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The article is devoted to the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII). This initiative is a part of the common approaches of the United States and its G7 partners. The prerequisite for its creation was implementing the Chinese "Belt and Road Initiative" (B&R), which the U.S. and its allies consider a severe challenge to their interests in the world economy. The PGII will focus on soft infrastructure development in middle- and low-income countries. It will contribute to introducing modern digital technologies and evolution of Industry 4.0 in developing regions. Furthermore, the following priorities are within the framework of the Partnership: climate and energy security, digital communications, healthcare, and social equality. The most important difference from the "Belt and Road" is the model of development and financing of projects. Unlike the Chinese public funding approach, the PGII will attract private investment. However, it requires active work with governments of the recipient countries to adapt their institutions and legislations. It is a prerequisite for reducing sovereign risks and attracting Western investors. At the same time, implementing necessary standards creates the risk of time lags against the backdrop of dynamically developing Chinese projects. The competition between the PGII and B&R can lead to opposing political and economic blocs, negatively manifesting the emerging international relations system. Such a division can take the form of developing incompatible standards and requirements of political loyalty in exchange for access to goods, services, and technologies for the PGII recipient countries.

The article examines trade policy initiatives of the Biden administration. In a complex climate of domestic political polarization, the United States compete with China and defends its position in international markets. These challenges affect the areas of high technologies, digital economy, information and communications sector, renewable energy sources, and infrastructure. At the same time, an equally important problem in the context of increased geopolitical risks remains increasing the reliability of logistics and production chains, primarily for microelectronics. Addressing these challenges requires the creation of appropriate platforms that allow the United States to interact with partner countries. Within these frameworks, the United States intends to promote the priorities of the Biden administration: standards in the field of high technologies, ensuring the energy transition, protecting working conditions and inclusion. Another crucial area is promoting the fight against corruption, ensuring transparency of business processes in partner countries and training personnel. Completing these goals should attract American business and investment to the Pacific and Indian Ocean regions and Latin America. These should also increase American leverage in its strategic competition with China. At the same time, the formats of cooperation created by the United States must be insured against their internal political situation and the risks of interruption of work when there is a change of presidential administrations. In less than four years of its work (2021–2024), the Biden administration has proposed three platforms: the Global Infrastructure and Investment Partnership, the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity, and the Partnership of the Americas for Economic Prosperity. The results of their implementation are different. This article examines the two last mentioned regional platforms and describes conditions for their creation, work prospects, probable risks, and some results.

Received 11.12.2020. The article is dedicated to the 100th anniversary of the Academician N. N. Inozemtsev. The article provides an overview of the unpublished collective monograph "Foundations of the Theory of International Relations" – the fundamental work of a group of the IMEMO researchers, devised in the 1970s in the USSR. The process of creating a monograph is considered in the context of domestic and foreign policy conjuncture of that historical period, as well as the history of IMEMO. Among factors that slowed down the publication of this work were ideological transformations in the USSR, the divergence of political elite groups' interests. The main provisions of the monograph, based on a systematic approach and works by representatives of Marxism and Marxism-Leninism, are given. Particular attention is paid to comparison with the American and Western European international relations theory concepts of that period. Self-sufficiency of the monograph as a full-fledged theoretical concept within the framework of the Marxist-Leninist theory of international relations is substantiated. The authors of the article prove the relevance of the monograph both as a historical source and as a milestone for modern scientific Marxist thought. Owing to the collapse of the world socialist system, the Marxist paradigm received an opportunity to reach its own realism, separated from ideology and based on the central idea of Marxism – the position of development as an objective quality of the socio-historical process. The publication of the collective monograph "Fundamentals of the Theory of International Relations" is planned for the end of 2021.

By 2021, the nature of the key factors that will determine the dynamics of the EU–China relations in the medium term has become clearer. The pandemic accelerated many ongoing processes in the world, revealed "weak points" in national and regional economies and security, and exposed the true intentions of international actors. The authors proceed from the working hypothesis that an ideologized rigid approach with elements of pragmatism will dominate in the EU–China relations in the post-crisis period. The balance in the formula of these relations "partner, competitor, rival" will significantly depend on the position of the United States, as well as the European Union's compliance with the "bloc discipline". Competition in the field of technology will be of key importance, but the struggle for political and ideological leadership in the changing world order will also become more acute. The political response of the EU and China to technological challenges will represent a mix of protectionism and neo-techno-nationalism. Politicians in the European Union feel that toughness toward Beijing is well received by the voters. At the same time, the EU member states diverge in their approaches to China, although the efforts are made to harmonise policies both in the European Union and in the transatlantic community. In its turn, the PRC feels more confident in the technological and political competition. The pace of China catching up with the technological abilities of the EU is impressive, though significant gaps remain. Beijing does not have intentions of de-coupling from the West and keeps a strong interest in being present in the EU markets, but it becomes more selective with regard to foreign investments at home. Meanwhile, the global shift of world politics to Asia will require adjustment on the part of the European Union. A possible approach already tested in expert discussions is further engagement with trading partners and blocs in the region, especially the newly established Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership. The EU–China relations and their influence, in particular, on Russia were the subject of case study organized by the Center for Situational Analysis of IMEMO RAN. For details see: Analysis and Forecasting. IMEMO Journal, 2021, no. 2. (Available at: https:// www.afjournal.ru/index.php?page_id=464#).