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AbstractIn Homo Juridicus, Alain Supiot argues that law has an 'anthropological' function – constituting people as rational beings by linking together their biological and symbolic dimensions. The law also serves a 'dogmatic function', embodying Western values and serving as a bar to totalitarian scientism and tempering the excesses of technology in the workplace. However, the anthropological function of the law has been undermined by the advance of science and economics and widespread privatisation, contractualisation and deregulation. This article contests Supiot's claims, especially as regards Marxism, counterposing his position to that of Bolshevik legal theorist Evgeny Pashukanis. Pashukanis's insights into the relationship between law and capitalism are used to re-frame Supiot's argument and to undermine his contention that globalisation is inimical to law. Pashukanis is also invoked to contest the claims that the anthropological function of the law is the only alternative to totalitarianism and that law serves to 'humanise' technology.

In Englischer Sprache heraus gegeben Durch Robertum Knox, Schiff-Capitain bey der Ost-Indischen Compagnie in Engelland ; Kupfert.: Rob. Knoxens Ceylanische Reis Besch[reibung] ; Volltext // Exemplar mit der Signatur: Bamberg, Staatsbibliothek -- Geogr.it.q.132

In Englischer Sprache heraus gegeben Durch Robertum Knox, Schiff-Capitain bey der Ost-Indischen Compagnie in Engelland ; Kupfert.: Rob. Knoxens Ceylanische Reis Besch[reibung] ; Volltext // Exemplar mit der Signatur: Bamberg, Staatsbibliothek -- Bip.Geogr.it.q.16#1

AbstractBill Bowring's book attempts to argue for a Marxist account of international law that embraces it as a tool for progressive politics and revolutionary change. He argues it is necessary to give a substantive account of both, locating them in the real struggles of the oppressed. Specifically, he locates human rights in the three great revolutions ‐ the French, the Russian and the anticolonial. However, this revolutionary heritage has been 'degraded' by recent events. As such, it is necessary to adopt 'revolutionary conservatism', invoking international law's origins against its current degradation. This review argues that, owing to international law's indeterminacy, Bowring's project is susceptible to imperial appropriation. This means, however, that Bowring cannot give an account of why we should use international law. It then argues that Bowring's account of Pashukanis is wrong, and that Pashukanis's work can better make sense of Bowring's insights and international law more generally.