Suchergebnisse

Viele Banken sind aufgrund ihrer Größe, Vernetzung und Komplexität nicht mehr abwickelbar. Geraten sie in Schieflage, stellen sie eine enorme Bedrohung für das gesamte Finanzsystem ihres Wirtschaftsraumes dar. Fünf Jahre Finanzkrise haben das Problem nicht gemildert, sondern verschärft. Die Kosten für die Stützung der Banken sind immens und stellen die betroffenen Staaten vor große Herausforderungen. Zudem schaffen diese Staatsgarantien gefährliche Fehlanreize: Sie verleiten Manager und Financiers dazu, hohe Risiken einzugehen und machen ein weiteres Anwachsen der Banken wahrscheinlich. Der Ausweg wird derzeit in der Einführung eines Trennbankensystems gesucht. Es soll kleinere, weniger stark verflochtene und somit leichter abzuwickelnde Finanzinstitute etablieren und das Einlagen- und Kreditgeschäft besser vor den Risiken des Investmentbanking schützen. Die Bundesregierung hat im Februar 2013 ihre Pläne für eine Aufspaltung der deutschen Universalbanken in Geschäfts- und Investmentbanken vorgestellt. Diese Studie zeigt jedoch, dass auch bei unterschiedlichen Aufspaltungsszenarien zahlreiche Finanzinstitute eine Größe behalten, in der noch nie eine Bank erfolgreich - das heißt ohne verheerende Folgen für das gesamte Wirtschaftssystem - abgewickelt wurde. Zudem sieht der Gesetzentwurf vor, dass das Einlageninstitut und die Restbank in einer Holding vereint bleiben. Ob das ausreicht, um eine Entflechtung sicherzustellen, die eine Abwicklung der Bank ermöglicht, ist ebenfalls zweifelhaft. Aus Sicht der Autoren ist deswegen höchst fraglich, ob der vorliegende Gesetzesentwurf geeignet ist, sein erklärtes Ziel zu erreichen, Großbanken abwickelbar zu machen und die impliziten, das Problem verstärkenden Staatsgarantien außer Kraft zu setzen. ; Many banks are now too big, complex, and closely networked to be wound up. When they get into difficulties, they threaten the entire financial system of their economic area. Five years of financial crisis have not alleviated but exacerbated this problem. The cost of stabilizing banks is enormous, posing serious challenges for the states affected. In addition, such state guarantees create dangerously false incentives: they encourage managers and financiers to run high risks, and favor the further expansion of banks. At present, solutions are being sought in the introduction of a separated banking system, with the aim of creating smaller, less complex financial institutions that would be easier to wind up and of protecting deposit and credit business more effectively from the risks of proprietary trading. In February 2013, the German federal government presented its plans to break up German universal banks into retail and trading institutions. However, this paper shows that in all the various scenarios for such a separation, many financial institutions would still exceed the size at which a bank has ever been wound up successfully - that is, without disastrous consequences for the economy as a whole. The government proposals also envisage the deposit bank and the residual bank remaining united within a holding structure; it is questionable whether this would suffice to ensure unbundling and thus the feasibility of liquidation. The authors are therefore not convinced that the proposed legislation can achieve its declared objective of enabling the liquidation of large banks and avoiding the associated state guarantees that aggravate the problem.

Many banks are now too big, complex, and closely interconnected to be liquidated. When they run into difficulties, they threaten the entire financial system of their economic area. Five years of financial crisis have not alleviated but exacerbated this problem. The cost of stabilizing banks is enormous, posing serious challenges to the states affected. In addition, such state guarantees create dangerously false incentives: they encourage managers and investors to engage into high risk-taking, and favor the further expansion of banks. At present, solutions are being sought in the introduction of a separated banking system, with the aim of creating smaller, less complex financial institutions that would be easier to unwind and of protecting the deposit and loan-granting part more effectively from the risks of proprietary trading. In February 2013, the German federal government presented its plans to break up German universal banks into retail and trading institutions.1 However, this article shows that under various scenarios for such a separation, many financial institutions would still exceed the size at which a bank has ever been liquidated successfully - that is, without disastrous consequences for the economy as a whole. The government proposals also envisage the deposit bank and the residual bank remaining united within a holding structure; it is questionable whether this would suffice to ensure unbundling and thus the feasibility of liquidation. The authors are therefore not convinced that the proposed legislation can achieve its declared objective of enabling the liquidation of large banks and avoiding the associated state guarantees that aggravate the problem.

This paper introduces a new methodology to date systemic financial stress events in a transparent, objective and reproducible way. The financial cycle is captured by a monthly country-specific financial stress index. Based on a Markov-switching model, high financial stress regimes are identified, and a simple algorithm is used to select those episodes of financial stress that are associated with a substantial negative impact on the real economy. By applying this framework to 27 European Union countries, the paper is a first attempt to provide a chronology of systemic financial stress episodes in addition to the expert-detected events that are currently available.

This paper presents a new database for financial crises in European countries, which serves as an important step towards establishing a common ground for macroprudential oversight and policymaking in the EU. The database focuses on providing precise chronological definitions of crisis periods to support the calibration of models in macroprudential analysis. An important contribution of this work is the identification of financial crises by combining a quantitative approach based on a financial stress index with expert judgement from national and European authorities. Key innovations of this database are (i) the inclusion of qualitative information about events and policy responses, (ii) the introduction of a broad set of non-exclusive categories to classify events, and (iii) a distinction between event and post-event adjustment periods. The paper explains the two-step approach for identifying crises and other key choices in the construction of the dataset. Moreover, stylised facts about the systemic crises in the dataset are presented together with estimations of output losses and fiscal costs associated with these crises. A preliminary assessment of the performance of standard early warning indicators based on the new crises dataset confirms findings in the literature that multivariate models can improve compared to univariate signalling models.

This paper presents a new database for financial crises in European countries, which serves as an important step towards establishing a common ground for macroprudential oversight and policymaking in the EU. The database focuses on providing precise chronological definitions of crisis periods to support the calibration of models in macroprudential analysis. An important contribution of this work is the identification of financial crises by combining a quantitative approach based on a financial stress index with expert judgement from national and European authorities. Key innovations of this database are (i) the inclusion of qualitative information about events and policy responses, (ii) the introduction of a broad set of non-exclusive categories to classify events, and (iii) a distinction between event and post-event adjustment periods. The paper explains the two-step approach for identifying crises and other key choices in the construction of the dataset. Moreover, stylised facts about the systemic crises in the dataset are presented together with estimations of output losses and fiscal costs associated with these crises. A preliminary assessment of the performance of standard early warning indicators based on the new crises dataset confirms findings in the literature that multivariate models can improve compared to univariate signalling models.