We suggest that procedures of monetarized bidding can facilitate co-operation in Elinor Ostrom type common(s) projects without crowding out communitarian faculties of self-governance. Axioms securing procedurally egalitarian bidding on the basis of declared monetary evaluations are introduced. They guarantee that all realized changes of a status quo are in an objective (pecuniary) sense equally advantageous for all members of the community. Some empirical evidence that procedurally fair bidding can promote communitarian co-operation rather than crowding it out, is presented. The practical scope and limits of procedural egalitarianism need further empirical exploration, though.
Unanimous voting as the fundamental procedural source of political legitimacy grants veto power to each individual. We present an axiomatic characterization of a class of bidding processes to spell out the underlying egalitarian values for collective projects of a productive state. At heart of such procedures is the determination of payments for all possible bid vectors such that equal profits according to bids emerge. Along with other intuitive requirements this characterizes procedurally fair bidding rules for advantageous projects of a collectivity.
Though the social choice of social institutions or social results is impossible there is, strictly speaking, no social choice individual evaluations of social institutions or results trivially are possible. Such individual evaluations can be deemed liberal either because they emphasize political institutions that embody liberal values (political liberalism) or because individuals make up their mind in a specifically liberal" way of forming ethical judgment (philosophical liberalism). Seen in this light the Paradox of Liberalism is of theoretical or philosophical interest but not a practical problem of political (institutional) liberalism.
In standard rational choice modelling decisions are made according to given information and preferences. In the model presented here the 'information technology' of individual decision makers as well as their preferences evolve in a dynamic process. In this process decisions are made rationally by players who differ in their informational as well as in their preference type. Relative success of alternative decisions feeds back on the type composition of the population which in turn influences rational decision making. An indirect evolutionary analysis of an elementary yet important basic game of trust shows that under certain parameter constellations the population dynamics of the evolutionary process specify a unique completely mixed rest point. However, as opposed to previous studies of preference formation in the game of trust there is no convergence to but only cycling around the rest point if the informational status of individuals evolves rather than being chosen strategically.
In standard rational choice modelling decisions are made according to given information and preferences. In the model presented here the 'information technology' of individual decision makers as well as their preferences evolve in a dynamic process. In this process decisions are made rationally by players who differ in their informational as well as in their preference type. Relative success of alternative decisions feeds back on the type composition of the population which in turn influences rational decision making. An indirect evolutionary analysis of an elementary yet important basic game of trust shows that under certain parameter constellations the population dynamics of the evolutionary process specify a unique completely mixed rest point. However, as opposed to previous studies of preference formation in the game of trust there is no convergence to but only cycling around the rest point if the informational status of individuals evolves rather than being chosen strategically.
Die Verhaltensökonomie und ihre praktischen Implikationen geraten immer stärker in den Fokus auch der deutschen Politik. Individuelle Entscheidungen sollen im Sinne eines "libertären Paternalismus" sanft beeinflusst werden. Die 'Nudges' bestehen in Standardvorgaben, Selbstbindungen und der Informationsbereitstellung. Deren Anwendung setzt allerdings die Klärung einiger Fragen voraus: Wer darf sich anmaßen, für die Wirtschaftssubjekte 'kluge' Entscheidungen zu treffen? Bei welchen Entscheidungen sind Eingriffe einer anderen Instanz begründbar? Mit welchem Zeithorizont und aufgrund welcher Wohlfahrtsüberlegungen wird eine Entscheidung als 'richtig' defi niert? Welcher Rationalitätsbegriff steht hinter dem Konzept? ; Behavioural economics and economic experiments can offer valuable insights to policymakers. Liberal or soft paternalism assumes that governmental nudging through the conscious setting of defaults in order to overcome potential behavioural anomalies can lead to better outcomes without giving up basic freedom of choice. Some authors recommend state interventions to prevent commercial firms from exploiting the effects of nudges, in particular through the use of defaults. They consider it necessary to create mandatory rules for how the nudging is permitted to be done. The state must decide on the scope and limits of the commitment power it grants to individuals. The danger of nudging is that information asymmetries can be used in order to manipulate people. The authors see nudges in the form of information provision and those for voluntarily improving self-control as useful. Educating individuals about the pitfalls of rational decision-making and using individual-level private mechanisms to avoid such pitfalls is put forward as a promising approach. Regarding paternalism as well as soft paternalism as enemies to freedom, liberal economists reject such state interference.
Ökonomen und Politiker beklagen sich gelegentlich übereinander. Die Ökonomen meinen, das politische Alltagsgeschäft berücksichtige die Erkenntnisse der Wissenschaft zu wenig und sei mit inkonsistenten Maßnahmen und suboptimalen Ergebnissen verbunden. Die Politiker sehen sich dagegen zum Teil mit realitätsfernen Empfehlungen konfrontiert. Die Bewertungsschemata für wissenschaftliche Exzellenz schaffen zudem Anreize für eher theoretisch ausgerichtete Forschung. Eine solch dramatische Diskrepanz zwischen Politikberatung und Forschung können die Autoren dieses Zeitgesprächs in der Regel nicht erkennen. ; Most German economists show strong patterns of professional specialisation. In their work, they either focus on basic research or on policy consultancy. The evidence provided by Haucap und Mödl has been used to question work incentives in academia. The suggestion to change work incentives, however, is not supported by Richter, who rather calls into question the German tradition of research funding. He argues that Germany should devote more competitive funding to research projects and less to institutions. Schmidt et al. explore the question the other way around: do policy consultants publish in top journals? They conclude that they do. Güth/Kliemt show how precarious and limited our (technologically useful) knowledge is. The discussion of alternative policies among economic experts should be used to tease out the controversial arguments to allow for better informed political judgements. Wagner/Fratzscher take a historical view, showing that when modern economic research (and economic research institutes) apply a more pluralistic paradigm than that which prevailed in Germany for a long period after the Second World War, economic research will automatically have a more significant impact on politics, since policy advisors will produce more varied advice with the potential for realisation. Koll also claims that policy advice must not be based on a single supply-side oriented mainstream point of view. By drawing lessons from the crisis, economics must identify a new mainstream providing reliable guidance and policy advice.
