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As the invention of fundamental new sciences spawns subsequent research, discovery, and commercialization, core technologies branch into new applications and markets. Some of them evolve over time into many derived technologies, whereas others are essentially "dead ends." The pattern of evolution and branching is called a "technological trajectory." An intriguing question is whether some firms can ride the trajectory by developing proprietary experience in a "platform technology." Because the knowledge is proprietary, firms that originate in industrial fields based on a platform technology acquire the technological skills to diversify and to mimic the branching of the underlying technological trajectory. The ability to compete in hypercompetitive markets depends on the acquisition of know-how that is applicable to a wide set of market opportunities. Such capabilities serve as platforms into quickly evolving markets. To respond rapidly to market changes, a firm must have already acquired fundamental competitive knowledge. In a high-technology industry, such knowledge invariably is derived from experience with the underlying science and related technological fields. The authors examine capabilities as platforms by analyzing the temporal sequence of diversification as contingent on market opportunities and previous experience. The pattern of diversification of firms reflects the evolutionary branching of underlying technologies. In that sense, the aggregate decisions of firms are driven by the technological trajectories common across an industrial sector. Certain technologies have wider technological and market opportunities, and consequently experience in those technologies serves as a platform for expansion. The authors propose that a firm's experience in platform technologies increases the likelihood of diversification when environmental opportunities are favorable. The proposition is tested with the sample of 176 semiconductor startup companies founded between 1977 and 1989. Evidence from multidimensional scaling of expert opinion and from an analysis of patent records was gathered to identity relatedness among subfields and the evolutionary direction of the technologies. A discrete hazard model is specified to estimate the effect of technological histories on subsequent diversification. The results confirm the relationship between relatedness and directionality of technologies and the industrial path of diversification. The finding that diversification depends on technological experience and market opportunity has important implications for firms' entry decisions. The authors discuss those implications by describing experience as generating options on future opportunities and distinguishing between the historical path by which the stock of knowledge is accumulated and the path by which new knowledge is generated and commercialized.

A number of well-known studies report that between one-third and two-thirds of international joint ventures eventually break up. While many generalizations, explanations, and prescriptions have been based on these statistics, their meaning is unclear. First, all foreign affiliates are subject to normal business risk, and to the risk that they will be divested by parents for strategic or financial reasons. Are these risks higher for joint ventures than for wholly-owned subsidiaries? Second, joint ventures may be shorter lived not because of their joint venture status, but because affiliates which are joint ventured have other characteristics that make them more likely to exit. To know whether joint ventures are shorter lived, one must control for the other factors that affect the longevity of affiliates, whether wholly-owned or joint ventured. Third, many joint ventures contracts contain clauses that allow partners to sell their stakes to one another at specific intervals. Because they make exit easier, joint ventures should have shorter lives, but these shorter lives should only be due to selloffs, not to liquidations. It is therefore important to see whether the supposedly higher termination rate of joint ventures stakes is due to a higher rate of selloffs or to a higher rate of liquidations.In this paper we (1) compare the longevity of stakes in joint ventures versus those in wholly-owned subsidiaries (2) while controlling for other factors that affect the longevity of such stakes and (3) while distinguishing between two types of exit, those through sale and those through liquidation. While past authors have addressed these three issues in piecemeal fashion, we believe we are the first to address them simultaneously. We analyze the factors that affect the longevity of 355 Japanese stakes in U.S. manufacturing affiliates. Controlling for all the factors that affect exit rates, we find that Japanese parents are more likely to terminate their stakes in U.S. joint ventures than in wholly-owned subsidiaries. This higher termination rate of joint venture stakes is explained by a higher probability of selling them, but not of liquidating them. Most of the other factors that have been found significant in explaining gross divestment of foreign affiliates do in fact only affect exits through sales, but not exits through liquidations. Hence it is true that joint ventures have shorter lives, but dangerous to interpret this finding as necessarily meaning that they are more likely to "fail".

The effects of strategic order of entry on firms' performance have long been an issue in many areas of study. Past research efforts, however, have been concentrated mostly on first mover or early entrant advantages. To contribute to developing a theory of latecomer strategies, the authors investigate how latecomers compete successfully or even leapfrog early movers. They review previous studies on early mover advantages and disadvantages, and group the sources of such advantages or disadvantages into three areas: the firm, its market, and its competitors. The theoretical focus is how a firm converts the opportunities stemming from entry order into performance. The authors seek to confirm and extend relevant theories by examining how late entrants have caught up with incumbent industry leaders in the global semiconductor industry. On the basis of in-depth case analysis of three Japanese and three Korean semiconductor companies, they identify and categorize successful latecomer strategies into two types: strategies for overcoming latecomer disadvantages and strategies for utilizing latecomer advantages. Focusing, thin margin or loss bearing, and volume building form the essence of strategies for overcoming disadvantages, whereas odd timing, time compression, human-embodied technology transfer, benchmarking, technological leapfrogging, and resource leveraging form the essence of strategies for utilizing advantages. Because many companies in Asia have had to face the reality of being latecomers, the Asian perspectives are particularly useful for studying and explicating latecomer strategies.