Suchergebnisse

AbstractA significant increase in the number of arrivals of refugees and migrants in Europe along the Western Balkans route brought several Balkan countries into the spotlight of international refugee protection in 2015 and 2016. Out of hundreds of thousands of refugees and migrants recorded entering the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Serbia, only a handful remained to seek asylum from their authorities. Under the circumstances, the applicability of the 1951 Refugee Convention with respect to refugees refraining from seeking asylum was brought into question, as well as the extent of transit countries' legal obligations under refugee law. Based on the Western Balkans experience, the present article seeks to re-examine the relationship between the concept of asylum and the regime of the 1951 Refugee Convention, the Convention's scope of application in "transit countries", and minimal standards stemming from positive law regarding the treatment of refugees and migrants in a transit context.

In spite of the fact that international law has proclaimed that outer space is to be used for peaceful purposes, States continue to expand their military capacity beyond the bounds of the Earth's atmosphere. Recent testing of anti-satellite weaponry is a cause for concern that the term 'peaceful uses' is losing its meaning in an increasingly militarized outer space environment. The problem certainly stems from the fact that space law does not explicitly define said uses, thereby allowing States to provide a legal justification for their actions. This article will examine existing space law, as well as general international law, in an attempt to flesh out a more substantial meaning for the most oft-abused provisions of the relevant treaties in three distinct sections: first, we shall explore the notion of 'peaceful uses' as a general term; we shall proceed with an analysis of the prohibition of stationing weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) in outer space; finally, we shall see how the Liability Convention may be read as limiting States' potential advantages from militarizing space.

AbstractRichard Baxter famously stated that "the first line of defence against international humanitarian law is to deny that it applies at all". While "under-classification" remains an issue today, a parallel trend needs to be acknowledged. This is the tendency to over-classify situations of violence, especially in relation to transnational terrorist organizations such as the so-called Islamic State group or Al-Qaeda. This tendency stems from practical difficulties inherent in the changing operational environment. The last few years have witnessed a proliferation of armed non-State actors that are labelled or designated as terrorists (e.g., in Iraq, Syria, Mali, Nigeria and Yemen). Terrorist groups are characterized by opaque, often volatile organizational structures and tend to operate in decentralized networks rather than clear hierarchies. The formation of splinter groups, changing alliances, temporary reunification and even open hostility among former allies are common phenomena. This complex factual situation has led to the proliferation of theories of conflict classification, many of them arguing in favour of more flexible classification via the loosening of existing standards. Because international humanitarian law is in many respects less protective than international human rights law, particularly regarding the rules on the use of force and detention, classifying a situation of violence as an armed conflict when the threshold has not been met is a problem that should not be underestimated. In this article, we revisit the criteria of intensity and organization, as well as the related matter of the role of motives in conflict classification, considering conflicts involving armed groups described as terrorists. Our goal is to identify minimum requirements that could diminish the risk of over-classification by various stakeholders.

Abstract
The use of social network analysis (SNA) during the War on Terror has been a topic of significant political and academic discourse. SNA is an empirical method that graphically and mathematically represents interactions or relationships between nodes (eg, individuals, organizations) and the ties that connect them. The nature and degree of interdependence among nodes are believed to provide insights into the relationships and behaviour of members within a social network. The scarcity of precise and comprehensive data on the structure, functioning, and activities of terrorist groups has prompted some states to incorporate SNA into their intelligence efforts and rely on its data for counterterrorism activities, including lethal operations. However, the compatibility of SNA with international law remains underexplored. In this article, we adopt a legal-empirical approach to elucidate SNA in accessible terms and examine the challenges it presents for international law. We contend that SNA is fundamentally incompatible with international humanitarian law (IHL) targeting rules, as the data it provides do not pertain to legally relevant criteria. Nevertheless, SNA offers valuable insights for IHL by illuminating intra-group dynamics to facilitate conflict classification, identifying legally relevant characteristics in armed groups' internal networks, and determining the strength of relations between armed factions. Our findings underscore the importance of a nuanced understanding of SNA's applications and limitations in the context of international law.