Suchergebnisse

This dissertation examines how two common types of market disruptions, technology-induced and government-induced disruptions, influence inequality. Specifically, it investigates how the spread of computers and the transition to capitalism are related to wage differentials and gender earnings differentials, respectively. Compared to prior work, this dissertation focuses particularly on how these disruptions influence inequality in heterogeneous ways across birth cohorts as well as between and within work establishments, using unconditional quantile regression and fixed effects regression. Results suggest that the spread of computers was related to greater inequality among older cohorts across the wage distribution in (West) Germany over time. Whereas computerization appears to have affected older cohorts more strongly, market transformation in Slovenia coincided with a greater rise in gender earnings inequality and changes to the organization of gender inequality in the labor market among younger cohorts. Furthermore, although results provide little indication of a causal effect of computers on establishment-level inequality, computer investments tend to be higher in workplaces with greater heterogeneity in pay. Investments in computer technologies may also slightly contribute to between-establishment inequality in the long term, while appearing to have no long-term influence on within-establishment inequality. Overall, this dissertation highlights how disruptions shape inequality in nuanced ways and that cohorts and workplaces represent important structural boundaries that determine this effect.

This paper studies a new phenomenon, the 'top to bottom' corruption networks of organized crime, law enforcement and Government officials in Russia. We examine the Soviet roots of corruption and its transformation during transitional period. By focusing on contemporary Russian corruption networks this paper explores the complex of state-run oligarchic structure with established rates, well organized inter-institutional groups incorporated by common ideas of extracting profits. The danger is in the existence of extensive and stable corruption networks, which not only profit by their illegal activities between Organized Crime groups and Law Enforcements, but invest in further corrupt developments to control the government. We argue that corruption in Russia, for a long time, has been imbedded in the system of social relations and, by the majority of citizens, was not considered to be a crime. Presenting arguments against existing simplified understanding of corruption, this study elucidates corruption networks as an expansion of Organized Crime in all spheres of post-totalitarian Russia. It also shows that a magic circle of corruption closely intertwines with the inefficiency of power and the inefficiency of rule of law.

This paper studies a new phenomenon, the 'top to bottom' corruption networks of organized crime, law enforcement and Government officials in Russia. We examine the Soviet roots of corruption and its transformation during transitional period. By focusing on contemporary Russian corruption networks this paper explores the complex of state-run oligarchic structure with established rates, well organized inter-institutional groups incorporated by common ideas of extracting profits. The danger is in the existence of extensive and stable corruption networks, which not only profit by their illegal activities between Organized Crime groups and Law Enforcements, but invest in further corrupt developments to control the government. We argue that corruption in Russia, for a long time, has been imbedded in the system of social relations and, by the majority of citizens, was not considered to be a crime. Presenting arguments against existing simplified understanding of corruption, this study elucidates corruption networks as an expansion of Organized Crime in all spheres of post- totalitarian Russia. It also shows that a magic circle of corruption closely intertwines with the inefficiency of power and the inefficiency of rule of law. [Copyright 2007 The Regents of the University of California; published by Elsevier Ltd.]