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A review essay on a book by Andrew L. Johns, Vietnam's Second Front: Domestic Politics, the Republican Party, and the War (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2010).

Although associated with post-World War I Germany, the stab-in-the-back perspective is a common cultural response to defeat in war. An American, post-Vietnam War version maintains that the military could have won the war but for the activities of Democratic presidents, Congress, civilian strategists, the press, and antiwar protesters. The roots of the legend lie in arch-conservative assumptions, partisanship, wartime right-wing criticism of Lyndon Johnson's war, militant cold war attitudes, and attempts of purveyors of the myth to defend failed policies and strategies and to counter the "Vietnam syndrome." Seriously flawed historically, logically, and empirically regarding the possibility of victory and the role of the press and the antiwar movement, the stab-in-the-back argument nevertheless enjoys partial public acceptance because of the influence of its proponents and also because it is an essential component of a larger myth: the "Lost Cause."

Prelude: nuclear diplomacy and notions about nuclear use from Truman to Johnson, August 1945-January 1969 -- The madman theory: Mr. Nixon, Dr. Kissinger, and Dr. Strangelove, 1945-1969 -- The "big game" and the bombing of Cambodia, December 1968-March 1969 -- The Vance ploy and the Mining ruse, March-April 1969 -- The Mining ruse, threat diplomacy, peace plans, and withdrawals, April-July 1969 -- The first Duck Hook Plan, the "Nixon Doctrine," and a deadline, July-August 1969 -- Toward the November option: Duck Hook and Pruning Knife, July-September 1969 -- To escalate or not to escalate? September-October 1969 -- The secret nuclear alert, October 1969 -- Epilogue: aftermaths and assessments