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Conceptualizing behavior decision theoretically as being 'pulled' (by an expected future) is fundamentally different from conceptualizing it as 'pushed' (or determined by past conditions according to causal laws). However, the fundamental distinction between teleological and non-teleological explanations not withstanding, decision-theoretic and evolutionary 'ways of world making' lead to strikingly similar forms of political, philosophical, and economic models. Common Hobbesian roots can account historically for the emergence of such a common 'PPE' outlook, while a game-theoretic framework of indirect evolution can accommodate the fundamental methodological tension between teleological and non-teleological approaches or the 'humanities' and the 'science' traditions in PPE's disciplines.

The Future of Democracy: Essays of the Tampere Club, by Ernesto Garzon Valdes et al., iw reviewed.

Anthony de Jasay's work has been enormously influential, describing both a theoretical philosophical model for a stateless, liberal, free market order and offering analysis of and solutions to many of the technical economic problems associated with such a vision of society - most notably his work on the free rider and his return. In this book ten significant scholars in philosophy and political economy, including Nobel laureate in economics James Buchanan, pay tribute to the man and his work in a series of essays at once both respectful and critical. Ordered Anarchy focuses on three fundamental questions of libertarian thinking. Which are the basic libertarian principles and how do rights and liberties relate to each other? Is order possible and durable in an anarchic or quasi-anarchic society, and if so, under which preconditions? How and to what extent are the pillars of politics, such as the constitution, institutions and government, detrimental or beneficial to an enduring free society? While Narveson, Palmer and Bouillon focus on the first of these questions, the late Radnitzky and van Dun address the second. Benson, Holcombe and Kliemt provide answers to question number three, while Buchanan and Little highlight the role of Anthony de Jasay in this debate and the inspiration that his thinking has given to the authors of this volume.

Unanimous voting as the fundamental procedural source of political legitimacy grants veto power to each individual. We present an axiomatic characterization of a class of bidding processes to spell out the underlying egalitarian values for collective projects of a productive state. At heart of such procedures is the determination of payments for all possible bid vectors such that equal profits according to bids emerge. Along with other intuitive requirements this characterizes procedurally fair bidding rules for advantageous projects of a collectivity.

Relying on the specific example of ultimatum bargaining experiments this paper explores the possible role of empirical knowledge of behavioural 'norm(ative) facts' within the search for (W)RE - (Wide) Reflective Equilibria on normative issues. Assuming that 'pro-social' behaviour 'reveals' moral orientations, it is argued that these 'norm-facts' can and should be used along with stated preferences in justificatory arguments of normative ethics and economics of the 'means to given ends' variety. At the same time behavioural norm-facts are so heterogeneous that any hopes to reach an inter-personally agreed (W)RE in matters moral seem futile. [Copyright Elsevier B.V.]

Though the social choice of social institutions or social results is impossible there is, strictly speaking, no social choice individual evaluations of social institutions or results trivially are possible. Such individual evaluations can be deemed liberal either because they emphasize political institutions that embody liberal values (political liberalism) or because individuals make up their mind in a specifically liberal" way of forming ethical judgment (philosophical liberalism). Seen in this light the Paradox of Liberalism is of theoretical or philosophical interest but not a practical problem of political (institutional) liberalism.

Abstract
There is an ever increasing shortage of human organ transplants in Germany. This paper aims at understanding the reasons for that shortage better and then discusses various ways to overcome it. After estimating the potential supply of donor organs it is discussed why actual supply remains far below potential supply. Insufficient reimbursement for hospitals, a lack of incentives to donate, and mistaken donation rules are diagnosed to cause the shortage. Thus, organ shortage is due not to natural constraints but to inappropriate social institutions. Introducing a presumed consent rule, reciprocity in organ allocation, better payments for hospitals and for donors seem potential remedies.