Suchergebnisse

In the field of international relations, it has long been believed that nationalism generates adverse foreign policy preferences. This article revisits this long-standing assumption by investigating how stimulating nationalistic sentiments shapes mass foreign policy preferences in two contexts, namely when celebrating national achievements and greatness with a focus on the national Self and when invoking negative historical memories in relation to a salient Other. Using a survey experiment conducted in China, which capitalized on visual stimuli drawn from real-world sources to stoke respondents' nationalistic sentiments, this article shows that not all rises of nationalism are the same. Adverse foreign policy preferences, such as a preference for a hawkish approach, an uncompromising attitude, and a dislike for the status quo, emerge when nationalistic sentiments are stoked by invoking negative historical memories but not by celebrating general national achievements and greatness.

How does a patron state dampen a client state's domestic aspirations for developing nuclear weapons? What nonproliferation tools most effectively induce a client state's domestic preference for nuclear forbearance? This article assesses the relative effectiveness of three nonproliferation tools available to a nuclear patron: a declaration of extended deterrence, forward deployment of nuclear weapons, and a conditional threat of punishment. More specifically, using experimental data on the South Korean public, this article examines whether nuclear forward-deployment and a conditional threat of punishment are more effective than a declaratory policy in enhancing the credibility of extended deterrence and curbing public aspirations for nuclearization. The experimental results show that neither nuclear forward-deployment nor a conditional threat of punishment reduces public support for nuclear armament significantly more than a declaratory policy. They also reveal that compared to when a nuclear ally does not exist, the three nonproliferation tools do not necessarily dampen the public's preference for developing indigenous nuclear weapons. The robustness of the findings is assessed using an experiment on a small sample of government officials. Taken together, this study provides the first experimental evidence on public perception of different nonproliferation tools in a client state.

AbstractHow does a patron state dampen a client state's domestic aspirations for developing nuclear weapons? What nonproliferation tools most effectively induce a client state's domestic preference for nuclear forbearance? This article assesses the relative effectiveness of three nonproliferation tools available to a nuclear patron: a declaration of extended deterrence, forward deployment of nuclear weapons, and a conditional threat of punishment. More specifically, using experimental data on the South Korean public, this article examines whether nuclear forward-deployment and a conditional threat of punishment are more effective than a declaratory policy in enhancing the credibility of extended deterrence and curbing public aspirations for nuclearization. The experimental results show that neither nuclear forward-deployment nor a conditional threat of punishment reduces public support for nuclear armament significantly more than a declaratory policy. They also reveal that compared to when a nuclear ally does not exist, the three nonproliferation tools do not necessarily dampen the public's preference for developing indigenous nuclear weapons. The robustness of the findings is assessed using an experiment on a small sample of government officials. Taken together, this study provides the first experimental evidence on public perception of different nonproliferation tools in a client state.

What explains a patron's decision to publicly condone, condemn, or forgo commenting on its client's unilateral provocations? We present a new theoretical framework that identifies a patron's two strategic considerations – maximizing its sphere of influence and avoiding entanglement – and factors that affect them. We claim that whenever a patron faces a great power rivalry or a vulnerable client, it is more likely to condone its client's provocations in order to safeguard its sphere of influence. On the other hand, when the risk of escalation looms large, the patron is more likely to condemn its client's provocations in order to avoid entanglement. Focusing on the Sino-North Korean patron–client relationship, we test our theory on an original dataset that tracks China's official reactions to provocations initiated by North Korea. We find that China tends to condone North Korea's provocations when the USA criticizes them, and refrains from condemning when North Korea is domestically fragile. We also find that China is more likely to condemn its client's provocations in the period after North Korea became a nuclear state. In addition, we draw on examples from the USA–Pakistan and the USA–Israel patron–client relationships to illustrate our causal logic. This article offers new insights on how a patron manages its client's unruly behavior, and provides the first large-N evidence on China's responses to North Korean provocations from 1981 to 2016.

Does nationalism lead to interstate war? This book challenges the existing presumption that nationalism causes war and systematically investigates how popular nationalism affects a country's decision to launch military aggression. In doing so, the book makes a provocative and novel claim that popular nationalism has both a conflict-inducing and a restraining effect and identifies the conditions under which popular nationalism triggers interstate violence. Specifically, the book asserts that popular nationalism leads to war only when leaders who confront popular nationalism are very confident about their chance of achieving complete victory in conflict or they are politically vulnerable. In the absence of these two conditions, popular nationalism has a restraining effect, pushing leaders toward seeking the status quo and avoiding the use of force. The book first demonstrates the restraining effect of popular nationalism through a survey experiment conducted in China and an in-depth case study on the territorial dispute between China and Japan in the East China Sea. It then offers a comprehensive historical and contemporary analysis of when popular nationalism's restraining effect turns into a conflict-inducing one through case studies on the War of 1812 and the Falklands War. The book provides important insights into whether popular nationalism could put great powers like the United States and China on a collision course, as well as broad policy implications for preventing war driven by popular nationalism.

Abstract
When Japan in 2019 removed South Korea from its whitelist of most trusted trading partners, South Koreans responded by organizing mass nationalist boycotts against Japanese goods. What affects South Korean citizens' willingness to participate in this nationalist movement? In this article, we offer a systematic investigation of individuals' motivations behind their boycott participation along the two dimensions of nationalist boycotts – boycotts as a collective choice and boycotts as an emotional reaction – as well as the historical patterns of South Korean nationalist boycotts against Japan. From original survey data collected in South Korea, we find that citizens' baseline nationalism is an important moderating factor. For those who have strong nationalistic sentiments against Japan, both collective action and emotional primes have only a marginal impact. However, for those who have relatively low baseline nationalism against Japan, an expectation of mass participation plays a critical role in boosting their desire for boycott participation.

AbstractDoes the rise of nationalism lead to immigration policy change? By focusing on elite‐led nationalism, this study offers a novel perspective: When top political leaders rely on nationalism as their legitimation strategy, they are more disposed to adopt policies aimed at strict immigration control, such as the imposition of sanctions on illegal immigrants, due to their hands being tied. We perform a battery of empirical tests using a cross‐national, time‐series data for 33 countries for the years 1980–2010. We find evidence that nationalist countries are positively associated with heightened immigration control. This finding is robust even after possible reverse causality is taken into account. The overall analysis illustrates that nationalism is a significant factor in explaining why countries are pushing for more restrictive immigration control in the contemporary world.

What explains a patron's decision to publicly condone, condemn, or forgo commenting on its client's unilateral provocations? We present a new theoretical framework that identifies a patron's two strategic considerations – maximizing its sphere of influence and avoiding entanglement – and factors that affect them. We claim that whenever a patron faces a great power rivalry or a vulnerable client, it is more likely to condone its client's provocations in order to safeguard its sphere of influence. On the other hand, when the risk of escalation looms large, the patron is more likely to condemn its client's provocations in order to avoid entanglement. Focusing on the Sino-North Korean patron–client relationship, we test our theory on an original dataset that tracks China's official reactions to provocations initiated by North Korea. We find that China tends to condone North Korea's provocations when the USA criticizes them, and refrains from condemning when North Korea is domestically fragile. We also find that China is more likely to condemn its client's provocations in the period after North Korea became a nuclear state. In addition, we draw on examples from the USA–Pakistan and the USA–Israel patron–client relationships to illustrate our causal logic. This article offers new insights on how a patron manages its client's unruly behavior, and provides the first large-N evidence on China's responses to North Korean provocations from 1981 to 2016.

How robust is public support for extended nuclear deterrence in patron and client states? Recent studies have improved scholarly understanding of US public opinion about nuclear weapon use against non-nuclear adversaries. Yet, there is limited knowledge of public attitudes regarding retaliation for nuclear strikes against US allies. We develop a theoretical typology of nuclear crises and investigate this phenomenon with a novel survey experiment (n = 6,623). Americans, Japanese, and South Koreans viewed realistic emergency alert messages about a most-likely case for nuclear retaliation: a North Korean missile attack on a US ally protected by the nuclear umbrella. Support for nuclear retaliation is low in all three countries, with important cross-national differences. Favorability increases with North Korean nuclear first-use, but it remains limited nonetheless. Surprisingly, US "tripwire" troop casualties do not increase Americans' demands for nuclear retaliation. These findings have important implications for the study of nuclear crises and practice of extended deterrence.

How can democratic governments convince their citizens to support a costly military alliance? We theorize about two rhetorical tools that foreign policy leaders have historically used to achieve this goal: instrumental cues emphasizing national interests and ideational cues highlighting shared values. We then assess the effects of these appeals in various forms and contexts by analyzing two original survey experiments fielded in the United States. Our analysis shows that alliance rhetoric – whether positive or negative – can sway public support for alliances. Positive appeals to both interests and values raise citizen approval for maintaining a costly alliance in times of peace and during an active crisis, though their effects are slightly muted in a crisis. We also find that negative rhetoric erodes public support for alliances, but only under limited conditions: negative rhetoric affects public support for peace-time alliance policies but not for defending an ally during a crisis, and its effect disappears in the presence of positive rhetoric. The findings contribute to literatures on the domestic politics of international institutions and the role of political communication in foreign policy.