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Als-Ob-Kriegsführung bedeutet, dass irgendeinem unerwünschten Phänomen wie Verbrechen, Armut, Drogen, illegale Immigration, Terrorismus politisch der Krieg erklärt wird. In immergleicher Weise wird diese Kriegserklärung von den Amtsinhabern des Weißen Hauses seit Anfang des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts strategisch eingesetzt. In diesem Arbeitspapier wird diese Strategie untersucht und der dreifachen Anziehungskraft nachgegangen, die ein derartiges kriegsähnliches Vorgehen für den Präsidenten hat. Erstens kann die politische Exekutive so das große Problem überwinden, dass sich der amerikanischen Regierung immer in den Weg stellt: die Gewaltenteilung. Einem Problem den Als-Ob-Krieg zu erklären bedeutet, es wird zum 'öffentlichen Feind Nummer eins' und jede Koordinierung des Regierungshandelns und Ausweitung staatlichen Tuns zielt auf seine Beseitigung. Zweitens bietet eine solche Kriegserklärung ein Mittel, um der Beamtenschaft und den politischen Hauptentscheidungsträgern eine einzigartige Priorität zu signalisieren; so lässt sich eine Neuverteilung der knappen allgemeinen Betriebsmittel hin zur neuen Priorität bewirken. Drittens ermöglicht es diese Strategie einem Präsidenten, überhaupt eine politische Rangordnung durchzusetzen und nationale Gestaltungsansprüche des Regierens in einer politischen Kultur auszuweiten, die einem Tätigwerden des Bundesstaates an sich von Anfang an feindlich gegenübersteht.

Spanning the entire twentieth century and encompassing immigration policies, the nationalistic fallout from both world wars, the civil rights movement, and nation-building efforts in the postcolonial era, this work advances a major interpretation of American nationalism and the future prospects for diverse democracies

Spanning the 20th century and encompassing immigration policies the nationalistic fallout from both World Wars, the civil rights movement, and nation-building efforts in the postcolonial era 'The Liberty of Strangers' advances a new interpretation of American nationalism and the future prospects for diverse democracies

In the twenty years after 1945 both the United States and Britain created public funding regimes for social science, through the National Science Foundation (NSF) and the Social Science Research Council (SSRC) respectively. The historical and political contexts in which these institutions were founded differed, but the assumptions about social science concurred. This article uses archival sources to explain this comparative pattern. It is argued that the political context in both countries played a key role in the development of the two research agencies. In each country the need politically to stress the neutrality of social research - though for different reasons in each case - produced a bias towards positivist scientific methodology, untempered by ideology. This propensity created the trajectory upon which each country's public funding regime rests. (British Journal of Political Science / FUB)

President Jimmy Carter twice attempted to enact major reforms of the US welfare system. Using archival material from the Carter Presidential Library, this article argues that one major reason for the failure of both initiatives was the persistence of regional divisions between representatives from the north and south in the Congress. This factor is as germane to the welfare failure as poor presidential-congressional relations and changes to the committee seniority system in the Congress. American welfare programmes were institutionalized in such a way that, from the 1930s, building a coalition across sectional interests (as represented by members of the Congress) was nearly impossible: gains ot one region constituted losses to the other. The consequence of the way Carter pursued and failed to achieve welfare reform was to enhance the priorities, particulary 'working for welfare', exploited by Reagan in the final year of his administration when the Family Support Act was enacted. (British Journal of Political Science / FUB)

Despite the growth in government spending upon training programmes under the Conservatives, this policy remains understudied in the literature on Thatcherism. To explain this policy the author identifies four, New Right-based, components of the Conservatives' training objectives: the weakening of trade unions and the apprenticeship system; linking the receipt of unemployment benefits with participation in training or work activity; advantaging employer preferences in the implementation of training programmes; minimising government intervention and acting only in response to unemployment. The author argues that these aims have been developed in a way consistent with neoliberal principles. The Conservatives have effected a shift from a national tripartite regime to a local, employer-dominated neoliberal training regime.