Pcoins for Parking: A Field Experiment with Tradable Mobility Permits
In: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 2021-029/VIII
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In: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 2021-029/VIII
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With congestion being one of the most important externalities in transportation, it remains important to investigate effective and politically feasible solutions for it. We have conducted an 8-week experiment with tradable mobility permits, specifically applied to the use of parking facilities at a Dutch employer. We combine actual mobility behaviour with trading behaviour and survey responses of participants and non-participating employees of the same company. We have analysed the choice to participate in a voluntary experiment, and the behavioural response to tradable permits. Our results provide suggestive evidence that active participants do adjust their behaviour as intended. Furthermore, participation takes less time than people anticipate, and permits are viewed as a fairer and better functioning alternative to paid parking.
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In: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 13-100/VIII
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Working paper
In: Transitions Towards Sustainable Mobility, S. 101-118
In the European Union, the infrastructure charging regimes that can be observed are often far from internalising external costs and are rarely based on efficiency principles. In this situation differentiation of existing charges appears to be a sensible intermediate step. In this paper we study the empirical evidence of the different aspects that affect infrastructure pricing as described by theory. In order to do so information was collected from a number of case studies, and a set of indicators was defined, not only to allow for the analysis of price differentiation practise with respect to the degree of differentiation, but also to account for the level of ambition of the price setting actors. The cross-case analysis was based on a number of hypotheses that were drawn from the theoretical framework. Testing for the hypotheses using the case study information allowed us to establish an overview of the current state of differentiated infrastructure charging.
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Congestion levels have grown substantially in recent years, while the traditional economic response to congestion – road pricing – remains politically infeasible in most locations. Tradable permits are likely to be a more viable alternative, because they do not require a net financial flow from road users to the government. It is therefore the right moment to design and empirically test tradable permit schemes for managing urban mobility. This paper presents and empirically tests a complete design of a market for tradable permits, both in terms of the conceptual set-up of the market as well as its technical implementation. The design is evaluated against a number of criteria, including: transparency and containment of transaction costs, stability of permit prices in relation to the dynamic equilibrium on the mobility market and the prevention of undesirable speculation and fraud. We present evidence of the empirical functioning of this market, using the results of a conducted lab-in-the-field experiment with virtual mobility behaviour and real financial incentives.
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In: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 2019-007/VIII
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Working paper
In: Brands , D K , Verhoef , E T , Knockaert , J & Koster , P R 2020 , ' Tradable permits to manage urban mobility : Market design and experimental implementation ' , Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice , vol. 137 , pp. 34-46 . https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tra.2020.04.008
Congestion levels remain a substantial challenge, while the traditional economic response to congestion – road pricing – remains politically infeasible in most locations. Tradable permits are likely to be a more viable alternative, because they do not require a net financial flow from road users to the government. It is therefore the right moment to design and empirically test tradable permit schemes for managing urban mobility. This paper presents and empirically tests a complete design of a market for tradable permits, both in terms of the conceptual set-up of the market as well as its technical implementation. The design is evaluated against a number of criteria, including: transparency and containment of transaction costs, stability of permit prices in relation to the dynamic equilibrium on the mobility market and the prevention of undesirable speculation and fraud. We present evidence of the empirical functioning of this market, using the results of a conducted lab-in-the-field experiment with virtual mobility behaviour and real financial incentives.
BASE
In: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper No. 11-181/3
SSRN
Working paper