Suchergebnisse

Recently, bids by Chinese multinational enterprises for leading companies in advanced economies have multiplied, despite numerous concerns being raised about such acquisitions. This Perspective explains the reasons why target firms find Chinese acquirers uniquely appealing, and explores how governments could position themselves in view of competing perspectives about such deals.

Recently, bids by Chinese multinational enterprises for leading companies in advanced economies have multiplied, despite numerous concerns being raised about such acquisitions. This Perspective explains the reasons why target firms find Chinese acquirers uniquely appealing, and explores how governments could position themselves in view of competing perspectives about such deals.

Abstract
This study examines why a large number of Western advanced economies joined the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in 2015 despite the bank's purported challenge to the Western-centred international order in the area of multilateral development finance. Through a mixed-method examination involving elite interviews, analyses of government pronouncements and regressions, and by drawing on concepts from rational choice theory, international policy diffusion, and rational design of international institutions, this study finds that the AIIB's success with regard to its large membership is due to China's effective creation of a demand for the organization among Western advanced economies. We argue that policymakers in Western countries enjoyed 'induced agency', which China granted them in the process of creating the organization and deciding about its membership. First, Western advanced economies had agency because their involvement was needed to prevent the AIIB from becoming a homogenous small organization consisting of Asian debtor countries in favour of a global organization with a heterogeneous group of both debtor and creditor country members. The AIIB was thus set up to accommodate the specific economic and political goals of Western advanced economies. Secondly, Western advanced economies experienced agency in the process of deciding about their membership in the bank because China proactively courted them to join the AIIB. China moreover endorsed the spontaneous intensification of communications that ensued among Western advanced economies with regard to joining the AIIB. Both efforts ultimately resulted in diffusion among them of the decision to become members. Thirdly, the Western advanced economies were granted agency in the process of determining the AIIB's organizational design, thus allowing them to converge the initially diverse visions for the institutional design of the bank and shift it from contesting the existing system of multilateral development banks to effectively integrating into it. Our study thus advances a theory of country-specific demand for membership in an international organization.

This study examines why a large number of Western advanced economies joined the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in 2015 despite the bank's purported challenge to the Western-centred international order in the area of multilateral development finance. Through a mixed-method examination involving elite interviews, analyses of government pronouncements and regressions, and by drawing on concepts from rational choice theory, international policy diffusion, and rational design of international institutions, this study finds that the AIIB's success with regard to its large membership is due to China's effective creation of a demand for the organization among Western advanced economies. We argue that policymakers in Western countries enjoyed 'induced agency', which China granted them in the process of creating the organization and deciding about its membership. First, Western advanced economies had agency because their involvement was needed to prevent the AIIB from becoming a homogenous small organization consisting of Asian debtor countries in favour of a global organization with a heterogeneous group of both debtor and creditor country members. The AIIB was thus set up to accommodate the specific economic and political goals of Western advanced economies. Secondly, Western advanced economies experienced agency in the process of deciding about their membership in the bank because China proactively courted them to join the AIIB. China moreover endorsed the spontaneous intensification of communications that ensued among Western advanced economies with regard to joining the AIIB. Both efforts ultimately resulted in diffusion among them of the decision to become members. Thirdly, the Western advanced economies were granted agency in the process of determining the AIIB's organizational design, thus allowing them to converge the initially diverse visions for the institutional design of the bank and shift it from contesting the existing system of multilateral development banks to effectively integrating into it. Our study thus advances a theory of country-specific demand for membership in an international organization.

Chinese cross-border investments are often assumed to be state driven and a tool of Beijing's economic statecraft. However, corresponding evidence remains inconclusive. This article examines mainland Chinese direct investments in Taiwan and finds that they are not particularly effective tools of economic statecraft. Their excessive politicization and the sheer possibility that investments could be used for Beijing's economic statecraft resulted in a considerable pushback by Taiwan's government, bureaucrats and civil society against large and sensitive investments. The agency enjoyed by Taiwan hindered Beijing from deploying cross-Strait direct investments for political purposes, and Beijing has not openly promoted or supported such investments in Taiwan. Moreover, cross-border direct investments are by nature less exploitable for political purposes because they involve company-level commercial and entrepreneurial decisions. This sets them apart from other forms of economic statecraft, such as sanctions or trade restrictions, where the state has greater influence. Mainland Chinese companies have had limited commercial interests in Taiwan, and the investments that have been made there do not appear to have triggered significant political or security externalities. These findings suggest more generally that foreign direct investment might not be particularly effective as a tool of economic statecraft. (China Q / GIGA)

AbstractChinese cross-border investments are often assumed to be state driven and a tool of Beijing's economic statecraft. However, corresponding evidence remains inconclusive. This article examines mainland Chinese direct investments in Taiwan and finds that they are not particularly effective tools of economic statecraft. Their excessive politicization and the sheer possibility that investments could be used for Beijing's economic statecraft resulted in a considerable pushback by Taiwan's government, bureaucrats and civil society against large and sensitive investments. The agency enjoyed by Taiwan hindered Beijing from deploying cross-Strait direct investments for political purposes, and Beijing has not openly promoted or supported such investments in Taiwan. Moreover, cross-border direct investments are by nature less exploitable for political purposes because they involve company-level commercial and entrepreneurial decisions. This sets them apart from other forms of economic statecraft, such as sanctions or trade restrictions, where the state has greater influence. Mainland Chinese companies have had limited commercial interests in Taiwan, and the investments that have been made there do not appear to have triggered significant political or security externalities. These findings suggest more generally that foreign direct investment might not be particularly effective as a tool of economic statecraft.

While China's experience of using special economic zones (SEZs) for advancing economic development is a model increasingly adopted in other developing countries, the processes involved in replicating this model elsewhere and the outcomes of such replication remain little understood. This review article's nested examination of three relevant strands of literature and two case studies of India and Ethiopia indicates that successful replication of China's SEZ-led development would involve deliberate processes of adaptation from the original model. Replication must be "smart," by taking into account the temporal, systemic, and other discrepancies between the Chinese model and the replicating country; replicating the benefits of China's approach whilst avoiding the drawbacks; and maximising the positive effects of direct Chinese involvement and investments while reducing negative repercussions. (JCCA/GIGA)

Why do foreign countries support the internationalization of the renminbi (RMB) by establishing offshore RMB centres? The Chinese government has openly stated that internationalization of the country's currency is one of its top priorities. International use of the RMB has already significantly increased in recent years. Yet, existing literature has almost exclusively focused on the structure of the Chinese economy and China's domestic politics to explain RMB internationalization. With this article, we seek to fill a gap in the literature by analysing the reasons why foreign countries support RMB internationalization. Using the cases of Germany and the UK, we show that a combination of economic and political factors, partly in response to inducements from Beijing, best explain why foreign countries support Chinese efforts to internationalize the RMB. Some of these factors are similar to both countries, but there are also differences regarding the reasons why they support this key Chinese goal. We use the case of the establishment of offshore RMB centres to conduct our analysis, given the clear political nature of foreign countries allowing China to open them in their own territory. We thus also show that the Chinese currency is starting to display the characteristics of negotiated currencies.

This study seeks to explain the profound discord currently observable in elite political discourse on Chinese investments in many host countries. Using Argentina as a case study, a combination of quantitative content analysis and qualitative discourse analysis was employed to analyze parliamentary speeches on a controversial space-monitoring station built there by China in 2015. The study finds that the competing discourses about China in Argentinean politics draw primarily on locally embedded contexts and the region's particular historical experiences and geopolitical position. These local narratives are used in different ways by both sides of the debate to support contradicting positions on relevant issues. Questions of regional hegemony, center-periphery relations, national autonomy as well as Peronist and anti-Peronist ideologies are being drawn on by elite politicians in an attempt to cope with the deep uncertainty about what China's increased engagement means for the country and to compensate for the lack of predictability about China's behavior in its future role as a major global power. Ultimately, however, Argentina's elite politicians end up in a dilemma in which these narratives and historical memories can be spun in both ways to either support or reject a controversial investment project to go ahead on domestic soil that is, at the same time, a symbolic test for the potential depth of the future relationship with China.