Untangling Fixed Effects and Constant Regressors
In: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 15-137/VI
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In: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 15-137/VI
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In: Journal of Econometrics, Band 148, Heft 1, S. 72-85
We consider the question whether top tennis players in a top tournament (Wimbledon) employ an optimal (efficient) service strategy. While we show that top players do not, in general, follow an optimal strategy, our principal result is that the estimated inefficiencies are not large: the inefficiency regarding winning a point on service is on average 1.1% for men and 2.0% for women, implying that–by adopting an efficient service strategy–players can (on average) increase the probability of winning a match by 2.4%-points for men and 3.2%-points for women. While the inefficiencies may seem small, the financial consequences for the efficient player at Wimbledon can be substantial: the expected paycheck could rise by 18.7% for men and even by 32.8% for women. We use these findings to shed some light on the question of whether economic agents are successful optimizers.
In: Journal of international economics, Band 85, Heft 1, S. 14-24
ISSN: 0022-1996
While virtually all currency crisismodels recognise that the fate of a currency peg depends on how tenaciously policy makers defend it, they seldom model how this is done. We incorporate themechanics of speculation and the interest rate defence against it in the model ofMorris and Shin (American Economic Review 88, 1998). Our model captures that the interest rate defence reduces speculators' profits and thus postpones the crisis. It predicts that well before the fall of a currency interest rates are increased to offset the buildup of exchange market pressure, and this then unravels in a sharp depreciation. This pattern is at odds with predictions of standard models, but we show that it fits well with reality.
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While virtually all modern models of exchange rate crises recognise that the decision to abandon an exchange rate peg depends on how harshly policy makers are willing to defend the regime, they virtually never model how the exchange rate is defended. In this paper we incorporate both the mechanics of speculation and a defence policy against speculation in the well-known currency crisis model of Morris and Shin (American Economic Review 88 (1998) 587-97). After adding these natural elements, our model outperforms standard currency crisis models at explaining stylised features of speculative attacks. Moreover, our model connects the theoretical currency crisis literature to an empirical literature on exchange market pressure, by bringing together its building blocks: exchange rate changes plus counter-acting defence policies. We use this connection to confirm our model's predictions empirically.
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In: Economic policy, Band 35, Heft 102, S. 357-402
ISSN: 1468-0327
SUMMARYBased on narrative identification, we construct a novel comprehensive dataset of pension reform measures in OECD countries from 1970 to 2017. We then study the timing of these measures. Our main and new result is that business cycle indicators are important for their timing: a worsening makes contractionary measures more likely and expansionary measures less likely. The demography matters only in the sense that the OECD-wide demography explains the general reform trend for a country. We find no evidence that country-specific or short-run demographic developments matter. We discuss a conceptual framework with adjustment costs of changing pension generosity that can account for both the reform responsiveness to the business cycle and the lack of responsiveness to changes in demographic forecasts. We also discuss potential policy implications of our findings.
In: IMF Working Paper, S. 1-45
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