Why are religious civil wars so difficult to resolve peacefully? This dissertation argues that states, not just insurgents, drive the intractability of religious conflicts. More specifically, it draws on insights from social psychology, along with religious and strategic studies, to develop and test a novel theoretical framework for why and when government officials refuse to compromise with opposition movements that mobilize along religious lines. The argument posits that Western political and military elites share a secular strategic culture that heightens the correspondence between religious insurgents' behavior and motives. This cognitive bias leads decision makers to infer that religious guerrillas fight to radically alter the status quo, rather than protest unfavorable conditions, such as poverty or territorial occupation. It is most influential when religious demands represent a central incompatibility in the conflict and counterinsurgents face an unfamiliar faith tradition. Ultimately, government officials discount the efficacy of a negotiated settlement because they conclude their opponents will stop at nothing to achieve their objective. It is not that religious insurgents are necessarily unwilling to make concessions; it is that they cannot credibly do so.These claims are tested with comparative evidence from British counterinsurgency campaigns during the early postwar period with an emphasis on Mandatory Palestine, Cyprus, and Kenya. The dissertation draws on original data collected from more than a half dozen archives in Great Britain, Cyprus, and Israel. This includes documents from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and housed at The National Archives of the United Kingdom that have only been available to the public since 2013. For each case, process tracing is employed to show as explicitly as possible the link between British decision-makers general beliefs about religion and their strategic preferences over the course of the conflict. The dissertation's argument and findings challenge the influential notion that dissidents' spiritual beliefs alone drive civil wars to endure longer and remain resistant to bargained solutions. In addition, they promise to augment the study of religious conflict by establishing a research agenda on the role of state forces in such engagements.
Despite a robust literature on general forms of state repression, the determinants of religious repression remain unclear. This article argues that a regime's experience with religious conflict will lead it to be more repressive of religious groups within its territory for three primary reasons. Religious conflict increases the behavioral threat posed by religious groups, lowers the cost of repressing these communities, and evokes vivid memories of past religious violence that underscore the role of the state in taming religion to maintain social order. New, cross-national data on religious conflict and repression from 1990 to 2009 show that religious conflict has a significant and positive effect on the level of religious repression for the time period under investigation, expanding the types and severity of government restrictions on religion in a country. Our findings point to the importance of studying the causes and nature of negative sanctions against religious communities, specifically.
Despite a robust literature on general forms of state repression, the determinants of religious repression remain unclear. This article argues that a regime's experience with religious conflict will lead it to be more repressive of religious groups within its territory for three primary reasons. Religious conflict increases the behavioral threat posed by religious groups, lowers the cost of repressing these communities, and evokes vivid memories of past religious violence that underscore the role of the state in taming religion to maintain social order. New, cross-national data on religious conflict and repression from 1990 to 2009 show that religious conflict has a significant and positive effect on the level of religious repression for the time period under investigation, expanding the types and severity of government restrictions on religion in a country. Our findings point to the importance of studying the causes and nature of negative sanctions against religious communities, specifically.
This article investigates how and when regime transitions intensify minority discrimination through an analysis of two types of religious persecution following the Arab uprisings. We argue that weakened institutions and the prevalence of religious outbidding during political transitions make societal-based religious discrimination (SRD) more likely to increase than government-based religious discrimination (GRD). This is because social divisions are often exacerbated and social unrest difficult to contain, while at the same time, policy change can be difficult to enact and enforce. We test these claims through a mixed-methods research design. Employing a synthetic control method, the cross-national, quantitative analysis from 1990 to 2014 confirms that GRD has not changed since the Arab uprisings, while SRD has substantially increased in those countries (i.e. Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia) that also experienced regime change. A case study of Egypt provides more direct evidence of the institutional and outbidding mechanisms. The qualitative analysis draws on ethnographic research conducted in Cairo during 2014, which includes in-depth interviews with Coptic Orthodox Christians. Our findings underscore the twin challenge of protecting and accommodating minority religions during periods of political transition.
This article investigates how and when regime transitions intensify minority discrimination through an analysis of two types of religious persecution following the Arab uprisings. We argue that weakened institutions and the prevalence of religious outbidding during political transitions make societal-based religious discrimination (SRD) more likely to increase than government-based religious discrimination (GRD). This is because social divisions are often exacerbated and social unrest difficult to contain, while at the same time, policy change can be difficult to enact and enforce. We test these claims through a mixed-methods research design. Employing a synthetic control method, the cross-national, quantitative analysis from 1990 to 2014 confirms that GRD has not changed since the Arab uprisings, while SRD has substantially increased in those countries (i.e. Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia) that also experienced regime change. A case study of Egypt provides more direct evidence of the institutional and outbidding mechanisms. The qualitative analysis draws on ethnographic research conducted in Cairo during 2014, which includes in-depth interviews with Coptic Orthodox Christians. Our findings underscore the twin challenge of protecting and accommodating minority religions during periods of political transition.
This book presents a new approach for studying peace beyond the absence of war. As war ends, the varying nature of the peace that ensues has been the object of much debate. Through in-depth case studies, including Cyprus, Cambodia, South Africa, Abkhazia, Transnistria/Russia, Colombia, Sri Lanka, the Philippines and Myanmar, the book illustrates how conceptualising 'relational peace' provides a framework that can be applied across cases and actors, different levels of analysis, a variety of geographical contexts and using different temporal perspectives and types of data. This novel framework enables improved empirical studies of peace. The book contributes nuanced understandings of peace in particular settings and demonstrates the multifaceted nature of peaceful relations – what is termed 'relational peace practices' – making important contributions to the field of studying peace beyond the absence of war