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Depoliticization presents itself to us both as a theoretical and a practical-political problem. The argument of the thesis aims to develop depoliticization as a philosophical concept which gains its impetus from and is tested against the politics of the European Union (EU). My approach to depoliticization (critique) is that ethics provides part of the solution, rather than simply being part of the problem. After a conceptual reflection, I analyze EU politics in terms of its modes of self-justification, the incontestable nature of some of its central institutions, and its one-sided reliance on negative integration through juridical means. In an attempt to develop the relationship between politics and ethics more constructively, I then develop an account of both direct and indirect relations. A key aspect of my analysis is the distinction between localized and generalized depoliticization critique – only the latter extends to the ontological dimension, which is why the former falls short. This leads to an ambiguous patchwork of politicizing and depoliticizing effects, which is illustrated by the development of the ethical-political relationship between Rousseau and Schmitt. These are what I call direct relations between politics and ethics, in which ethics is directly 'brought' to politics. I then consider indirect relations, in which a specific procedure is interposed: I consider Habermas' proposed reforms of EU politics, and interpret Rawls' political liberalism as a complementary accoun

In 'Cultural Difference and Human Rights', Julien Kloeg claims, with Pablo Gilabert, that theoretical attempts to justify human rights should move beyond the dichotomy of providing either a humanist or a political justification. Kloeg demonstrates how philosophical anthropology could ground an attempt to combine both types of justifications. In order to provide such a combination, he develops both a new conception of culture based on Plessner's thinking on spatial finitude, and a Rancièrian conception of human rights.

Theorists of justice have to steer between two rocks. On the one hand, there is the intuition that an individual's morally permitted preferences should be respected: it is not justifiable to intervene with them. On the other hand, such preferences are the result of formation processes, which are notoriously vulnerable to manipulation. Does justice demand respect for preferences that produce or perpetuate injustices, suffered either by the individual herself or by others? In this paper, I will investigate this problem in the context of the ambiguous tenet of neutrality. The field of gender justice has extended Rawlsian theories of justice in order to account for structural factors, such as socialisation. Some theorists have argued that the justice-inhibiting character of some preferences implies that the first intuition should be rejected in favour of the second in some cases, which leads to the conclusion that some preferences are like obstacles standing in the way of justice and should thus be reformed. I will call this the 'Normative Hierarchy View' and argue that it is problematic. It presupposes a certain attitude with respect to those who hold the preferences, which forecloses a politically salient kind of respect. Furthermore, at the