive and confident civil and political societies - and their emphasis on equal rights and equitable development for all Malaysians - have put the traditional Malay and religious elites on the defensive. The pro-democracy movement and the prospects of regime change have threatened not only the party-dominant regime but also - and more importantly - the constitutional and institutional foundations of ethnic exclusivism and privileges. Moreover, two Malay-based parties, the United Malays National Organization (UMNO) and the Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS), are viewed as giving too many political concessions to the non-Malay communities to gain an electoral advantage, making the traditional Malay and religious elites even more defensive of their position and power. As a result, religious issues are excessively politicised, further deteriorating the already complicated inter-ethnic relations of the country. The prospects for achieving a democratic regime and society appear grim, although hopes have run high since the electoral rise of the multi-ethnic opposition. Adapted from the source document.

The rising antagonistic attitudes and tension between the Malay majority and ethnic and religious minorities in Malaysia since 2007 is intriguing because it has occurred when society experienced an unprecedentedly large-scale and assertive multi-ethnic pro-democracy movement. This article argues that precisely these assertive and confident civil and political societies - and their emphasis on equal rights and equitable development for all Malaysians - have put the traditional Malay and religious elites on the defensive. The pro-democracy movement and the prospects of regime change have threatened not only the party-dominant regime but also - and more importantly - the constitutional and institutional foundations of ethnic exclusivism and privileges. Moreover, two Malay-based parties, the United Malays National Organization (UMNO) and the Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS), are viewed as giving too many political concessions to the non-Malay communities to gain an electoral advantage, making the traditional Malay and religious elites even more defensive of their position and power. As a result, religious issues are excessively politicised, further deteriorating the already complicated inter-ethnic relations of the country. The prospects for achieving a democratic regime and society appear grim, although hopes have run high since the electoral rise of the multi-ethnic opposition. (JCSA/GIGA)