The twenty-first century will see the emergence of maritime powers that have the capacity and capability to challenge the U.S. Navy for control of the seas. Unfortunately, the Navy's ability to react to emerging maritime powers' rapid growth and technological advancement is constrained by its own planning, ac- quisition, and political processes. Introducing our own technology advances is hindered as well. .
The twenty-first century will see the emergence of maritime powers that have the capacity and capability to challenge the U.S. Navy for control of the seas. Unfortunately, the Navy's ability to react to emerging maritime powers'rapid growth and technological advancement is constrained by its own planning, acquisition, and political processes. Introducing our own technology advances is hindered as well. The planning and acquisition system for our overly platform focused naval force structure is burdened with so many inhibitors to change that we are ill prepared to capitalize on the missile and robotics age of warfare. Yet by embracing the robotics age, recognizing the fundamental shift it represents in how naval power is conveyed, and refocusing our efforts to emphasize the "right side" of our offensive kill chain - the side that delivers the packages producing kinetic and nonkinetic effect - we may hurdle acquisition challenges and bring cutting-edge technology to contemporary naval warfare. Incorporating robotics technology into the fleet as rapidly, effectively, and efficiently as possible would magnify the fleet's capacity, lethality, and opportunity - all critical to strategic and tactical considerations. Doing so also would recognize the fiscal constraints under which our present force planning cannot be sustained. As Admiral Walker advised above, it is now time to change.
A war-at-sea strategy, by confining conflict to the sea without land invasion or strike, would provide U.S. political leadership less intrusive ways to deter war, resolve crises with less threat of escalation, and in peacetime inspire allied engagement.
"This volume describes how technological and geo-political trends are rapidly transforming maritime affairs. A mix of original and previously published material, the volume describes how 21st-century great power competition is changing the face of naval operations in general, and US Navy operations in the western Pacific in particular. The rise of an assertive China and its new anti-access and area-denial capabilities threaten the aircraft carrier-based maritime dominance of the U.S. Navy. Military and political trends in the western Pacific and beyond suggest that the world is encountering a pivotal moment when existing weapons, tactics, and operations might be rendered obsolete by techno-strategic change. This volume considers these developments from three perspectives by describing: (1) the techno-strategic setting; (2) the institutional constraints that impede the ability of the U.S. Navy to respond to these changes; and (3) a new approach to naval force planning and strategy to cope with these developments. The volume culminates in a discussion of sophisticated strategies and operational concepts that position the U.S. Navy and its maritime allies and partners to prevail in today's techno-strategic churn. This book will be of much interest to students of naval policy, strategic studies, Asia-Pacific politics, and International Relations"--
17 USC 105 interim-entered record; under temporary embargo. ; Over the last century, the U.S. Navy has encountered critical moments when the emergence of new technologies and competitors cause paradigmatic shifts, undermining established operations and force structure. Today, the rise of an assertive China and its new anti-access and area-denial capabilities threaten the aircraft carrier-based maritime dominance of the U.S. Navy. Citizens and elected officials alike need to be conversant in the process to create the strategy, forces, and metrics needed to guarantee that the United States wins the emerging maritime competition in the Western Pacific. It is time to explain to the American public the enduring considerations and limitations that shape the operations of their global Navy. ; U.S. Government affiliation is unstated in article text.
Interfaces, 37, pp. 342-352. (Awarded U.S. Patent 8,050,849 B1 ; The article of record as published may be located at http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/inte.1070.0286 ; This is a sea story about using a simple classroom example to save a great deal of money, as well as to convince beginning Postgraduate Naval School operations research students—experienced, skeptical military officers—that mathematical analysis can yield immediate results. The application is planning a ship's transit from one point to another in a fixed amount of time, given that the ship can operate with one or more of its propulsion plants idled to save fuel. Simple analysis yields nonintuitive results that US Navy shipboard energy-conservation guides overlook. One of the authors (Kline) solved this homework problem as a student and subsequently applied this example when he took command of USS AQUILA, a patrol hydrofoil missile ship. AQUILA achieved results so striking in comparison to her sister ships that the squadron material officer inspected her engineering plant to ensure that no safety settings were being overridden to achieve this record. Kline's spreadsheet decision-support tool was provided to other hydrofoil commanders. A more general version has been conveyed to the US Navy. Considering that our navy spends about a billion dollars per year on fuel for surface-combatant ships alone, this development promises substantial, long-term returns.
The subject of deterrence fell away from the forefront of American strategic thinking during the three decades following the fall of the Soviet Union. Our ability to deter much weaker states by denying them the ability to achieve their aims was long assumed. But today there is a new global security situation that makes it imperative for American military officers and security specialists to begin to relearn the fundamental tenets of this aspect of national security. The purpose of this volume is to contribute to that campaign of learning by drawing on some of the excellent scholarship published in the Naval War College Review during the Cold War and the decades since. Some of the articles included here lay out a few of the fundamentals of the theories of deterrence. ; https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/usnwc-newport-papers/1045/thumbnail.jpg
