Refugees, Perceived Threat & Domestic Terrorism
In: Studies in conflict and terrorism, Band 47, Heft 6, S. 668-699
ISSN: 1521-0731
12 Ergebnisse
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In: Studies in conflict and terrorism, Band 47, Heft 6, S. 668-699
ISSN: 1521-0731
In: Terrorism and political violence, Band 28, Heft 5, S. 868-887
ISSN: 1556-1836
In: Defence and peace economics, Band 32, Heft 6, S. 742-756
ISSN: 1476-8267
In: Terrorism and political violence, Band 34, Heft 2, S. 218-239
ISSN: 1556-1836
In: Conflict management and peace science: the official journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 36, Heft 1, S. 20-41
ISSN: 1549-9219
Domestic political use of force is a strategy for political leaders to divert the public's attention away from economic instability and rebuild political capital. But, diversionary incentives are not the only motivation; the targeted vulnerable minority's capabilities are important. We analyze how the combination of diversionary incentive and out-group mobilization capabilities influences leaders' decision-calculus. Embattled leaders make strategic decisions about both the target and the adequate severity of force to accomplish diversion without risking conflict escalation. We empirically test the resulting hypotheses using the Minorities at Risk dataset from 1998 to 2003 and find support for our expectations. Incentive alone does not determine domestic political use of force; the same incentive produces variance in the severity of force dependent on the targeted out-group's mobilization capability. Governments match the severity of domestic force to political survival goals and the costs and risks of political use of force.
World Affairs Online
In: Journal of elections, public opinion and parties, Band 27, Heft 2, S. 133-155
ISSN: 1745-7297
In: Conflict management and peace science: the official journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 36, Heft 1, S. 20-41
ISSN: 1549-9219
Domestic political use of force is a strategy for political leaders to divert the public's attention away from economic instability and rebuild political capital. But, diversionary incentives are not the only motivation; the targeted vulnerable minority's capabilities are important. We analyze how the combination of diversionary incentive and out-group mobilization capabilities influences leaders' decision-calculus. Embattled leaders make strategic decisions about both the target and the adequate severity of force to accomplish diversion without risking conflict escalation. We empirically test the resulting hypotheses using the Minorities at Risk dataset from 1998 to 2003 and find support for our expectations. Incentive alone does not determine domestic political use of force; the same incentive produces variance in the severity of force dependent on the targeted out-group's mobilization capability. Governments match the severity of domestic force to political survival goals and the costs and risks of political use of force.
In: Research & politics: R&P, Band 8, Heft 2, S. 205316802110199
ISSN: 2053-1680
During times of domestic turmoil, the use of force abroad becomes an appealing strategy to US presidents in hopes of diverting attention away from internal conditions and toward a foreign policy success. Weaponized drone technology presents a low cost and potentially high-reward option to embattled presidents. While generally covert operations, drone strikes are frequently reported in the media, making them a viable diversionary tool. To gauge whether drone strikes are in fact capable of diverting the public's attention, we surveyed 1198 Americans and find that a successful drone strike increases presidential approval despite a weak and sagging economy, and the impact of diversionary drone use is significantly greater than that which accompanies traditional diversionary methods.
In: International organization, Band 72, Heft 2, S. 485-521
ISSN: 1531-5088
AbstractThe links between protests and state responses have taken on increased visibility in light of the Arab Spring movements. But we still have unanswered questions about the relationship between protest behaviors and responses by the state. We frame this in terms of concession and disruption costs. Costs are typically defined as government behaviors that impede dissidents' capacity for collective action. We change this causal arrow and hypothesize how dissidents can generate costs that structure the government's response to a protest. By disaggregating costs along dimensions of concession and disruption we extend our understanding of protest behaviors and the conditions under which they are more (or less) effective. Utilizing a new cross-national protest-event data set, we test our theoretical expectations against protests from 1990 to 2014 and find that when protesters generate high concession costs, the state responds in a coercive manner. Conversely, high disruption costs encourage the state to accommodate demands. Our research provides substantial insights and inferences about the dynamics of government response to protest.
In: Foreign policy analysis, Band 18, Heft 2
ISSN: 1743-8594
Abstract
Countries routinely translate official statements and state media articles from native languages to English. Over time, these articles provide a window into what each government is trying to portray to the world. The FOCUSdata Project provides years' worth of text and language sentiment ratings for hundreds of thousands of articles from state media and ministry of foreign affairs' websites from North Korea, China, Russia, and Iran. Information is an important foreign policy tool and national security strategists analyze how it influences the attitudes and behaviors of foreign audiences. This article introduces the FOCUSdata Project and shows how the sentiment data provide unique abilities to analyze Russia's and Iran's reactions to US policies and events and NGO human rights campaigns. Evaluating countries' official narratives improves understanding of government signals to outside actors, reactions to crises and foreign policy tools, and interests regarding (un)favorable developments. Governments' sentiment provides unique explanatory power.
In: Journal of politics in Latin America, Band 14, Heft 1, S. 55-83
ISSN: 1868-4890
Despite constant monitoring, we lack a good explanation for the 2018–2019 protest crisis in Nicaragua. The escalation of protests, repression, duration, and the death toll are surprising. Applying a novel political and economic cost framework, we benchmark Nicaragua's historical and recent political protests and explain the Ortega administration's responses, thus providing a rich case (with comparative data for context) that makes sense of this extraordinary period of protest. The empirical analysis buttresses our qualitative case study of protest motivations and tactics and extreme state violence that define four phases of the conflict. The combination of qualitative and quantitative analyses creates one of the first robust studies of protest–response dynamics of this protest crisis. We conclude that these protests are unique with respect to previous protests in the country and the region and that government repression was a logical response in some phases but was inconsistently applied. (JPLA/GIGA)
World Affairs Online
In: Journal of politics in Latin America, Band 14, Heft 1, S. 55-83
ISSN: 1868-4890
Despite constant monitoring, we lack a good explanation for the 2018–2019 protest crisis in Nicaragua. The escalation of protests, repression, duration, and the death toll are surprising. Applying a novel political and economic cost framework, we benchmark Nicaragua's historical and recent political protests and explain the Ortega administration's responses, thus providing a rich case (with comparative data for context) that makes sense of this extraordinary period of protest. The empirical analysis buttresses our qualitative case study of protest motivations and tactics and extreme state violence that define four phases of the conflict. The combination of qualitative and quantitative analyses creates one of the first robust studies of protest–response dynamics of this protest crisis. We conclude that these protests are unique with respect to previous protests in the country and the region and that government repression was a logical response in some phases but was inconsistently applied.