Suchergebnisse

Who designs? : power and the design of the General Agreement -- Critical moments and institutional resilience -- Power and politics in the GATT : the effects on trade, 1950-1994 / with Joanne Gowa -- A matter of timing : WTO accession and international trade

AbstractThis paper analyzes the impact of investment commitments in preferential trade agreements (PTAs) on multinational firms' production networks. The analysis tests the hypothesis that strong investment commitments in PTAs encourage multinational firms to locate affiliates in agreement partners. Agreement countries are desirable locations for MNCS' production networks because PTAs reduce the costs of information concerning the host countries, provide a common regulatory framework for investment by way of the PTA, and embed investment in a larger package of trade liberalization that facilitates cross‐border movement of intermediate goods. The study employs an original dataset of investment provisions in PTAs that measures the liberalization, protection, and integration in investment activities, and another on the location of multinational firms' subsidiaries. An analysis of 317 PTAs supports the main hypothesis: strong investment commitments in PTAs are associated with a higher number of common MNC affiliates among partner countries, controlling for a host of political and economic factors. This paper contributes to the scholarship on multinational firms' behavior in the post‐agreement phase of PTAs and more broadly on the mapping of trade agreement provisions in key areas of global production.

Squid Game, a Netflix original series about children's games turned into deathmatches, has become a phenomenal global success and has captivated the latest cultural and media scenes. This article examines the representation of games in Squid Game to argue that their unprecedented appeal to the masses derives from a paradoxical human desire for ruthless competition and moral cooperation. That is, while Squid Game presents a superb allegory of the degree to which contemporary game playing is driven by consumer capitalism, it simultaneously unfolds a moving drama in the midst of competition where unanticipated team spirit is kindled and underdogs win against all odds. Focusing on a dialectic between result-oriented competition and utopian cooperation, the article concludes that the huge popularity of Squid Game demonstrates the contemporary spectator's need for a hybrid entertainment when watching games.

Reciprocal trade agreements (RTAs) have proliferated rapidly in Asia in recent years, an unprecedented phenomenon in a region in which state-led institution-building efforts were largely unsuccessful during the Cold War years. In this article, we investigate the qualitative provisions of RTAs in Asia, focusing on agreements that are professedly geared toward trade liberalization through reciprocal exchanges of trade concessions. We build on the concept of credible commitment—that states "tie their hands" through international agreements and thus signal strong commitment to trade liberalization. We argue that a broad range of agreement provisions will affect an RTA's ability to achieve its primary objective: trade liberalization. We present a coding scheme that measures the strength of a wide variety of provisions in the legal texts of RTAs. Using quantitative analysis, we analyze the impact of various components of Asia's RTAs on participants' trade flows.

Using data on bilateral trade flows from both before and after World War II, this article examines the impact of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade on trade between its members and on the system of interwar trade blocs. It shows that the distribution of the benefits produced by the GATT was much more highly skewed than conventional wisdom assumes. The article also shows that the gold, Commonwealth, Reichsmark, and exchange-control blocs exerted positive and significant effects on trade after 1945. The authors attribute these effects to the bargaining protocol that governed successive rounds of GATT negotiations, the signature element of the postwar trade regime.

Using data on bilateral trade flows from both before and after World War II, this article examines the impact of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade on trade between its members and on the system of interwar trade blocs. It shows that the distribution of the benefits produced by the GATT was much more highly skewed than conventional wisdom assumes. The article also shows that the gold, Commonwealth, Reichsmark, and exchange-control blocs exerted positive and significant effects on trade after 1945. The authors attribute these effects to the bargaining protocol that governed successive rounds of GATT negotiations, the signature element of the postwar trade regime. (World Politics / SWP)