Suchergebnisse

Views the 2008 financial crisis as a market & government failure involving a wide gap between the truth & what those involved thought to be true. Discussion begins with by noting the centrality of the housing sector to the US economy & tracing housing industrial policy to 1968 & the debut of mortgage securitization. Problems with securitization are identified before examining the growth of securitization in the US, highlighting the function of Freddie Mac. Attention is given to the problematic capital requirements of Freddie Mac & the other government-sponsored enterprise Fannie Mae, the emergence of private securitization, the bubble created by financial innovation, the "suits-vs-geeks" clash between high-level executives & financial engineers at Freddie Mac & Fannie Mae. Thus, the blame for the recent housing & mortgage credit bubble is assigned to the growth of securitization, the large volume of loans with low down payments, & the suits-vs-geeks divide. Alternative narratives of blame are then reviewed. It is suggested that regulators had the tools but not the knowledge to prevent the financial crisis. Adapted from the source document.

The nature of political arguments -- Applying the three-axes model -- Fast political thinking and simple moral frames -- Beyond your dominant heuristic -- Your mind on politics: motivated reasoning -- Further thoughts on human nature -- The state of closure: discrediting the opponent -- The ideological turing test -- I'm reasonable, they're not -- Using all three languages: examples -- Conclusion -- Appendix: testing the three-axes model

Filling in frameworks -- Machine as metaphor -- Instructions and incentives -- Choices and commands -- Specialization and sustainability -- Trade and trust -- Finance and fluctuations -- Policy in practice -- Macroeconomics and misgivings -- Concluding contemplation

The financial crisis of 2008 -- The discrepancy between knowledge and power -- Mechanisms for decentralizing power

The discipline of economics is not what it used to be. Over the last few decades, economists have begun a revolutionary reorientation in how we look at the world, and this has major implications for politics, policy, and our everyday lives. For years, conventional economists told us an incomplete story that leaned on the comfortable precision of mathematical abstraction and ignored the complexity of the real world with all of its uncertainties, unknowns, and ongoing evolution.What economists left out of the story were the positive forces of creativity, innovation, and advancing technology that