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AbstractThis paper investigates how issue linkage between the European Parliament (EP) and the Council affects Member States' bargaining success in European Union lawmaking. Drawing from the spatial model of EU decision‐making and the relais actors thesis, it theorizes the general and conditional effect of inter‐institutional package deals on states' bargaining satisfaction. Using the DEUII dataset, the analysis reveals the following findings. First, issue linkage has a varying effect on preference attainment as cross‐legislation packages decrease states' bargaining success, while within‐legislation logrolls increase it. Second, states with centrist preferences are less successful when issue linkage occurs. By contrast, package deals favour Member States sharing positions with the EP and those holding the EP rapporteur and the Council presidency. However, these effects vary with the type of package deals and the voting rule in the Council. Third, in contrast to conventional negotiations, issue linkage produces a relatively symmetric distribution of bargaining success among Member States.

The article explores factors affecting the duration of the co-decision procedure (currently the ordinary legislative procedure), the main procedure for adopting legislation in the European Union. Drawing from rational choice institutionalism, it expects the speed of co-decision to be determined by three attributes: the impatience of legislators, issue linkage and the characteristics of Council and European Parliament negotiators ( relais actors). The hypotheses are tested using survival analysis on a dataset of 599 controversial legislative acts submitted and enacted under co-decision between 1999 and 2009. The results show that co-decision proposals are decided faster when they are urgent, negotiated prior to the European Parliament elections and concluded through single proposal logrolls. By contrast, multi-proposal packages and the ideological distance between relais actors prolong decision-making. Overall, the article contributes to the literature by showing that the impatience of legislators, package deals and the properties of negotiators are relevant drivers of co-decision duration.

The aim of the article is to empirically analyze the effectiveness of the European Parliament's amendments in one of the special legislative procedures, namely consultation. In the first step, several hypotheses were developed predicting positive or negative impact of certain factors on the EP amendments success. Subsequently, those suppositions were quantitatively tested by logistic regression on special dataset representing 599 legislative acts adopted during the fifth and sixth parliamentary term, that is, between 1 May 1999 and June 2009, under consultation. The results revealed that the EP is more likely to be successful in this procedure if it implements five strategies. Firstly, it seeks to conclude a package deal, that is, it links a consultation decision to a codecision or budgetary proposal. Secondly, it delays its opinion on a legislative proposal. Thirdly, it persuades the European Commission to support its amendments. Fourthly, it prolongs legislative negotiations with the Council until the end of parliamentary term. Fifthly, it accumulates all its negotiation resources on salient proposals. In addition, the EP is more likely to succeed in consultation when it proposes democratic and financial amendments, whereas it is least likely to be successful when it tables institutional issues. The success of EP amendments is also significantly greater in directives than in regulations, decisions or framework decisions. On the other hand, voting rule in the Council, rapporteur experience and her/his political affiliation with EPP‑ED, PES or ELDR/ALDE don't have any impact on the EP amendments success.

AbstractThe distributive bargaining literature argues that Germany prevails in the European Union due to its superior power resources. This paper tests this expectation empirically by assessing Germany's success on actual EU legislation with three sources of data: Council voting records (2009–2019), decision outcomes on the most controversial proposals (1999–2009) and the outcomes of the Eurozone reform (2010–2015). The results provide no support for Germany's prevalence in daily EU lawmaking. This country is found to cast a substantive number of contestations in the Council and attain significantly lower bargaining success than other member states on key EU secondary legislation. The paper suggests that such poor showing stems from a high extremity and intensity of Germany's preferences. Generally, this study contributes to the scholarly knowledge by refuting the narrative that Germany dictates actual EU legislation and challenging the distributive bargaining argument that states with greater power resources are more successful in the EU.

AbstractThe article seeks to explain the bargaining success of Poland and Germany in EU lawmaking. Specifically, it explores how the similarity of Poland's and Germany's preferences affects their bargaining success and whether it is more beneficial than their proximity to other member states holding the highest voting power. The analysis conducted on the DEUII dataset leads to three conclusions. First, there is a strong discrepancy between Poland's and Germany's preferences. Second, despite having divergent preferences, both Poland and Germany are more successful when they approximate or hold similar positions on EU legislation. Importantly, this relationship is robust to the extremity of their preferences, the status quo position, their closeness to the Parliament and Commission, the proposal's multidimensionality, procedure or policy area. Third, bringing preferences closer provides both Poland and Germany with higher success than moving their policy positions towards other pivotal member states, namely France, the UK (except for Poland), Italy and Spain. Overall, the paper demonstrates that mutual cooperation (i.e. the approximation or exchange of preferences) is extremely profitable for Poland and Germany as their success is strongly dependent on the level of similarity of their preferences, irrespective of other negotiating conditions and relations with pivotal actors.

The purpose of this article is to analyze whether the Treaty of Lisbon provisions have – as expected – increased the EU legislative productivity. To this end, the author tests the hypothesis that the TL has increased the number of legislative proposals submitted by the European Commission under the ordinary legislative procedure. This expectation is verified using a negative binomial regression on a dataset containing 1116 draft acts proposed by the Commission in 2004‑2014. The analysis shows that, contrary to expectations, the Treaty of Lisbon has not led to a visible increase in EU legislative productivity. Despite the extension of treaty bases envisaging the OLP and QMV, the number of proposals submitted under this procedure after the entry into force of the TL remained more or less at the same level as before. In addition, the study reveals that adaptation, anticipation of future enlargement, closeness to the end of the EP term as well as annual schedule of legislative work are key predictors of the Commission's productivity.

Celem artykułu jest analiza, czy zawieranie koalicji z Niemcami wpływa na sukces Polski w procesie legislacyjnym UE. Przetestowano dwie hipotezy: 1) jeśli preferencje Polski oraz Niemiec są zgodne, to sukces Polski jest większy; 2) koalicja z Niemcami zapewnia Polsce większy sukces w obszarach o szczególnym znaczeniu dla Warszawy, to jest: w rolnictwie, energii, środowisku, sprawach wewnętrznych oraz wspólnym rynku. Hipotezy przetestowano za pomocą metody ilościowej – regresji liniowej na bazie DEU II. Uzyskano następujące wnioski. Po pierwsze, budowanie koalicji polsko-niemieckiej w UE jest niezmiernie skomplikowane ze względu na wyraźną sprzeczność preferencji obu państw. Po drugie, mimo to budowanie koalicji z Niemcami jest dla Polski niezmiernie opłacalne. Analiza wykazała, że gdy Polska zawiera sojusz z Niemcami, to jej sukces w procesie legislacyjnym UE widocznie wzrasta. Po trzecie, zawiązywanie koalicji z Niemcami jest szczególnie opłacalne w politykach UE, które są kluczowe z punktu widzenia interesów Polski, czyli w rolnictwie, energii, sprawach wewnętrznych oraz wspólnym rynku. Jedynym wyjątkiem jest obszar ochrony środowiska.

Abstract:
The purpose of the article is to identify the conditions that affect the success of the European Parliament's amendments in the ordinary legislative procedure. In the first step, hypotheses were delineated predicting the impact of specific factors on the effectiveness of EP demands. Subsequently, they were verified using the logistic regression. The results revealed that the EP is more likely to be successful in this procedure if it applies the following negotiation techniques. First, it bundles several legislative proposals in one package. Second, it persuades the European Commission to support its amendments. Third, it negotiates the legislative proposals in trilogues. Fourth, it is cohesive during negotiations. Fifth, it prolongs negotiations with the Council until the end of parliamentary term. Sixth, it designates a rapporteur from a country acting at the same time as the Council Presidency. Seventh, it negotiates with the Council when the Presidency legislative workload is high.

Celem artykułu jest analiza, czy zawieranie koalicji z Niemcami wpływa na sukces Polski w procesie legislacyjnym UE. Przetestowano dwie hipotezy: 1) jeśli preferencje Polski oraz Niemiec są zgodne, to sukces Polski jest większy; 2) koalicja z Niemcami zapewnia Polsce większy sukces w obszarach o szczególnym znaczeniu dla Warszawy, to jest: w rolnictwie, energii, środowisku, sprawach wewnętrznych oraz wspólnym rynku. Hipotezy przetestowano za pomocą metody ilościowej – regresji liniowej na bazie DEU II. Uzyskano następujące wnioski. Po pierwsze, budowanie koalicji polsko-niemieckiej w UE jest niezmiernie skomplikowane ze względu na wyraźną sprzeczność preferencji obu państw. Po drugie, mimo to budowanie koalicji z Niemcami jest dla Polski niezmiernie opłacalne. Analiza wykazała, że gdy Polska zawiera sojusz z Niemcami, to jej sukces w procesie legislacyjnym UE widocznie wzrasta. Po trzecie, zawiązywanie koalicji z Niemcami jest szczególnie opłacalne w politykach UE, które są kluczowe z punktu widzenia interesów Polski, czyli w rolnictwie, energii, sprawach wewnętrznych oraz wspólnym rynku. Jedynym wyjątkiem jest obszar ochrony środowiska. ; The purpose of the article is to analyze whether building a coalition with Germany affects Poland's success in the EU's legislative process. Two hypotheses are tested: (1) when Polish and German preferences are homogenous, Poland's legislative success is greater; (2) the coalition with Germany ensures Poland's greater success in the areas of particular significance to Warsaw, that is in agriculture, energy, environment, home affairs and the single market. The above hypotheses are tested using a quantitative method of a linear regression. Regression calculations are based on the DEU II dataset. The results are as follows. First, forming a Polish-German coalition in the EU's lawmaking is extremely tricky due to strong divergences of both countries' preferences. Second, building a coalition with Germany is particularly beneficial for Poland, nevertheless. The analysis shows that when Poland enters an alliance with Germany, its success in the EU's legislative process significantly increases. Third, building a coalition with Germany is very profitable for Poland in these policy areas which are crucial from the perspective of Poland's interests, namely in agriculture, energy, home affairs and the single market. The only exception is the environment.

The purpose of the article is to analyze whether building a coalition with Germany affects Poland's success in the EU's legislative process. Two hypotheses are tested: (1) when Polish and German preferences are homogenous, Poland's legislative success is greater; (2) the coalition with Germany ensures Poland's greater success in the areas of particular significance to Warsaw, that is in agriculture, energy, environment, home affairs and the single market. The above hypotheses are tested using a quantitative method of a linear regression. Regression calculations are based on the DEU II dataset. The results are as follows. First, forming a Polish-German coalition in the EU's lawmaking is extremely tricky due to strong divergences of both countries' preferences. Second, building a coalition with Germany is particularly beneficial for Poland, nevertheless. The analysis shows that when Poland enters an alliance with Germany, its success in the EU's legislative process significantly increases. Third, building a coalition with Germany is very profitable for Poland in these policy areas which are crucial from the perspective of Poland's interests, namely in agriculture, energy, home affairs and the single market. The only exception is the environment. ; Celem artykułu jest analiza, czy zawieranie koalicji z Niemcami wpływa na sukces Polski w procesie legislacyjnym UE. Przetestowano dwie hipotezy: 1) jeśli preferencje Polski oraz Niemiec są zgodne, to sukces Polski jest większy; 2) koalicja z Niemcami zapewnia Polsce większy sukces w obszarach o szczególnym znaczeniu dla Warszawy, to jest: w rolnictwie, energii, środowisku, sprawach wewnętrznych oraz wspólnym rynku. Hipotezy przetestowano za pomocą metody ilościowej – regresji liniowej na bazie DEU II. Uzyskano następujące wnioski. Po pierwsze, budowanie koalicji polsko-niemieckiej w UE jest niezmiernie skomplikowane ze względu na wyraźną sprzeczność preferencji obu państw. Po drugie, mimo to budowanie koalicji z Niemcami jest dla Polski niezmiernie opłacalne. Analiza wykazała, że gdy Polska zawiera sojusz z Niemcami, to jej sukces w procesie legislacyjnym UE widocznie wzrasta. Po trzecie, zawiązywanie koalicji z Niemcami jest szczególnie opłacalne w politykach UE, które są kluczowe z punktu widzenia interesów Polski, czyli w rolnictwie, energii, sprawach wewnętrznych oraz wspólnym rynku. Jedynym wyjątkiem jest obszar ochrony środowiska.