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In "Agonism as Deliberation" (Knops 2007) I suggest a reconciliation between Mouffe's agonist version of democracy, adjusted to preserve consistency, and deliberation. Here I reply to two subsequent criticisms of this project: Gürsözlü (2009) and Fives (2009). Although both hold agonism and deliberation incompatible impossible, they do so from opposing perspectives. Gürsözlü defends Mouffe's agonism as distinct and coherent on the basis of what he considers a correct understanding of her concept of hegemony. Fives argues Mouffe's approach is separate but incoherent, and should be rejected. Against these two conflicting positions, I seek to demonstrate not only that integration between agonism and democracy is possible, but that it has distinct benefits for both agonism and deliberative theory. Divested of its contradictory assertion that universal rational consensus is impossible in principle, agonism can be interpreted as theory of the moment of difference within a broader deliberative dialectic that seeks to move from more to less partial consensus. Conceived in this way, we can better appreciate how these two approaches can complement one another, in pursuing shared goals, rather than the static and unnecessary opposition offered by the two critics I address here.

In ?Agonism as Deliberation? (Knops 2007) I suggest a reconciliation between
Mouffe?s agonist version of democracy, adjusted to preserve consistency, and
deliberation. Here I reply to two subsequent criticisms of this project:
G?rs?zl? (2009) and Fives (2009). Although both hold agonism and deliberation
incompatible impossible, they do so from opposing perspectives. G?rs?zl?
defends Mouffe?s agonism as distinct and coherent on the basis of what he
considers a correct understanding of her concept of hegemony. Fives argues
Mouffe?s approach is separate but incoherent, and should be rejected. Against
these two conflicting positions, I seek to demonstrate not only that
integration between agonism and democracy is possible, but that it has
distinct benefits for both agonism and deliberative theory. Divested of its
contradictory assertion that universal rational consensus is impossible in
principle, agonism can be interpreted as theory of the moment of difference
within a broader deliberative dialectic that seeks to move from more to less
partial consensus. Conceived in this way, we can better appreciate how these
two approaches can complement one another, in pursuing shared goals, rather
than the static and unnecessary opposition offered by the two critics I
address here.

This article argues that the discursive dilemma and the judgement aggregation which causes it are based on a misconception of what it means for a group to give reasons for a democratic decision. Judgement aggregation analyses fail to distinguish between the procedure for determining such a decision, which should involve a vote of all group members, and the process for determining the reasons for such a decision, which should only take account of the views of the members that supported that decision. On the basis of this improved interpretation, the article advances a method for representing reasons for group decisions that is both democratic and rational, thus avoiding the choice between these apparently incompatible goals suggested by the discursive dilemma.

This article argues that the discursive dilemma and the judgement aggregation which causes it are based on a misconception of what it means for a group to give reasons for a democratic decision. Judgement aggregation analyses fail to distinguish between the procedure for determining such a decision, which should involve a vote of all group members, and the process for determining the reasons for such a decision, which should only take account of the views of the members that supported that decision. On the basis of this improved interpretation, the article advances a method for representing reasons for group decisions that is both democratic and rational, thus avoiding the choice between these apparently incompatible goals suggested by the discursive dilemma. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright holder.]

Much of the appeal of deliberative democracy lies in its emancipatory promise to give otherwise disadvantaged groups a voice, and to grant them influence through reasoned argument. However, the precise mechanisms for delivery of this promise remain obscure. After reviewing Habermas's formulation of deliberation, the article draws on recent theories of argumentation to provide a more detailed account of such mechanisms. The article identifies the key emancipatory mechanism as explicitness in language. It outlines the primary modalities of this mechanism: expressing differences of opinion, mobilising a shared standard of inference, and recognising and excluding fallacious appeals to irrelevant factors such as force or authority. It describes how these modalities are enhanced at a secondary, reflexive level that recognises the partiality and defeasibility of particular argumentative exchanges. Such qualifications, it is argued, support a model of deliberation across discourses that allows a clearer appreciation of its potential and limits.

The contemporary emphasis on public participation in policy making derives both from concerns to increase the legitimacy of public decision making & to develop more dialogic forms of governance, & from more 'bottom-up' action intended to ensure that the voices of those excluded from policy making are heard. This has resulted in diverse forms of participative practice, including forums in which social movement organizations meet officials, & forums initiated by officials to which 'the public' are invited. This article examines four case studies of participation, studied as part of research conducted in the ESRC Democracy & Participation program. It focuses on a microlevel analysis of the dynamics of exchanges within such forums to question the capacity of such forums to generate alternative discourses within which policy problems can be defined & addressed. Adapted from the source document.