Enduring trade disputes: disguised protectionism and duration and recurrence of international trade disputes
In: The review of international organizations, Volume 11, Issue 3, p. 283-310
ISSN: 1559-7431
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In: The review of international organizations, Volume 11, Issue 3, p. 283-310
ISSN: 1559-7431
World Affairs Online
In: The review of international organizations, Volume 11, Issue 3, p. 283-310
ISSN: 1559-744X
In: APSA 2013 Annual Meeting Paper
SSRN
Working paper
In: International Studies Quarterly, Volume 56, Issue 4, p. 704-719
In: International studies quarterly: the journal of the International Studies Association, Volume 56, Issue 4
ISSN: 1468-2478
Do fair trade PTAs-trade agreements that contain provisions for protection of labor rights-lead to improvements in labor protection in PTA partner states? If so, how do the PTAs bring about such improvements? I argue that trade partner states are likely to engage in ex ante due diligence and improve the protection of labor rights at home before they sign or even enter into negotiations for a PTA. Given that large developed economies have increasingly placed value on strong labor protection, trade partners of these economies act on the belief that, holding other factors constant, having stronger labor protection will increase their attractiveness as a potential or a prospective PTA partner. I test this argument in the context of the United States and its trade partners between 1982 and 2005. The evidence shows that trade partner states indeed are much more likely to improve labor protection (i) prior to the 2002 Trade Act publicizing the importance of labor protection and (ii) prior to signing a PTA with the United States. Adapted from the source document.
In: World politics: a quarterly journal of international relations, Volume 64, Issue 3, p. 426-475
ISSN: 1086-3338
Member states of the GATT/WTO have linked some issue-areas outside trade to the institution and did so with varying depths. At the same time they have chosen not to link other issue-areas. What accounts for this variation? The author argues that states establish a legalized linkage between the GATT/WTO and an issue-area outside it when they are uncertain about the possibilities of disguised protectionism. Such uncertainty exists under two conditions: when diversity in regulations in an issue-area across states generates a large adverse impact on trade (negative externalities) but that diversity can be justified at the international level for (1) having an independent objective apart from hampering trade and (2) when there are few alternative policies to achieve that objective (legitimacy). States establish a highly legalized linkage in these situations to reduce the uncertainty and minimize disguised protectionism. By contrast, when regulatory diversity exhibits low legitimacy, states establish only a weakly legalized linkage. In the absence of meaningful externalities, they do not establish any linkages. The author evaluates this argument in two ways. He provides an overview of eleven issue-areas about which there have been some debates or conflicts about linkages to the GATT/WTO. In addition, he carries out in-depth case studies of three issue-areas—labor standards, environmental standards, and health safety standards. The findings of this article contribute to a better understanding of international institutions and cooperation as well as of the evolution of the multilateral trade institution.
In: World politics: a quarterly journal of international relations, Volume 64, Issue 3, p. 426-475
ISSN: 0043-8871
Member states of the gatt/wto have linked some issue-areas outside trade to the institution and did so with varying depths. At the same time they have chosen not to link other issue-areas. What accounts for this variation? The author argues that states establish a legalized linkage between the gatt/wto and an issue-area outside it when they are uncertain about the possibilities of disguised protectionism. Such uncertainty exists under two conditions: when diversity in regulations in an issue-area across states generates a large adverse impact on trade (negative externalities) but that diversity can be justified at the international level for (1) having an independent objective apart from hampering trade and (2) when there are few alternative policies to achieve that objective (legitimacy). States establish a highly legalized linkage in these situations to reduce the uncertainty and minimize disguised protectionism. By contrast, when regulatory diversity exhibits low legitimacy, states establish only a weakly legalized linkage. In the absence of meaningful externalities, they do not establish any linkages. The author evaluates this argument in two ways. He provides an overview of eleven issue-areas about which there have been some debates or conflicts about linkages to the gatt/wto. In addition, he carries out in-depth case studies of three issue-areas - labor standards, environmental standards, and health safety standards. The findings of this article contribute to a better understanding of international institutions and cooperation as well as of the evolution of the multilateral trade institution. (World Politics / SWP)
World Affairs Online
In: APSA 2012 Annual Meeting Paper
SSRN
Working paper
In: International studies quarterly: the journal of the International Studies Association, Volume 56, Issue 4, p. 704-719
ISSN: 0020-8833, 1079-1760
In: APSA 2011 Annual Meeting Paper
SSRN
Working paper
In: APSA 2009 Toronto Meeting Paper
SSRN
Working paper
In: International studies quarterly: the journal of the International Studies Association, Volume 52, Issue 3, p. 657-686
ISSN: 1468-2478
In: The SAIS review of international affairs / the Johns Hopkins University, the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Volume 28, Issue 2, p. 141-153
ISSN: 1945-4716
World Affairs Online
In: International studies quarterly: the journal of the International Studies Association, Volume 52, Issue 3, p. 657-686
ISSN: 0020-8833, 1079-1760
World Affairs Online
In: SAIS Review, Volume 28, Issue 2, p. 141-153
Actors ranging from activists & scholars to policy-makers & politicians claim that many international organizations, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), suffer from a democratic deficit, lack of accountability, & illegitimacy. This article argues that these contestations have increased because of rising interdependence & the constrained structure of international governance. High interdependence generates policy spillover effects, but international organizations -- arranged in discrete policy domains -- lack the ability to make tradeoffs necessary to contain the spillovers. Popular mobilization against these organizations results when actors adversely affected by the spillovers are left out of the policymaking process. Based on this explanation of the phenomena, the article generates several policy options that the United States can pursue to restore stability & effectiveness to the international governance system. Adapted from the source document.