Search results

AbstractTraditionally, international humanitarian law (IHL) is conceptualized as a body of mutually binding, horizontal international legal rules that are agreed upon by States and that govern the relationships between parties to armed conflicts. Yet, there is discernible evidence that contemporary IHL – and the broader normative environment that pertains to the regulation of armed conflicts in which it is situated – is incorporating elements of unilateralization, manifested in legal and non-legal norms that regulate armed conflicts taking the form of commitments whose validity is not dependent on being reciprocated. This article examines some of the systemic implications of unilateralization of IHL and considers its pitfalls and potential.

The "organization" of the non-State armed group and the "intensity" of the violence between it and its opponent(s) have emerged as the two key criteria to determine the temporal scope of the law of non-international armed conflict. These criteria have served to lift the fog of law in some important respects. Yet, several aspects of the temporal scope of the law of non-international armed conflict remain unsettled. This article addresses three of them, namely the assertion that the factors for ascertaining organization and intensity that have evolved in the jurisprudence of international criminal courts and tribunals are indicative rather than determinative, to whom the criterion of organization is to be applied, and whether the requisite level of intensity of armed violence can be cumulative when multiple organized armed groups are pitted against each other and government forces even though the armed violence that arises in the bilateral relations between two opposing parties does not reach the requisite level of intensity.

AbstractWhile it is generally accepted today that international humanitarian law (IHL) is binding on organized armed groups, it is less clear why that is so and how the binding force of IHL on organized armed groups is to be construed. A number of explanations for that binding force have been offered. The present contribution critically examines five such explanations, namely that organized armed groups are bound via the state on whose territory they operate; that organized armed groups are bound because their members are bound by IHL as individuals; that norms of IHL are binding on organized armed groups by virtue of the fact that they exercisede factogovernmental functions; that customary IHL is applicable to organized armed groups because of the (limited) international legal personality that they possess; and that organized armed groups are bound by IHL because they have consented thereto.

Currently, no judicial or quasi-judicial mechanisms exist with the explicit competence to consider complaints of individuals claiming to be victims of violations of international humanitarian law. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) cannot fulfil this role as it has neither the means, the purpose nor the mandate to make enforceable judicial determinations with regard to claims of individuals alleging to be victims of such violations. Instead, it operates mainly through confidential discussions with governments. Likewise, criminal prosecutions of individual perpetrators before national or international courts, while contributing significantly to improving the implementation of humanitarian law, cannot and should not be the only answer to violations of the law. For one thing, the future International Criminal Court (ICC) will only consider the most serious violations of humanitarian law, leaving numerous other violations uninvestigated. Moreover, criminal prosecutions are concerned with individuals rather than parties to the conflict. The acts that are labelled as international crimes, however, find their basis in the collectivity. Crimes are unlikely to be prevented nor will compliance with their prohibition be significantly improved through criminal prosecution of individuals alone. Similarly, while the ICC may, either upon request or on its own motion, afford reparations to victims of war crimes, these are reparations afforded within the individual responsibility framework of the ICC. The Court may make an order directly against a convicted person rather than against a state or entity.

Advances in technologies that could endow humans with physical or mental abilities that go beyond the statistically normal level of functioning are occurring at an incredible pace. The use of these human enhancement technologies by the military, for instance in the spheres of biotechnology, cybernetics and prosthetics, raise a number of questions under the international legal frameworks governing military technology, namely the law of armed conflict and human rights law. The article examines these frameworks with a focus on weapons law, the law pertaining to the detention of and by "enhanced individuals," the human rights of those individuals and their responsibility for the actions they take while under the influence of enhancements.

In response to the weaknesses of international tribunals and domestic courts in the prosecution of crimes such as genocide crimes against humanity and war crimes, a generation of 'internationalised' criminal courts has been established. This text covers three active & one putative jurisdiction of this kind.

International crimes, such as crimes against humanity, genocide and war crimes, are committed by individuals. However, individuals rarely commit such crimes for their own profit. Instead, such crimes are often caused by collective entities. Notable examples include the 'dirty war' in Argentina in the 1970s and 1980s, the atrocities committed during the Balkan Wars in the early 1990s and the crimes committed during the ongoing armed conflicts in the Darfur area in Sudan. Referring to Darfur, the Prosecutor of the ICC noted in 2008 that, although he had indicted a few individuals, 'the information gathered points to an ongoing pattern of crimes committed with the mobilisation of the whole state apparatus'. This book reviews the main legal avenues that are available within the international legal order to address the increasingly important problem of system criminality and identifies possible improvements

This is the third book in the series Shared Responsibility in International Law, which examines the problem of distribution of responsibilities among multiple states and other actors. In its work on the responsibility of states and international organisations, the International Law Commission recognised that attribution of acts to one actor does not exclude possible attribution of the same act to another state or organisation. Recognising that the applicable rules and procedures for shared responsibility may differ between particular issue areas, this volume reviews the practice of states, international organisations, courts and other bodies that have dealt with the issue of international responsibility of multiple wrongdoing actors in a wide range of issue areas, including energy, extradition, investment law, NATO-led operations and fisheries. These analyses jointly assess the fit of the prevailing principles of international responsibility and provide a basis for reform and further development of international law