Suchergebnisse

The year 2010 saw advances in bilateral and multilateral initiatives to promote nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. On 8 April 2010 Russia and the United States signed the Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START), mandating further reductions in their deployed strategic nuclear forces. The treaty preserves the main elements of the expired 1991 START's comprehensive verification regime, the principal means by which Russia and the USA monitored each other's strategic nuclear forces. In the wake of New START's entry into force on 5 February 2011, there appeared to be few near-term prospects for negotiating deeper reductions of Russian-US nuclear forces. In May the eighth five-yearly Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference was widely hailed as a success when the participating states parties adopted by consensus a final document. The document contained recommendations for advancing the treaty's principles and objectives, including steps towards establishing a weapon of mass destruction-free zone in the Middle East. However, the discussions during the conference revealed continuing deep divisions among the states parties -- especially between the nuclear weapon 'haves' and 'have-nots' -- over the basic aims and goals of the NPT. These divisions cast doubt on the prospects for making progress in implementing even the modest steps endorsed in the final document. Also during 2010 the USA hosted a Nuclear Security Summit meeting that brought together heads of state and government to consider how to reduce the risk of nuclear terrorism and to increase the security of nuclear materials and facilities. While the meeting did not lead to new joint initiatives, a number of participating states announced steps to adopt or implement a number of existing conventions, agreements and measures for enhancing nuclear security and combating illicit trafficking in nuclear materials. In 2010 little progress was made towards resolving the long-running controversies over the nuclear programmes of Iran and North Korea, which have been the focus of international concerns. These concerns were heightened when North Korea revealed that it had constructed a previously undeclared uranium enrichment plant. In Iran, the IAEA remained unable to resolve questions about nuclear activities with possible military dimensions, while Iran experienced technical problems with its uranium enrichment programme. Adapted from the source document.

In October 2006 North Korea carried out a nuclear test explosion using technology and material that it had imported for peaceful purposes. The explosion, which followed a series of ballistic missile flight-tests, sent a clear message that North Korea was seeking to develop a nuclear arsenal. The test explosion was widely condemned and the United Nations Security Council responded by demanding that North Korea return to the Six-Party Talks with China, Japan, South Korea, Russia and the USA and imposing financial and trade restrictions aimed at denying North Korea access to the nuclear- and missile-related technology, equipment and expertise. In January Iran ended the voluntary suspension of its uranium enrichment program and resumed installation of gas centrifuges at the pilot enrichment plant at Natanz. The move prompted the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to refer Iran's nuclear file to the UN Security Council, which adopted a resolution in July demanding that Iran suspend all uranium enrichment-related and plutonium reprocessing activities, including research and development, subject to IAEA verification. Iran defied this demand and the Security Council adopted a new resolution in December imposing sanctions targeting Iran's nuclear and ballistic missile programmes. The controversial Indian -- US Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative -- aimed at resuming full civil nuclear co-operation between the two countries-remained in limbo at the end of 2006. In March both sides approved a plan for separating India's nuclear programme into civilian and military components. In December the US Congress approved an India-specific exemption from the 1954 Atomic Energy Act, a crucial step towards the resumption of trade in nuclear materials and technology. However, India objected to conditions imposed by the US legislation. At the Conference on Disarmament (CD), the USA submitted a draft text for a global fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT). The text did not include any provisions for an international verification mechanism, which put the USA at odds with most other CD members. Despite renewed efforts during the year, the long-delayed negotiations on a FMCT remained stalled on procedural matters. Adapted from the source document.

In 2005 the global nuclear non-proliferation regime continued to face a number of serious challenges from both inside and outside the regime. The seventh five-yearly Review Conference of the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which forms the main legal and normative foundation of the regime, ended without any substantive decisions on key treaty-related issues. The review conference highlighted deep divisions in the states parties' views about the nature of the main implementation and compliance challenges facing the NPT, particularly with respect to the question of what should be the relative balance between the treaty's disarmament and non-proliferation obligations. The conference's meagre outcome was widely seen as a lost opportunity to strengthen nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament efforts. The controversy over the scope and nature of Iran's nuclear program continued to be the subject of high-level diplomacy in 2005. The negotiations between Iran and the E3 (France, Germany and the UK) on the future of Iran's nuclear program broke down after having made little progress. The main point of contention was Iran's uranium enrichment program, which Iran had voluntarily suspended in 2004 but announced that it would restart in 2005. The E3 insisted that Iran accept a complete and permanent cessation of the program. Iran rejected this demand and reaffirmed its plans to develop a complete nuclear fuel cycle. In August 2005, Iran reactivated the uranium conversion facility located near Esfahan and subsequently declared that it would resume work on centrifuge enrichment. This led to calls from the E3 and the USA for Iran to be reported to the UN Security Council. During 2005 the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) provided further detail about Iran's failure to declare important nuclear activities as required by its comprehensive safeguards agreement with the agency. The IAEA reported that it had not found evidence of a secret Iranian military nuclear weapon program but added that it was not in a position to give credible assurances that there were no undeclared nuclear activities taking place in the country. Elsewhere, there were two new rounds held in the Six-Party Talks on North Korea's nuclear weapon programme. A Joint Statement on the principles guiding the talks issued by the parties in September was a potential breakthrough. However, it quickly became apparent that the Joint Statement left unsettled a number of key questions and points of contention that had emerged in the talks. Little subsequent progress was made towards resolving the diplomatic impasse, against the background of a hardening of the positions of both North Korea and the USA. During 2005 international concern about the dangers of nuclear material falling into the hands of non-state actors, including terrorist groups, led to growing support for measures to protect nuclear material and facilities around the globe. Progress was made in implementing the US-funded Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) programme, which is aimed at consolidating and expanding existing efforts to remove potential nuclear weapon-usable material from vulnerable sites. The parties to the 1980 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material amended the convention to make it legally binding for the parties to protect nuclear facilities and material in domestic use, transport, and storage. The convention had previously only covered material in international transport. In September, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a Nuclear Security Plan covering the period 2005-2009. The goal of the plan is to assist countries in upgrading physical protection of their nuclear material and facilities, detecting illicit nuclear trafficking across borders and improving control of radioactive sources. Adapted from the source document.

Developments in 2004 raised serious questions about the future of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and its principal legal foundation, the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT). Evidence emerged confirming the existence of a clandestine transnational network of companies and middlemen, centred around Pakistan's leading nuclear scientist, Abdul Qadeer Khan, that supplied sensitive nuclear technology and expertise to Iran and Libya and possibly to other states. This raised concern about the diffusion of nuclear weapon capabilities to non-state as well as state actors, and it spurred new initiatives aimed at preventing the illicit transfer of nuclear technologies and materials. There continued to be controversy over the nature of Iran's nuclear program, as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) provided further detail about Iran's failure to declare important nuclear activities as required by its safeguards agreement with the agency. In addition, there was little progress made in the international talks on the future of North Korea's nuclear program. These developments led to proposals for repairing perceived shortcomings in the non-proliferation regime. There was particular interest in revisiting one of the key provisions of the NPT -- the guarantee, contained in Article IV of the treaty, that non-nuclear weapon states have an 'inalienable right' to import and develop materials and technologies for use in civil nuclear energy programs. Some experts cited the North Korean and Iranian nuclear programs as evidence that Article IV creates a fundamental weakness in the NPT, in that it allows NPT parties seeking to acquire nuclear weapons to legally put in place the fuel cycle facilities needed for manufacturing these weapons under the cover of civil nuclear energy programs. Concern about closing this perceived loophole led to growing interest in the idea of limiting civil uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing programs to a handful of fully transparent nuclear fuel cycle facilities operating under multinational or international control. The implementation of the NPT regime continued to generate controversy in 2004, as the third meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 NPT Review Conference ended in deadlock. The meeting highlighted deep differences between the states parties over the issue of responding to suspected or clear-cut cases of non-compliance and the perceived lack of commitment of some parties to fulfilling their treaty obligations. The inability of the parties to produce a report containing any substantive recommendations on treaty implementation issues, or even to adopt an agenda for the 2005 Review Conference, cast doubt on the prospects for a successful outcome to the Conference. There was some important good news in 2004 for non-proliferation efforts. Libya implemented its December 2003 pledge to verifiably abandon and dismantle, under international inspection, its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missile programmes. Some observers believed that the Libyan action, following the removal of Saddam Hussein and the disclosure of Iran's nuclear programme, created a unique opportunity to make progress towards the goal of establishing a WMD-free zone in the Middle East. Adapted from the source document.

The nuclear non-proliferation regime continued to face serious challenges in 2003. Its main legal foundation, the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT), suffered a setback when North Korea became the first party to withdraw from the NPT and later announced that it had developed a nuclear weapon capability. In addition, evidence emerged that Iran had secretly pursued over several decades nuclear fuel cycle technologies with direct military applications, in contravention of its NPT-mandated safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Revelations in 2003 also highlighted the willingness of some states, or of individual scientists, to sell sensitive nuclear technologies and design expertise of the kind that Iran, Libya and North Korea are alleged to have purchased from Pakistan. These developments led to proposals for repairing perceived shortcomings in the NPT. There was particular interest in revisiting one of its key provisions: the guarantee, contained in Article IV, that non-nuclear weapon states have an 'inalienable right' to import and develop materials and technologies for use in civil nuclear energy programs. Some experts cited the North Korean and Iranian nuclear programs as evidence that Article IV creates a fundamental weakness in the NPT, in that it allows states parties seeking to acquire nuclear weapons to legally put in place the fuel cycle facilities required to manufacturing these weapons under the cover of civil nuclear energy programs. This perceived loophole led to interest in the idea of limiting uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing activities for civil nuclear programs to a handful of fully transparent nuclear fuel cycle facilities, operating under multinational control and close IAEA supervision. Iraq's suspected weapons of mass destruction program remained at the centre of international attention in the wake of the US-led military campaign to oust Saddam Hussein's regime. With regard to nuclear weapons, the main question was whether Iraq had been engaged in proscribed nuclear-related activities, as alleged by pre-war US and British intelligence reports. The accuracy of these reports -- and the process by which they had been put together -- came under increasing critical scrutiny during the year as US inspection teams failed to find evidence of a reconstituted Iraqi nuclear weapons program. In December, Libya announced that it would verifiably abandon and verifiably dismantle, under international inspection, its WMD and ballistic missile programs. Some observers perceive Libya's announcement, following the removal of Saddam Hussein and the disclosure of Iran's nuclear program, as a unique opportunity to work towards the goal of establishing a WMD-free zone in the Middle East. Adapted from the source document.

The nuclear nonproliferation regime came under growing pressure in 2002. North Korea restarted the nuclear facilities 'frozen' by the 1994 Agreed Framework & announced its withdrawal from the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty. Iran's acknowledgement of the existence of hitherto undeclared nuclear facilities fuelled suspicion about its nuclear weapon ambitions. In May, Russia & the US signed the Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty. The treaty gives the parties considerable flexibility to reduce their nuclear forces to between 1700 & 2200 warheads each by 2012 & marks a new approach to nuclear arms control. In Dec, the US announced a plan to deploy an anti-missile system to defend its territory. 2 Tables, 2 Appendixes. Adapted from the source document.

In 2001 the controversy over missile defense & the future of the 1972 ABM Treaty came to a head. President George W. Bush gave notice that the US would withdraw from the treaty in order to build a large-scale national missile defense system. Bush's announcement had been expected & elicited a restrained response from the People's Republic of China & Russia. It reflected his administration's rejection of treaty-based approaches to arms control. While 'agreeing to disagree' on missile defense, Bush & Russian President Vladimir Putin pledged to make deep cuts in strategic nuclear forces. However, there was a disagreement over whether these cuts should be made as informal initiatives or as part of a treaty. There was also a disagreement over whether all warheads removed from missiles would have to be dismantled, as advocated by Russia, or could be placed in storage. 3 Tables, 4 Appendixes. Adapted from the source document.

In 2000, the nuclear arms control agenda was dominated by the international controversy over US plans for a limited national missile defense system & its proposal to amend the 1972 ABM Treaty to permit it to deploy such a system. This dispute overshadowed the Russian Parliament's ratification of the 1993 START II Treaty & complicated US-Russian efforts to negotiate further nuclear force reductions. At the same time, there appeared to be growing interest in both countries in reducing nuclear arsenals outside the framework of traditional arms control treaties. One positive development for nuclear arms control was that the 2000 Review Conference of the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) ended with the adoption by consensus of a Final Document setting out a number of concrete nuclear disarmament goals. 10 Tables. Adapted from the source document.

In 2012 the nuclear programme of Iran remained at the centre of international concerns about the spread of nuclear weapons. Little progress was made towards resolving the long-running controversy over the scope and nature of the programme. The resumption of talks between Iran and the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council plus Germany (the 'P5+1' states) failed to break the deadlock over Iran's non-compliance with the Security Council's demands that Iran suspend all uranium enrichment and other sensitive nuclear fuel cycle activities. Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) were also unable to agree on a framework plan for addressing the IAEA's concerns that Iran had pursued nuclear activities with possible military dimensions, in contravention of its commitments under the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The impasse led to renewed calls to expand the IAEA's legal powers to investigate NPT parties suspected of violating their treaty-mandated safeguards agreements, even beyond those set out in the Model Additional Protocol. The lack of progress in these two separate but closely related sets of talks fuelled speculation that some states -- specifically, Israel or the United States -- might prioritize extra-legal measures, or even resort to the preventive use of military force, to deal with Iran's suspected nuclear weapon programme. The renewed attention to military options raised further doubts about the efficacy of international legal approaches, in particular the use of punitive economic sanctions, in dealing with suspected or known cases of states violating important arms control treaty obligations and norms. Adapted from the source document.

Russian-US nuclear arms control The momentum behind treaty-based approaches to nuclear arms control and disarmament was highlighted in 2011 by the entry into force of the 2010 Russia-USA Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START), which mandated additional reductions in the two parties' strategic offensive nuclear forces. The parties implemented on schedule the inspections, data exchanges, notifications and other measures set out in the treaty's cooperative monitoring and verification regime. In establishing this regime -- one of the treaty's main achievements -- New START continued an arms control process through which Russia and the USA have redefined their strategic relationship. There were questions about the next steps in Russian-US arms control. Both sides acknowledged that making further cuts in their nuclear arsenals would require expanding the bilateral agenda to address tactical nuclear weapons and non-deployed warheads as well as broader strategic stability issues. The most prominent of the latter related to ballistic missile defence, which was the focus of an intensifying dispute in 2011. There was also recognition that deeper cuts in their respective strategic nuclear arsenals would require bringing the three other nuclear weapon states recognized by the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) into a multilateral nuclear arms-reduction process. Adapted from the source document.