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The article deals with the declining union density and shrinking coverage of collective agreements in most EU/EES countries, in particular in Eastern Europe and Greece. In many countries, international organizations pushed through "structural reforms" weakening trade unions. The result is declining union density and decreased capacity to conclude sectoral collective agreements and avoid downwards derogations at company level. Even in some core eurozone countries have governments without much of social dialogue carried through "internal devaluation" to restore competitiveness. High union density (Finland) or high union mobilization capacity (France) could not prevent this development. The economic performance of a country and degree of globalization, including the absence of a national currency, appear to be more important. The Swedish (and Nordic) model of self-regulation, resting on negotiations between the labour market parties, contrasts sharply to French state regulation with its high frequency of state extension of collective agreements and minimum wages set by the state. Union density in Sweden is still among the highest in the world but has declined considerably the last twenty years, in particular among the rapidly growing share of foreign-born blue-collar workers. As a small, strongly export-dependent country dominated by large transnational groups, Swedish economy is very influenced by globalization. This has shifted the balance of power to the advantage of employers, and by that circumscribed the unions' efforts to achieve developing jobs and improved working environment.

The industrial relations models among the EU/EES countries vary widely. The Nordic model of self-regulation contrasts sharply to French state extension of collective agreements and minimum wage set by the state. While social dialogue often refers to tripartite negotiations, bipartite collective bargaining is characteristic of self-regulation. Swedish self-regulation is the most far-reaching among the Nordic countries, as state intervention is less common than in Denmark, Finland and Norway. In most EU/EES countries, in particular the new Central and Eastern European member states and Greece, union power is undermined by declining union density and shrinking coverage of collective agreements. In many cases, international organisations pushed through "structural reforms" weakening trade unions. The result is decreased bargaining capacity at industry level and difficulties in avoiding downwards derogations at company level. Even in some core eurozone countries governments have carried through "internal devaluation" to restore competitiveness. High union density (Finland) or high union mobilisation capacity (France) could not prevent this development. The economic performance of a country and degree of globalisation, including the absence of a national currency, appear more important. Swedish union density is still among the highest in the world but has declined considerably in the last twenty years. As a strongly export-dependent country dominated by large transnational groups, is Sweden very exposed to globalisation. This has shifted the balance of power to the advantage of transnational companies, and by that circumscribed the unions' efforts to achieve developing jobs and improved working environment.

The Swedish model of industrial relations is distinguished by a high degree of self-regulation with roots around the turn of the century 1900. Under the threat of state regulation, the labour market parties in the 1930s, and again in the late 1990s, found they had a common interest in self-regulation. The 1938 Saltsjöbaden Agreement between the blue-collar confederation LO and the employer confederation SAF had its predecessors in the 1905 Engineering Agreement and the December Compromise LO-SAF. Two dimensions of Swedish industrial relations are highlighted: self-regulation (unilateral and bi-partite) versus state regulation and centralization versus decentralization. These can in turn be combined into a four-field table, which is extended to include bipartite regulation between state and unions (state-supported union-run unemployment funds) and tripartite regulation (the 1990-1993 Stabilization Agreements). Advantages and disadvantages of self-regulation are discussed on the basis of an article by Ann Numhauser-Henning, professor of Private Law at Lund University. The Swedish model of bipartite collective self-regulation (in Swedish also labelled partsreglering) is maintained by a high coverage of collective agreements, in turn promoted by the high density of employers' associations and the internationally high union density. Up to the end of the 1930s the rate of unionization among Swedish white-collar workers was very low in many industries. The dominant attitude among private-sector employers was to consider working and employment conditions for white-collar workers as a matter reserved for unilateral employer control. Therefore, in 1931 eight white-collar unions founded Daco (the Confederation of Employees) in order to get the legislation considered necessary to change this situation. Two options were on the agenda as regards the form of legislation. Procedural legislation on the right of association and negotiation best conformed with the Swedish model of self-regulation, but at the same time was exceptional as the blue-collar workers had acquired these rights long ago through their own efforts. In 1936 the Law on Rights of Association and Negotiation was enacted with support from the social democratic government. Although this legislation deviates from the Swedish model of self-regulation, there is a world of difference between negotiated employment conditions (collective bargaining) and substantive legislation on employment conditions, which was the alternative option. In Denmark the turn of events followed a different path as a substantive law for white-collar workers, the funktionærloven, was introduced in 1938. In the absence of negotiation rights, younger Swedish public-sector professional employees in the 1930s and 1940s carried out unilateral actions in the form of mass layoffs and blockades of hiring of new staff combined with refusal to accept wages below a fixed minimum level. The centralization of LO in 1941 may be described as unilateral self-regulation and as a supplement to the Saltsjöbaden Agreement. In 1935 a government commission had recommended the LO to centralize, and the labour market parties to define rules of conduct safeguarding industrial peace. Union centralization in Sweden was quite different from the corresponding processes in Denmark and Norway. Although collective agreements distinguish all Nordic countries, Sweden is in a class of its own with respect to self-regulated wage formation and conflict resolution. A departure from the traditional Swedish model of industrial relations occurred with the series of labour laws introduced in the 1970s. One of the first was the 1971 law on employment protection for elderly employees. The 1997 Industry Agreement between the unions in manufacturing and corresponding SAF associations has clear parallels to the 1938 basic agreement with respect to origin (threat of state regulation), contents (negotiation procedure, conflict resolution) and the spirit of cooperation. The new reinforced National Mediation Office (2000) received, in addition to its mediation role in labour disputes, the task of promoting 'an efficient wage formation process' that meant the appearance of a new mix of self-regulation and state regulation.

Union density remains very high in Sweden. The significantly raised fees for union unemployment funds in January 2007 were followed by an unprecedented decline in the number of union members in modern Swedish history. In the course of two years union density dropped by 6 percentage points: from 77% in 2006 to 71% in 2008. As a result, the density of employers' associations today is much higher than union density. The article below describes and analyzes union decline among different groups of workers and why it was not difficult to foresee this development when the center-right government sharply raised membership contributions to finance the state-subsidized Swedish unemployment insurance. From July 2008 the government more closely linked fund fees to the unemployment rate for each fund, thus differentiating fund fees between different groups of employees. Since the subsequent economic crisis hit private sector blue-collar workers harder than other employees, the differentiation of fees was further widened. As a consequence, total union fees (including fund fees) also varied more by time and between different categories of workers, which in turn was reflected in the development of union density. From 2006 to 2010 blue-collar density fell by 8 percentage points compared to the 4-point decline among white-collar workers. In contrast to the depression of the 1990s, union density did not increase when unemployment increased rapidly from 2008 to 2009. The article also discusses why the government failed to achieve its main goal of changing the financing system of unemployment insurance: to influence wage formation.

Union density remains very high in Sweden. The significantly raised fees for union unemployment funds in January 2007 were followed by an unprecedented decline in the number of union members in modern Swedish history. In the course of two years union density dropped by 6 percentage points: from 77% in 2006 to 71% in 2008. As a result, the density of employers' associations today is much higher than union density. The article below describes and analyzes union decline among different groups of workers and why it was not difficult to foresee this development when the center-right government sharply raised membership contributions to finance the state-subsidized Swedish unemployment insurance. From July 2008 the government more closely linked fund fees to the unemployment rate for each fund, thus differentiating fund fees between different groups of employees. Since the subsequent economic crisis hit private sector blue-collar workers harder than other employees, the differentiation of fees was further widened. As a consequence, total union fees (including fund fees) also varied more by time and between different categories of workers, which in turn was reflected in the development of union density. From 2006 to 2010 blue-collar density fell by 8 percentage points compared to the 4-point decline among white-collar workers. In contrast to the depression of the 1990s, union density did not increase when unemployment increased rapidly from 2008 to 2009. The article also discusses why the government failed to achieve its main goal of changing the financing system of unemployment insurance: to influence wage formation.

Union density remains very high in Sweden. The significantly raised fees for union unemployment funds in January 2007 were followed by an unprecedented decline in the number of union members in modern Swedish history. In the course of two years union density dropped by 6 percentage points: from 77% in 2006 to 71% in 2008. As a result, the density of employers' associations today is much higher than union density. The article below describes and analyzes union decline among different groups of workers and why it was not difficult to foresee this development when the center-right government sharply raised membership contributions to finance the state-subsidized Swedish unemployment insurance. From July 2008 the government more closely linked fund fees to the unemployment rate for each fund, thus differentiating fund fees between different groups of employees. Since the subsequent economic crisis hit private sector blue-collar workers harder than other employees, the differentiation of fees was further widened. As a consequence, total union fees (including fund fees) also varied more by time and between different categories of workers, which in turn was reflected in the development of union density. From 2006 to 2010 blue-collar density fell by 8 percentage points compared to the 4-point decline among white-collar workers. In contrast to the depression of the 1990s, union density did not increase when unemployment increased rapidly from 2008 to 2009. The article also discusses why the government failed to achieve its main goal of changing the financing system of unemployment insurance: to influence wage formation.

In January 2007 the Swedish centre-right government in office since September 2006 raised considerably fees for union unemployment funds. Union membership (fund membership included) therefore suddenly became much more expensive. Trade unions lost 8% of their members over two years and union density fell by 6 percentage points, while unemployment funds were hit by a still larger decline. In 2008, fund fees were more closely linked to the rate of unemployment among the members of each fund. The result was a marked social polarisation of fund fees, in 2009 further sharpened by accelerating unemployment. In addition to describing the consequences of the government policy, this article discusses the ambition of the government to influence wage formation by remodelling the Swedish Ghent system.

In January 2007 the Swedish centre-right government in office since September 2006 raised considerably fees for union unemployment funds. Union membership (fund membership included) therefore suddenly became much more expensive. Trade unions lost 8% of their members over two years and union density fell by 6 percentage points (from 77% in 2006 to 71% in 2008), while unemployment funds were hit by a still larger decline. In 2008, fund fees were more closely linked to the rate of unemployment among the members of each fund. The result was a marked social polarisation of fund fees, in 2009 further sharpened by accelerating unemployment. In addition to describing the consequences of the government policy, this article discusses the ambition of the government to influence wage formation by remodelling the Swedish Ghent system.

This report presents and comments on the Swedish part of a survey made in autumn 2007 to obtain expert opinions on industrial relations in the EU25 and G7 countries in the year 2025. The survey was carried out by the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (Eurofound). One of the basic questions was about how the process of globalisation will influence future industrial relations in each of the EU27 member states (EU15 "old members states" and EU12 "new member states") and in Global 7 countries (Australia, Brazil, China, India, Japan, South Africa, and the USA). The questionnaire contained 16 questions about the future development of actors, processes, outcomes and general trends in industrial relations and their environment. The respondents were representatives of trade unions, employers' organisations, governments and academic experts. From Sweden 13 respondents participated, four of them trade union representatives, another four representatives of employer organisations, two government representatives and three academic experts in the industrial relations field. The report focuses on the Swedish survey results, but also contains international comparisons. First some trends and features of Swedish industrial relations are presented. As regards union density the survey started from a series that includes full-time students working part-time. With a union density of 77% (2004) in their heads the Swedish respondents in average foresaw a density of 61% in 2025 (corresponding to 79% in 2004 and about 63% in 2025 excluding full-time students working part-time). The fall in the rate of unionization in 2007 probably influenced the foresight although the exact size of the decline was not yet known. An average union density of 61% corresponds to about 55% unionized workers in the private sector. That is substantially lower than in 2004, but a relatively small decline compared to the private sector union density in 2008 (65%, excluding full-time students). Between 2006 and 2008 density in this sector declined from 71% to 65%, that is by six percentage points in two years (excluding full-time students). A ten percentage points decline remains between 2008 and 2025, which means in average just 0.6 points per year. Collective bargaining coverage is expected to remain at a high level in 2025 (81%) but nonetheless 11 percentage points less than in 2004 (92%). By that the share of workers outside the collective bargaining system would more than double up to the year 2025. The declining union density could be expected to have a negative influence on bargaining coverage. If the average coverage fell to 81% in 2025, then the private sector collective bargaining coverage would probably be about 75%. If neither extension mechanisms nor legislation on minimum wages are introduced, as much as every fourth worker in the private sector could be outside the collective bargaining system. Long before such a situation occurs demands on legislation would probably appear. Almost 40% of Swedish respondents think that legislation on minimum wages will be introduced in the period up to 2025. As regards wages more than four out of five Swedish respondents think that collective agreements will still be the main way of regulation in the year 2025. Unions are expected to have the same impact as today at both industry and workplace level, but a considerable insecurity is indicated by the large variation in assessments, in particular regarding the impact of unions at workplace/enterprise level. This large variation probably reflects divergent views among respondents on the desirable future development. It might be called into question if the impact of Swedish trade unions were unchanged if union density declined to 61% in 2025 (about 55% in private sector) and collective bargaining coverage decreased by more than 10 percentage points. Bargaining at sector/industry level seems to continue to dominate the collective bargaining system as 10 of the 13 Swedish respondents think that the sector/branch will remain the dominant level of collective bargaining even in 2025. At the same time decentralisation is indicated as almost every second respondent thinks that either individual contracts (15%) or workplace/enterprise collective agreements (31%) will be the main way of regulating wages. Secondly, more than 60% of respondents think that the workplace/enterprise will be a more important bargaining level than today. The Swedish model of self-regulation (regulation by the labour market parties themselves) will survive, but the decreasing coverage of collective agreements might be followed by legislation on minimum wages and/or on extension of collective agreements. Most respondents, however, think that the role of the government as legislator in industrial relations will remain the same. The Swedish national arena will still be the dominant one in industrial relations in 2025, although the role of the international level and the EU level will increase, thus a certain centralisation (to the EU level) in addition to the decentralisation tendency mentioned above. A slight majority thinks that the regulating role of the EU Commission will increase in working life. Most respondents think that the impact of unions will decrease at the national level (54%), increase at the international level (69%) and remain about the same at sector/industry and workplace/enterprise levels (in the latter cases when the considerably diverging replies are weighted together). A slight majority think that social security and the degree of liberalism in economic policy will be unchanged. On the other hand, large minorities (46%) think that liberalism in economic policy will increase and social security decrease. Large majorities expect that individualism (69%), flexibility in working life (92%), self-employment (69%) and inequality in incomes (85%) will increase, while job security (80%), the wage gap between men and women (77%) and public support to unions (61.5%) will decrease.

This report supplements the report "Industrial Relations Foresight for Sweden: Presentation of Results and Comments. While the latter report focus on Sweden does this report primarily contain comparisons between the 34 countries participating in the Eurofound project on future industrial relations up to the year 2025.

Nach dem Genter System sind die Gewerkschaften zuständig für die Verwaltung und Auszahlung des Arbeitslosengeldes. Dieses System gilt in Dänemark, Schweden, Finnland und in etwas veränderter Form in Belgien. In allen nordischen Ländern, in denen die Gewerkschaften für die Arbeitslosenversicherung zuständig sind, sieht sich dieses System einem verstärkten Druck ausgesetzt. In Schweden hat sich der Anteil der Arbeitnehmer, die direkt, d.h. ohne Gewerkschaftsmitglied zu sein, bei einer Arbeitslosenversicherungskasse Mitglied sind, seit den 1980er Jahren erheblich erhöht. Betroffen davon sind alle Gruppen von Lohn- und Gehaltsempfängern. Gleichzeitig ist seit 1993 der gewerkschaftliche Organisationsgrad insbesondere unter jungen Arbeitnehmern zurückgegangen. Der Beitrag untersucht die Bedeutung des Genter Systems und anderer Merkmale der schwedischen Arbeitsbeziehungen für den immer noch sehr hohen gewerkschaftlichen Organisationsgrad in Schweden und diskutiert die möglichen Konsequenzen einer im Vorfeld der im September 2006 anstehenden Parlamentswahlen von dem nicht-sozialistischen Oppositionsbündnis vorgeschlagenen weitgehenden Reform des Systems der Arbeitslosenversicherung. (IAB)