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Since the end of the Cold War, globalization has brought new actors to the political arena - one of those actors being civil society or NGOs. Claudia Kissling addresses the topic of civil society participation in the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

This working paper introduces the concept of legal personality of non-state actors as an indicator of the democratic legitimacy of international organizations (IOs). Globalization has led to changes in statehood which are reflected in new democratic forms of participation and new expectations and attitudes towards political institutions. This also affects international politics in that international organizations are questioned with regard to their own legitimacy. In this context, normatively and empirically based policy proposals alike tend to suggest an increased role of new actors, mostly civil society organizations (CSOs) or NGOs, in overcoming the legitimacy deficit of IOs. However, if participation of non-state actors in international governance is to be effective, efficient and have a meaningful and lasting effect, it requires institutional rights and duties - and with it legal personality. Thus, legal personality of non-state actors can be taken as a minimum safeguarding clause for surmounting the legitimacy deficit of international organizations (normative approach). It can also be used as a helpful analytical framework for organizing empirical data on the participation of these actors in IOs (empirical approach). This working paper evaluates the legal rights and duties of NGOs in their cooperation with more than 30 international organizations and seeks to assess whether this implies that they have acquired legal personality and which quality this personality takes on. Such a comparative paper is a novelty in both political science and international law. By combining perspectives from two disciplines, this working paper illustrates the intrinsic empirical and theory-building value of (international) positive law in political science.

Die Autorin analysiert die Möglichkeiten, welche die Interparlamentarische Union (IPU) für die parlamentarisch-repräsentative Gestaltung der Weltpolitik durch die Vereinten Nationen bietet. Den Strukturwandel intergouvernementaler Organisationen wie der Vereinten Nationen sieht sie als eine sich aus den globalen Anforderungen ergebende Folge. Sie zeigt auf, dass die IPU in der Vergangenheit eine bedeutsame Rolle als Organisation einzelner Parlamentarier gespielt hat, dass sie zunehmend in Konkurrenz zu anderen Parlamentarierorganisationen geraten ist und ihre Meinungsführerschaft weitgehend verloren hat. Heute ist diese Institution durch das Erfordernis einer repräsentativen Mitgliedschaft der Parlamente der Prototyp einer internationalen parlamentarischen Organisation. Die besondere, von NGOs abweichende Rechtsnatur der IPU sieht die Verfasserin auch durch ein völkerrechtliches Gutachten sowie die Einräumung eines Beobachterstatus bei der UN-Generalversammlung als bestätigt. Sie stellt fest, dass die IPU zum Ausbau der parlamentarischen Dimension in den Vereinten Nationen geeignet ist. Sie betrachtet es als vorstellbar, dass sich die IPU auf der Grundlage eines Kooperationsvertrages als eine Art Sondereinrichtung im UN-System etablieren kann. (ICG)

This working paper introduces the concept of legal personality of non-state actors as an indicator of the democratic legitimacy of international organizations (IOs). Globalization has led to changes in statehood which are reflected in new democratic forms of participation and new expectations and attitudes towards political institutions. This also affects international politics in that international organizations are questioned with regard to their own legitimacy. In this context, normatively and empirically based policy proposals alike tend to suggest an increased role of new actors, mostly civil society organizations (CSOs) or NGOs, in overcoming the legitimacy deficit of IOs. However, if participation of non-state actors in international governance is to be effective, efficient and have a meaningful and lasting effect, it requires institutional rights and duties - and with it legal personality. Thus, legal personality of non-state actors can be taken as a minimum safeguarding clause for surmounting the legitimacy deficit of international organizations (normative approach). It can also be used as a helpful analytical framework for organizing empirical data on the participation of these actors in IOs (empirical approach). This working paper evaluates the legal rights and duties of NGOs in their cooperation with more than 30 international organizations and seeks to assess whether this implies that they have acquired legal personality and which quality this personality takes on. Such a comparative paper is a novelty in both political science and international law. By combining perspectives from two disciplines, this working paper illustrates the intrinsic empirical and theory-building value of (international) positive law in political science.

Since the end of the Cold War, globalization has brought new actors to the political arena. One of those which has attracted considerable attention in academic research is civil society or NGOs. Claudia Kissling addresses the topic of civil society participation in the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The regime qualifies well for this objective since it features, given its characteristics as a treaty regime in the international security field, notable legal avenues for civil society participation. The study takes on a twofold perspective. It addresses the empirical question of whether civil society can contribute to the evolution of regimes in the security field, especially when it comes to security cooperation. It also questions whether civil society can, under certain conditions, contribute to the democratic quality of international decision-making. Here, empirical findings are used in order to test normative political theories on the legitimacy and democracy of global institutions.

Civil society participation has become a buzzword in the debate about the legitimacy and accountability of international governance. Many organizations, prominently among them the World Trade Organization (WTO), have come under considerable pressure to open up their policy-making process towards non-state actors. Although the WTO has become more transparent in recent years, direct stakeholder access to its policy making is still denied. This situation is often contrasted with that at the United Nations (UN), where there is (allegedly) much more formally regulated and more substantial participation of civil society. In this paper, we compare the patterns of participation in these two organizations and seek to identify some common dynamics. We present a general framework for analysis based on a model of the policy cycle that allows us to distinguish 'push' and 'pull' factors that determine cooperation in different phases of policy making. In our empirical study, we find that in the WTO, there are few incentives for the organization itself to pull civil society actors into its policy-making process. Agendasetting is the task of governments; research and analysis is delivered by the Secretariat; compliance control is undertaken jointly by the organization and its members. To push the door to trade policy making open, civil society can only rely on public shaming, that is, threatening to undermine the organization's legitimacy as it violates widely accepted standards of good governance. In the UN system, there is in fact more cooperation, but it remains largely limited to the policy phases of agenda-setting, research and analysis and compliance control. Quite like the WTO, the UN protects an intergovernmental core of policy making in which cooperation with civil society remains at the discretion of state parties. Evidence for this are informal and ad hoc ways of collaboration and a lack of participatory rights for non-state actors in the Security Council and the General Assembly. We conclude that studying civil society participation in international public organizations through the lens of the policy cycle can give us a fine-grained picture of cooperative arrangements and enables us to identify potentials for cooperation as well as exclusion. Yet, we also observed two other factors at work that were not really grasped by the model of the policy cycle. First, the institutional culture of organizations can be more or less amenable to civil society. Second, organizations are susceptible to campaigns for 'good governance' that invoke standards of due process and may open the door to nonstate actors.

Civil society participation has become a buzzword in the debate about the legitimacy and accountability of international governance. Many organizations, prominently among them the World Trade Organization (WTO), have come under considerable pressure to open up their policy-making process towards non-state actors. Although the WTO has become more transparent in recent years, direct stakeholder access to its policy making is still denied. This situation is often contrasted with that at the United Nations (UN), where there is (allegedly) much more formally regulated and more substantial participation of civil society. In this paper, we compare the patterns of participation in these two organizations and seek to identify some common dynamics. We present a general framework for analysis based on a model of the policy cycle that allows us to distinguish 'push' and 'pull' factors that determine cooperation in different phases of policy making. In our empirical study, we find that in the WTO, there are few incentives for the organization itself to pull civil society actors into its policy-making process. Agendasetting is the task of governments; research and analysis is delivered by the Secretariat; compliance control is undertaken jointly by the organization and its members. To push the door to trade policy making open, civil society can only rely on public shaming, that is, threatening to undermine the organization's legitimacy as it violates widely accepted standards of good governance. In the UN system, there is in fact more cooperation, but it remains largely limited to the policy phases of agenda-setting, research and analysis and compliance control. Quite like the WTO, the UN protects an intergovernmental core of policy making in which cooperation with civil society remains at the discretion of state parties. Evidence for this are informal and ad hoc ways of collaboration and a lack of participatory rights for non-state actors in the Security Council and the General Assembly. We conclude that studying civil society participation in international public organizations through the lens of the policy cycle can give us a fine-grained picture of cooperative arrangements and enables us to identify potentials for cooperation as well as exclusion. Yet, we also observed two other factors at work that were not really grasped by the model of the policy cycle. First, the institutional culture of organizations can be more or less amenable to civil society. Second, organizations are susceptible to campaigns for 'good governance' that invoke standards of due process and may open the door to nonstate actors.