Suchergebnisse

Our paper follows on the observation made by Ferenc Pataki who stated that national identity isa collective identity shaped by both political/citizenship-related and cultural elements. Whilethese two elements are usually similar, the national identity of people from ethnic minoritiesdiffer along these two identities. Our analysis discusess the changes that happened during thehundred years since the Treaty of Trianion to these two elements of the national identity of thefollowing three generations of Hungarians in Vojvodina: between the two World Wars, thosewho grew up during the communism and those who became adults after 1990. We conclude thatthe first generation retained their cultural-historical national identiy formed before Wold War Ibut they did not develop Hungarian or South Slavic national idenities. To replace the SouthSlavic identity they developed a regional identity to Vojvodina. The second generation, who wereborn and raised after 1945, developed Yugoslavian political/citizenship-related national identythrough socialisation in a new political system and a regional identity to Vojvodina, which meantan alienation from Hungary. As a result of their shattered cultural-historical national identity,they started to assimilate, some of them lost their Hungarian cultural-historical identity andacquired a Serbian or Yugoslavian national identity instead. The national identity of the thirdgeneration who grew up after 1990 will be discussed in a second paper.

In this second paper, we are attempting to demonstarte the changes in the political/citizenshiprelated and cultural-historical national identity of the Hungarian ethnic minority in Vojvodina.With the end of Yugoslavia as a country this ethnic minority became Serbian citizens. The newleaders of Serbia had an adverse view on this ethnic minority until 2014 when the Serbianpolitical leaderership changed their political identity and favoured the West instead of EasternEurope.The financial aid provided by the Hungarian Government to the Hungarians living inVojvodina, which targeted cultural and economic development in the area, aimed to better thelife and strenghten the national identity of this ethnic minority. Those who received financialaid developed a better outlook on life. The possibility to acquire Hungarian citizenship easily strenghtened the Hungarian national identity of this minority and contributed to populationdecline. While people migrating to Hungary are primarily motivated by access to bettereducation, others migrate to Western Europe for work.

We analyse Roma fertility in four neighbouring countries in Central and Eastern Europe with a large Roma minority: in Hungary, Slovakia, Romania and Serbia. The sources of data are the respective national population censuses from 2011. Fertility is measured at the birth cohort level as the average number of children ever born. We make an international comparison of the fertility of Roma and non-Roma majority population women on the basis of completed education. In the case of Hungary, we also explore how the correlation between fertility and ethnic identity is modified when completed education and ethnic residential segregation are controlled. The fertility of Roma women is far above the majority population average in all birth cohorts and in each country. Educational attainment modifies this relationship. The fertility of highly educated Roma and majority population women is converging. The exposure to majority behaviour also has an effect. The lower the level of ethnic residential segregation, the smaller the difference between the fertility of Roma and majority population women. Completed education and residential segregation may exert different forces at the two ends of the educational hierarchy when their joint effect is explored. At the upper end of the social hierarchy, neither segregation nor ethnicity matters; at the lower end, however, both exposure to ethnic majority behaviour and ethnicity matter.