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Paternalism is an attempt to influence individuals' decisions for their own benefit, even if there are no third parties involved. This seems to contradict normative individualism, which provides the general orientation to our modern democracies. Soft or libertarian paternalism accepts the necessity of paternalism due to the existence of behavioural anomalies, but intends to apply only such measures that do not restrict the decision leeway of individuals. Nevertheless, the same objections that can be raised against its strong version can also be raised against soft paternalism. On the other hand, as soon as we accept that human beings are able to reflect not only about their actions but also about the preferences guiding their actions, there is no longer a necessary contradiction between paternalism and normative individualism. As far as we know today, the possibilities to successfully apply soft paternalistic measures are rather limited. On the other hand, while some criticisms of it are justified, others largely overshoot the mark and seem to be at least partly ideologically motivated.

First the assumption of self-interest as applied in Economics is presented. Here we also discuss areas in which (many) people behave less self- but more other-regarding than traditional economic models assume. Then, greedy behaviour is considered as existing in the political and economic "world". Here we refer to corruption as well as to the role of money as a positional good. We also discuss such behaviour in the academic world, in which money plays a role as well as reputation. Thus, while the assumption of mutually disinterested rationality is a very powerful instrument for analysing individual behaviour, to explain some phenomena we have to recognise that people are not only sometimes other-regarding, but also sometimes greedy, and that they might value money much more than traditional Economics assumes. We conclude with some remarks on what we can learn in this respect from Behavioural Economics.

We first show three major disagreements among today's leading economists: the minimum wage, the effects of large government debt and the politics of the European Central Bank. Using a prominent and highly relevant example, the possible deterrent effect of death penalty, we demonstrate how political convictions can have an impact on the results of empirical research even if the most advanced statistical methods are applied. Then we deal with three different approaches to analyse the process of political advice: the traditional approach, the Public Choice approach and the Political Economy of Scientific Advice. Contrary to the two others, the latter consistently applies the economic model of behaviour to all agents of this game: economic agents, politicians, but also scientists as political advisors. We then deal with the process of policy advice; the main scope is to show how this process has to be organised in order to allow for at least some objectivity, even if advisors are politically biased. To understand (and perhaps even improve) this process, the economic model of behaviour should be applied to all agents; a 'new' economic theory is not necessary.

In 2007, the Wall Street Journal published an article claiming that each execution saves more than 70 lives. This example is used to show how easy it is, using simple or advanced econometric techniques, to produce results that do or do not support the deterrence hypothesis. Moreover, we also point to some puzzles which have not been satisfactorily solved so far. We then present a critical survey of the papers published in the last ten years. It is shown how simple changes can produce quite different results using the same data. Finally, we draw some conclusions about the usefulness of statistical arguments in policy debates, but also on the moral questions involved in this particular debate.

Using Swiss data from 1983 to 2008, this paper investigates whether growth rates of the different measures of the quantity of money and or excess money can be used to forecast inflation. After a preliminary data analysis, money demand relations are specified, estimated and tested. Then, employing error correction models, measures of excess money are derived. Using recursive estimates, indicator properties of monetary aggregates for inflation are assessed for the period from 2000 onwards, with time horizons of one, two, and three years. In these calculations, M2 and M3 clearly outperform M1, and excess money is generally a better predictor than the quantity of money. Taking into account also the most (available) recent observations that represent the first three quarters of the economic crisis, the money demand function of M3 remains stable while the one for M2 is strongly influenced by these three observations. While in both cases forecasts for 2010 show inflation rates inside the target zone between zero and two percent, and the same holds for forecasts based on M3 for 2011, forecasts based on M2 provide evidence that the upper limit of this zone might be violated in 2011.

Up to now there was a general conviction that increasing unemployment and inflation have a negative impact on the government's popularity. This was true for Germany as well, but it does not seem to hold any longer. This paper first reviews the results of earlier periods before presenting new results for the last part of the Kohl government after unification and for the Schröder government. While the results for the former show the known pattern, neither unemployment nor inflation is significant in the equations of the Schröder government, the latter has even the wrong sign. The missing impact of unemployment might be due to statistical reasons: the short observation period and the low variance of the explanatory variables. With respect to inflation, however, the citizens might have recognised that they cannot any longer hold the government responsible as the European Central Bank is performing monetary policy in Europe since 1999 and is, therefore, also responsible for price stability in Germany.

Using data of Swiss referenda from 1981 to 1999, this paper presents new empirical results which allow us to discriminate better between the decision and mobilisation hypotheses of electoral participation. First, theoretical considerations which lead to these hypotheses are presented as well as the theory of expressive voting, and a survey of the available empirical evidence is given. Then, we describe the empirical approach before we come to its results. Those are much in line with the mobilisation but do not support the decision hypothesis. They are, however, also only partly compatible with the theory of expressive voting.

In the past there was hardly any use of economic instruments in environmental policy, mainly command and control measures were used. More recently, ecological taxes as well as tradable permits became more popular and voluntary agreements have been implemented. Using the Public Choice approach we ask for the reasons of this wider acceptance of economic instruments. We conclude that the use of market based instruments in environmental policy has not increased very much and their impact on the actual situation is still rather low, but there is hope of at least some increase in the future.