Suchergebnisse

AbstractThis paper considers a mixed duopoly two‐sided market of platforms in which a private firm competes with a public firm in a linear city model with fixed demand of full coverage. We examine whether prices of platforms are lower in the mixed duopoly market than in the standard pure duopoly market in which two private firms compete. We show that introducing a public competitor may or may not induce lower prices of the private platform than introducing a private firm, depending on the quality of the public platform service. In particular, if the quality of the public platform is superior, the prices of the platforms are lower than when it competes with the private rival, whereas they are higher if the quality is lower. We also show that the private firm invests more than the public firm. This has the policy implication that maintaining lower platform prices by introducing a competing public platform will not be sustainable in the long run.

AbstractThe conventional wisdom is that an incumbent can deter the rival firm's entry by costly limit pricing but cannot deter entry by a costless signal, so‐called cheap talk. In this short paper, we show that an incumbent can deter entry of a potential competitor by cheap talk if there is another potential entrant producing complementary goods. In equilibrium, which is partially revealing, the incumbent can use publicly observable cheap talk that can deter entry of the rival firm with some positive probability.

In this paper, we examine relations among various refinements of a perfect equilibrium. First, we compare two refinements of a perfect equilibrium, a strictly perfect equilibrium (SPE) and a truly perfect equilibrium (TPE). We show that true perfectness implies strict perfectness and even strict properness. We also introduce the concept of a restrictive perfect equilibrium allowing only some or all sequences of totally mixed strategies satisfying a certain property. A proper equilibrium is an example of a restrictive perfect equilibrium. Then, true perfectness imposing the most severe robustness against perturbations implies any restrictive perfectness. This proves that every TPE is proper.

In this paper, we consider an experience composite good, each of whose components is produced by independent firms sharing the information about the quality. We obtain two main results. First, if the production costs are equal across qualities, the undistorted equilibrium is the unique unprejudiced separating equilibrium. Furthermore, in a pooling equilibrium, low‐type firms are able to coordinate their prices upwards to be pooled with high‐type firms. Second, if the production costs differ across qualities, no (universally divine) pooling equilibrium exists and the undistorted equilibrium is the unique unprejudiced, universally divine equilibrium. The implication of our results is that high quality is signaled by high but undistorted prices in the case of experience composite goods, contrary to the case of single experience goods.

I consider a two‐dimensional job market signaling model in which firms care about a worker's personal network as well as his technical productivity, and a worker can choose both academic activity and social activity to signal his ability. In a simple model where the social activity forming a social network does not require special ability, I show that the Cho–Kreps intuitive criterion singles out Spence's outcome of signaling high academic ability by high education. I also demonstrate the possibility that a worker with high academic ability may underinvest in education when the social ability is correlated with the academic ability.

This paper investigates the possibility of signal jamming in games with multiple informed parties whose interests are conflicting. The possibility that signal jamming occurs in equilibrium depends on the observability of individual signals. Paradoxically, if the receiver can observe individual signals perfectly, signal jamming can occur in equilibrium, while it cannot occur if the receiver can observe only the one-dimensional signal synthesized from the senders' individual actions.