Suchergebnisse

With the increasing "agencification" of policy making in the European Union (EU), normative questions regarding the legitimacy of EU agencies have become ever more important. This article analyses the role of expertise and legitimacy with regard to the European Chemicals Agency ECHA. Based on the REACH regulation, so-called Substances of Very High Concern (SVHCs) are subject to authorisation. The authorisation procedure aims to ensure the good functioning of the internal market, while assuring that risks of SVHCs are properly controlled. Since ECHA has become operational in 2008, recurring decisions on SVHCs have been made. The question posed in this article is: to what extent can decision making in the REACH authorisation procedure be assessed as legitimate? By drawing on the notion of throughput legitimacy, this article argues that decision making processes in the authorisation procedure are characterized by insufficient legitimacy.

The adoption of the REACH regulation, setting out to reformchemicals policy of the European Union (EU), was accompanied by intense controversy over the role of the precautionary principle. Analysing decision making on so called Substances of Very High Concern (SVHCs), this article demonstrates that despite legal underpinning, precaution plays a limited role in the implementation of the REACH authorisation procedure. Due to ambiguous legislative provisions, the controversiesof the legislativeprocessare carriedover tothe implementationprocess.

With the increasing "agencification" of policy making in the European Union (EU), normative questions regarding the legitimacy of EU agencies have become ever more important. This article analyses the role of expertise and legitimacy with regard to the European Chemicals Agency ECHA. Based on the REACH regulation, so-called Substances of Very High Concern (SVHCs) are subject to authorisation. The authorisation procedure aims to ensure the good functioning of the internal market, while assuring that risks of SVHCs are properly controlled. Since ECHA has become operational in 2008, recurring decisions on SVHCs have been made. The question posed in this article is: to what extent can decision making in the REACH authorisation procedure be assessed as legitimate? By drawing on the notion of throughput legitimacy, this article argues that decision making processes in the authorisation procedure are characterized by insufficient legitimacy.

Comparative Politics; Political Economy; European Union Politics; Drug Safety and Pharmacovigilance

The centralised authorisation of GMOs in the European Union (EU) has received considerable academic attention in recent years, partly due to the fact thatMember States have not been able to agree on authorisation decisions in the comitology committee. As a consequence, these authorisations are given by the European Commission. These decisions are invariably in favour of authorisation despite the fact that Member States had been divided on this issue. Apart from the on-going discussions on a possible reform of the GMO authorisation (allowing for national restrictions or prohibitions), the new comitology rules brought about by the Lisbon Treaty are of equal importance as they might affect the authorisation of GMOs. In this article we discuss some of the changes to comitology and present empirical material on the first authorisation decisions after the entering into force of the new comitology rules. By drawing on delegation theory we will argue that, for the time being, the level of politicisation ofGMOauthorisation is unlikely to change.