Suchergebnisse

Unanimous voting as the fundamental procedural source of political legitimacy grants veto power to each individual. We present an axiomatic characterization of a class of bidding processes to spell out the underlying egalitarian values for collective projects of a productive state. At heart of such procedures is the determination of payments for all possible bid vectors such that equal profits according to bids emerge. Along with other intuitive requirements this characterizes procedurally fair bidding rules for advantageous projects of a collectivity.

Though the social choice of social institutions or social results is impossible there is, strictly speaking, no social choice individual evaluations of social institutions or results trivially are possible. Such individual evaluations can be deemed liberal either because they emphasize political institutions that embody liberal values (political liberalism) or because individuals make up their mind in a specifically liberal" way of forming ethical judgment (philosophical liberalism). Seen in this light the Paradox of Liberalism is of theoretical or philosophical interest but not a practical problem of political (institutional) liberalism.

In standard rational choice modelling decisions are made according to given information and preferences. In the model presented here the 'information technology' of individual decision makers as well as their preferences evolve in a dynamic process. In this process decisions are made rationally by players who differ in their informational as well as in their preference type. Relative success of alternative decisions feeds back on the type composition of the population which in turn influences rational decision making. An indirect evolutionary analysis of an elementary yet important basic game of trust shows that under certain parameter constellations the population dynamics of the evolutionary process specify a unique completely mixed rest point. However, as opposed to previous studies of preference formation in the game of trust there is no convergence to but only cycling around the rest point if the informational status of individuals evolves rather than being chosen strategically.

Gesundheitsökonomen nehmen Stellung zu den "Eckpunkten zu einer Gesundheitsreform" der Koalitionsparteien vom 4. Juli 2006.