Suchergebnisse

Purpose
Taking advantage of a unique measure of corporate culture obtained from advanced machine learning algorithms, this study aims to explore how corporate culture strength is influenced by board independence, which is one of the most crucial aspects of the board of directors. Because of their independence from the corporation, outside independent directors are more likely to be unbiased. As a result, board independence is commonly used as a proxy for board quality.

Design/methodology/approach
In addition to the standard regression analysis, the authors execute a variety of additional tests, i.e. propensity score matching, an instrumental variable analysis, Lewbel's (2012) heteroscedastic identification and Oster's (2019) testing for coefficient stability.

Findings
The results show that stronger board independence, measured by a higher proportion of independent directors, is significantly associated with corporate culture. In particular, a rise in board independence by one standard deviation results in an improvement in corporate culture by 32.8%.

Originality/value
Conducting empirical research on corporate culture is incredibly difficult due to the inherent difficulties in recognizing and assessing corporate culture, resulting in a lack of empirical research on corporate culture in the literature. The authors fill this important void in the literature. Exploiting a novel measure of corporate culture based on textual analysis, to the best of the authors' knowledge, this study is the first to link corporate culture to corporate governance with a specific focus on board independence.

AbstractDespite the growing importance of responsible behavior in the healthcare sector, research on corporate social responsibility (CSR) in association with board structure is scarce. Hence, the objective of this study is twofold: (1) to test whether a board structure is associated with firm financial and CSR performance and (2) whether the CSR committee and CEO duality moderates this association in the healthcare sector. Examining the moderation of CSR committee is important to understand whether CSR committee strengthens or weakens the link between female directors and CSR performance. Moreover, CEO duality's moderation will highlight whether powerful CEOs are a barrier for female directors' monitoring role. The data for the study was derived from the Thomson Reuters Eikon database for the years between 2011–2018. Overall, the results suggest that while female directors contribute to firm performance, CEOs with dual roles and larger boards harm firm performance. Further, independent directors have a limited contribution to CSR performance whereas they have no contribution to financial performance. Moderation analysis shows that CSR committees and female directors are not the replacement of one another; they are both needed and beneficial to the corporate structure. Although CEOs with a dual role impair the performance of a firm, they do not exert considerable influence on the other directors. As one of the important functions of a board is monitoring, these findings assist healthcare firms to configure their boards to improve their monitoring functions. The results are therefore helpful in terms of alleviating agency costs and in appeasing stakeholders.

PurposeTheory suggests that the market for corporate control, which constitutes an important external governance mechanism, may substitute for internal governance. Consistent with this notion, using a novel measure of takeover vulnerability primarily based on state legislation, this paper aims to investigate the effect of the takeover market on board characteristics with special emphasis on board gender diversity.Design/methodology/approachThis paper exploits a novel measure of takeover vulnerability based on state legislation. This novel measure is likely exogenous as the legislation was imposed from outside the firm. By using an exogenous measure, the analysis is less vulnerable to endogeneity and is thus more likely to show a causal effect.FindingsThe results show that a more active takeover market leads to lower board gender diversity. Specifically, a rise in takeover vulnerability by one standard deviation results in a decline in board gender diversity by 10.01%. Moreover, stronger takeover market susceptibility also brings about larger board size and less board independence, corroborating the substitution effect. Additional analysis confirms the results, including propensity score matching, generalized method of moments dynamic panel data analysis and instrumental variable analysis.Originality/valueThe study is the first to explore the effect of the takeover market on board gender diversity. Unlike most of the previous research in this area, which suffers from endogeneity, this paper uses a novel measure of takeover vulnerability that is probably exogenous. The results are thus much more likely to demonstrate causality.

Purpose
Exploiting two novel measures of takeover vulnerability and asset redeployability, this paper aims to investigate the effect of the takeover market on redeployable assets. Redeployable assets are those with alternative uses. Asset redeployability is a crucial concept in the literature on investment irreversibility.


Design/methodology/approach
In addition to the standard regression analysis, the authors execute several robustness checks: propensity score matching, entropy balancing, instrumental-variable analysis and generalized method of moment dynamic panel data analysis.


Findings
The authors' results reveal that more takeover threats reduce asset redeployability significantly, corroborating the managerial myopia hypothesis. Hostile takeover threats reduce managers' job security and thus induce them to myopically focus on the current utilization of assets in the short run, rather than how they may be deployed in the long run, resulting in less asset redeployability.


Originality/value
To the best of the authors' knowledge, this study is the first to investigate the effect of takeover threats on asset redeployability. Because the authors' measure of takeover vulnerability is principally based on the staggered passage of state legislations, which are plausibly exogenous, the authors' results likely reflect causality, rather than merely an association.