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We develop several results related to equilibrium in sophisticated voting under an amendment agenda procedure and supermajoritarian voting rules. Contrary to the simple majority case, we demonstrate that attainable equilibria are a function of the location of the status quo ex ante as well as the tie-breaking rule in place. Most importantly, we demonstrate that the Banks set (the set of sophisticated voting outcomes) does not reduce to the core under certain conditions. Moreover, in generalizing and extending the results in Colomer (1999), we define three analytically distinct regions, defined by the location of the status quo alternative, which determine the extent of the intersection between the Banks set and the core. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright holder.]

We develop several results related to equilibrium in sophisticated voting under an amendment agenda procedure and supermajoritarian voting rules. Contrary to the simple majority case, we demonstrate that attainable equilibria are a function of the location of the status quo ex ante as well as the tie-breaking rule in place. Most importantly, we demonstrate that the Banks set (the set of sophisticated voting outcomes) does not reduce to the core under certain conditions. Moreover, in generalizing and extending the results in Colomer (1999), we define three analytically distinct regions, defined by the location of the status quo alternative, which determine the extent of the intersection between the Banks set and the core.

The question of how the size of a polity and the functioning of its democracy is curiously understudied, especially in a cross-national, empirical fashion. After introducing the issue, this survey offers an overview of the various lines of research related to this topic including that on: legislatures, political participation, free-riding, and complexity and heterogeneity. After a review of the extant literature, several potential reasons for the widespread neglect of such an important topic are offered. In the final section I put forth three methodological frameworks the should prove useful for advancing our knowledge on this topic, which in include and "economic" approach, logical-quantitative modeling and agent-based simulation.

Despite its conceptual centrality to research in comparative politics and the fact that a single measure - the Laakso-Taagepera index (N[sub]s) - is widely employed in empirical research, the question of what is the best way to "count" parties is still an open one. Among other alleged shortcomings, N[sub]s has been criticized for over-weighting small parties, especially in the case of a one-party majority. Using seat shares data from over 300 elections, I have - for the first time - calculated N[sub]s as well as an alternative measure (N[sub]Bz) which employs Banzhaf scores, rather than seat shares, as weights. The Banzhaf index is a voting power index which calculates a party's voting power as a function of its coalitional potential. Though the two measures are highly correlated, I identify three particular party constellations in which the differences between N[sub]s and N[sub]Bz are significant and systematic. [Copyright Elsevier Ltd.]

Despite its conceptual centrality to research in comparative politics and the fact that a single measure—the Laakso-Taagepera index (LT)—is nearly universally employed in empirical research, the question of what is the best way to "count" parties is still an open one. Among other alleged shortcomings, LT has been criticized for over-weighting small parties, especially in the case of a one-party majority. Using seat-shares data from over 300 elections, I have calculated LT as well as an alternative measure (BZ) which employs normalized Banzhaf scores rather than simple party seat shares, as weights. The Banzhaf index is a voting power index which calculates a party's voting power as a function of its coalitional potential. Though the two measures are highly correlated, I identify three particular party constellations in which the differences between LT and BZ are systematic and statistically significant. In all of these cases, and especially in the case of a one-party majority, I argue that BZ is a more accurate representation of the actual party system, after any given election, while LT is perhaps better interpreted as a measure of the shape of the party system more generally. These findings have many implications, including with respect to the categorization of party systems and the empirical validity of Duverger's Law.

We offer a new measure of the ideologically cognizable number of political parties/party groupings that is intended to be complementary to the standard approach to counting the effective number of political parties -- the Laakso-Taagepera index (1979). This approach allows the possibility of precise measurement of concepts such as polarized pluralism or fragmented bipolarism and is applicable to both unidimensional and multidimensional representations of party locations. Using recent CSES (Comparative Study of Electoral Systems) data on one-dimensional representations of party locations in four real-world examples (two of which are available in an online appendix), we find that Slovenia, treated initially as a five-party system, has its optimal reduction as a two-bloc/party system, as does Spain, which is treated initially as a four-party system. However, Canada, treated initially as a four-party system, has its optimal reduction as a three-bloc/party system if we look at a unidimensional representation of the party space, while it remains a four-bloc system if we draw on Johnston's two-dimensional characterization of Canadian political competition. Finally, the Czech Republic, initially a five-party system, is optimally reduced to a system with four party groupings. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright holder.]

We offer a new measure of the ideologically cognizable number of political parties/party groupings that is intended to be complementary to the standard approach to counting the effective number of political parties – the Laakso–Taagepera index (1979). This approach allows the possibility of precise measurement of concepts such as polarized pluralism or fragmented bipolarism and is applicable to both unidimensional and multidimensional representations of party locations. Using recent CSES (Comparative Study of Electoral Systems) data on one-dimensional representations of party locations in four real-world examples (two of which are available in an online appendix), we find that Slovenia, treated initially as a five-party system, has its optimal reduction as a two-bloc/party system, as does Spain, which is treated initially as a four-party system. However, Canada, treated initially as a four-party system, has its optimal reduction as a three-bloc/party system if we look at a unidimensional representation of the party space, while it remains a four-bloc system if we draw on Johnston's two-dimensional characterization of Canadian political competition. Finally, the Czech Republic, initially a five-party system, is optimally reduced to a system with four party groupings.

AbstractResearch commonly finds that citizens are loss averse: they dislike losses far more than similarly sized gains. One implication is that arguments for policy change framed in terms of losses to be avoided often have a larger impact on public opinion than arguments framed in terms of gains to be enjoyed. Although several scholars have observed this pattern with respect to public opinion, we know far less about the effect of loss- and gain-framed arguments on political activism. This is a critical omission given the disproportionate impact of political activists on the policymaking process. Using field and survey experiments, we investigate the impact of gain- and loss-framed arguments on climate change activism. We find that loss-framed arguments can be less mobilizing, even when they are otherwise more persuasive, than gain-framed arguments. Our results deepen our theoretical understanding of what motivates political activism, especially in an era of professionalized politics.