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In 'Two Concepts of Liberty', Berlin wavered between two readings of the concept of positive liberty. In the first one, 'positive liberty' is a distinct concept, different from that of 'negative liberty'. Those who advocate liberty in the negative sense and those who advocate it in the positive sense do not disagree on which interpretation of the same thing -- 'liberty' -- is the correct one; they speak about different things. Both defend valid ideals, although those ideals may not be simultaneously achievable. In the second reading, negative and positive liberty are competing interpretations of the same concept, the defenders of negative liberty being involved in a substantive disagreement with the advocates of positive liberty on what the same term -- 'liberty' -- really means. On this understanding, negative and positive liberty cannot both be valid ideals: one of them (negative liberty) is a genuine value, the other (positive liberty) being nothing but the perversion of it. My article aims to uncover the roots of this ambiguity in unresolved difficulties in Berlin's account of the history of the ideas of negative and positive liberty and, more importantly, in his conception of value pluralism. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright holder.]

In 'Two Concepts of Liberty', Berlin wavered between two readings of the concept of positive liberty. In the first one, 'positive liberty' is a distinct concept, different from that of 'negative liberty'. Those who advocate liberty in the negative sense and those who advocate it in the positive sense do not disagree on which interpretation of the same thing – 'liberty' – is the correct one; they speak about different things. Both defend valid ideals, although those ideals may not be simultaneously achievable. In the second reading, negative and positive liberty are competing interpretations of the same concept, the defenders of negative liberty being involved in a substantive disagreement with the advocates of positive liberty on what the same term – 'liberty' – really means. On this understanding, negative and positive liberty cannot both be valid ideals: one of them (negative liberty) is a genuine value, the other (positive liberty) being nothing but the perversion of it. My article aims to uncover the roots of this ambiguity in unresolved difficulties in Berlin's account of the history of the ideas of negative and positive liberty and, more importantly, in his conception of value pluralism.

A comment on Will Kymlicka's "Western Political Theory and Ethnic Relations in Eastern Europe" (2001) disagrees with his assertion that it is the kind of nation building that impacts the handling of ethnocultural diversity rather than the fact that nation building occurs. After characterizing the nation-state, it is argued that nation building presupposes an international regime of nation-states. After elaborating on the notion of nation building, attention turns to establishing Kymlicka's claim that if ethnocultural justice requires that the one-nation state be superceded by a multination state, ie, minority self-government is necessary, then ethnocultural justice requires that exclusive jurisdiction be superceded by overlapping jurisdiction, ie, governance across nation-state borders. Hungarian nationalism is taken as a case to consider the practical relevance of overcoming the nation-state regime, demonstrating that shifts in the international environment have already affected perceptions of political alternatives. J. Zendejas

A comment on Will Kymlicka's "Western Political Theory and Ethnic Relations in Eastern Europe" (2001) disagrees with his assertion that it is the kind of nation building that impacts the handling of ethnocultural diversity rather than the fact that nation building occurs. After characterizing the nation-state, it is argued that nation building presupposes an international regime of nation-states. After elaborating on the notion of nation building, attention turns to establishing Kymlicka's claim that if ethnocultural justice requires that the one-nation state be superceded by a multination state, ie, minority self-government is necessary, then ethnocultural justice requires that exclusive jurisdiction be superceded by overlapping jurisdiction, ie, governance across nation-state borders. Hungarian nationalism is taken as a case to consider the practical relevance of overcoming the nation-state regime, demonstrating that shifts in the international environment have already affected perceptions of political alternatives. J. Zendejas

Serious thinkers tend to have a single, central concern that determines the entirety of their work, & Markus's central problem is the Enlightenment. The Enlightenment is not exclusively defined here as the intellectual movement of the mid-18th century, but as the much older philosophical tradition that underlies it. Markus, however, is not inspired by the content of the tradition itself but by its internal dilemmas. He has scrutinized the contradictions of the Enlightenment at least as thoroughly as the authors of the counter-Enlightenment did. Yet, he is not one of them. He does not want to abandon the program of modern philosophy; he does not even think such a turn would be at all meaningful. The question he poses is this: how can one cogently criticize the Enlightenment tradition & at the same time retain at least certain parts of it? What is it that makes the fundamental ideas of the Enlightenment rationally defensible even in the face of all the well-known objections? Adapted from the source document.

An analysis of political change in Eastern Europe, 1989/90, in which the legal continuity of legislative reforms merged with the abrupt & radical transformation of a revolution, focuses on events several months prior to the first free election in Hungary. A sociological approach is suggested for the regime change or "refolution" (reform + revolution), where the state's continued legitimacy is interrupted, but legality is maintained through the institutional order. It is argued that the vacuum of legitimacy during that period in Hungary, as well as the collusion of key politicans who identified legitimate power during the transitional period with orderly & tactical rule-governed actions, together produced a successful regime change. The genuine revolutionary process was modified under pressure from outside, Western powers. J. Sadler

Translated by Gabor Follimus. Based on responses to a questionnaire sent to 26 intellectuals by Századvég, a Budapest student review. Covers political and economic crisis, the evaluation of reform programs, and other issues.