Suchergebnisse

The problem of clean hands : negotiated compromise in lawmaking / Eric Beerbohm -- Which side are you on? / Anton Ford -- The moral distinctiveness of legislated law / David Dyzenhaus -- On compromise, negotiation, and loss / Amy J. Cohen -- Compromise in negotiation / Simon Cábulea May -- Uncompromising democracy / Melissa Schwartzberg -- Democratic conflict and the political morality of compromise / Michelle M. Moody-Adams -- The challenges of conscience in a world of compromise / Amy J. Sepinwall -- Necessary compromise and public harm / Andrew Sabl -- Compromise and representative government : a skeptical perspective / Alexander Kirshner.

"Childhood friends Juliet, Rebecca, Rose and Matthew grew up in a small village outside Dublin. Now privileged, wealthy and powerful, they appear to have it all. But when Juliet is involved in a suspicious accident and lies trapped between life and death at the bottom of a cliff, a secret that has been hidden for years threatens the seemingly perfect lives of the close-knit group. For the beautiful, fragile Rose, Juliet's accident draws unwanted attention to the sins of the past. For her husband, the ruthlessly ambitious Matthew, it removes a critical obstacle from the path of his political career. And as Rebecca discovers more about what happened to her friend, she begins to wonder if she ever knew the real Juliet ..."--Publisher description.

This volume presents chapters on the theme of borders and migration, written for the annual meetings of the American Society for Political and Legal Philosophy. It features three lead chapters and a series of responses by other scholars drawn from the fields of law, political science, and philosophy

In this review piece I assess the theoretical approach employed by Elizabeth Anderson in her book The Imperative of Integration. Anderson advocates a non-ideal theoretical approach to questions of normative political theory. She uses non-ideal arguments to offer a compelling justification of racial integration as a social policy. I unpack her argument to identify some of the important strengths of non-ideal theory. In doing so, I argue that non-ideal approaches provide insights that are necessary for the development of persuasive answers to normative questions, but that are not achievable with ideal theoretical alternatives.

▪ Abstract  Justice is a concept at the core of many fundamental debates in political and ethical theory. In this essay I consider what is at stake in one important debate, the effort to divorce conceptions of justice from conceptions of the good. Focusing primarily on the work of John Rawls, I analyze the underlying logic of arguments based on the notion that principles of justice can be the product of "reasonable agreement" among people who hold conflicting conceptions of the good. In doing so I consider four primary criticisms of the argument: The project is a false one in that, while it purports to be neutral, it in fact gives primacy to a particular, liberal, individualistic conception of the good on which the project is grounded; the project is inadequate because its construction of the deliberation and decision-making process fails to take account of important social factors; the project is misguided in that it fails to take account of actual social practices and, thus, fails to capture the complexity of the demands on a theory of justice; and the project is destined to fail because a theory of justice adequate to the challenges of modern society cannot be constructed in an abstract, thought-experiment way.

Identifies & evaluates various rational-choice models of institutional change. Although all rational-choice models are based on the initial assumption that social actors pursue specific interests in a rational fashion, this premise leads to a diverse range of explanations for institutional change. Three models of institutional change are identified: (1) an evolutionary approach to the emergence of social norms, (2) a market-based theory of exchange & selection founded on competition, & (3) a bargaining theory that explains institutional creation through power inequality structures. The decentralized emergence of social institutions is the product of repeated interactions among a small number of social actors. These interactions are characterized by multiple choices, & institutional rules are established when equilibrium & norms are created through individual actors' repeated pursuit of the same preference or choice. Following a detailed critique of each model, it is concluded that the bargaining approach is most valid because of its ability to accommodate a broad range of social conditions in the initial premise of rational action. 1 Figure. T. Sevier