Suchergebnisse

1. Introduction -- 2. Global Expressivism -- 3. Representationalism versus anti-representationalism about perceptual experience and in cognitive science -- 4. The world for us and the world in itself -- 5. Brains in vats -- 6. Anti-representationalism, realism, and anti-realism -- 7. Metaphysics for anti-representationalists? -- References.

This book provides an original perspective on the debate about anti-representationalism and the nature of philosophy. This debate has come to prominence in recent years through the work of people like Richard Rorty, Paul Horwich, Huw Price and Amie Thomasson. It is the first book to explicitly consider this well-known pragmatist kind of anti-representationalism in relation to anti-representationalist views in other areas of philosophy, in particular the philosophy of perception and cognitive science. Taking as its point of departure the neo-pragmatism of Rorty and Price, it critiques the way these (and other) thinkers develop, on this basis, a positive view of philosophy and its remit. By examining the debate about representationalism versus anti-representationalism in perception and cognitive science it provides a different way of understanding the significance of neo-pragmatism, as well as providing an independently interesting perspective on these other debates. A central idea in this perspective involves distinguishing between a world-for-us and a world-in-itself, though in a different way from Kant and many other philosophers. The book extends these reflections to examine questions about realism and the limits of metaphysics for anti-representationalist pragmatism, arguing the view can uphold a common sense kind of realism, as well as the value of distinctively philosophical enquiry in metaphysics.

Naturalized epistemololgy seeks to motivate norms for cognitive enquiry on such a naturalistic basis. Whilst naturalism must be embraced, this more ambitious project is in vain - to the extent one can justify naturalistic norms, they are not needed for optimal rational belief formation

"A critical investigation of modern naturalism is vitally needed for a deeper understanding of pragmatism's ability to offer enriching perspectives on contemporary philosophy of science. The kind of non-reductive naturalism so often associated with pragmatism needs to be assessed for its plausibility, as does whether a pragmatist perspective on different human ways of conceiving of the world can mediate between different points of view, especially those of natural science and common sense"-- Publisher summary

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