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I ask whether variations in electoral systems affect the conflict behavior of democratic leaders, specifically the timing of that conflict. Building from theories of political accountability and agency loss, I argue that the degree of agency loss coupled with variations in the principals that hold leaders accountable affects the timing of conflict in democratic systems. The results confirm the expectation that leaders in candidate‐centered systems are more likely to "gamble for resurrection" as the next election approaches than are party‐centered executives given the differences in the ability of their principals to select, sanction, and monitor them.

Research suggests that the costs of international conflict (e.g. casualties) alter public opinion, executive approval and policy positions of elected officials. However, do casualties affect voting in terms of aggregate outcomes and individual vote choices? This article examines how casualties from interstate conflicts affect voter behaviour, specifically incumbent vote share. Using the investment model of commitment to model individual vote choice, it is argued that increases in the costs of conflict (i.e., more casualties) can increase the probability that voters will support the incumbent, increasing incumbent vote share. This model is tested with both cross-national aggregate data from twenty-three countries and individual-level British survey data. The results support the argument.

Research suggests that the costs of international conflict (e.g. casualties) alter public opinion, executive approval and policy positions of elected officials. However, do casualties affect voting in terms of aggregate outcomes and individual vote choices? This article examines how casualties from interstate conflicts affect voter behaviour, specifically incumbent vote share. Using the investment model of commitment to model individual vote choice, it is argued that increases in the costs of conflict (i.e., more casualties) can increase the probability that voters will support the incumbent, increasing incumbent vote share. This model is tested with both cross-national aggregate data from twenty-three countries and individual-level British survey data. The results support the argument. ((British Journal of Political Science/ FUB)

Do variations in partisanship and political outcomes among democratic states affect the duration of militarized interstate disputes? To answer this question, the author develops a model of partisan competition derived from the government failure literature. The author argues factors associated with government failure determine the ability of governments to contend with the domestic political costs of militarized disputes, specifically the duration of those disputes. The author tests his expectations using hazard analysis on a dataset of 20 democratic governments and militarized disputes between 1945 and 1992. The results suggest the outcome of party competition in the form of a government's sensitivity to the potential political costs of conflict is an important part of the conflict process. The author concludes that differences in domestic political outcomes influence the duration of militarized interstate disputes. Governments that are politically more secure in their tenure engage in longer disputes. Alternatively, governments that are more vulnerable have significantly shorter disputes. In addition, because government partisanship contributes to vulnerability, it also affects dispute duration, with governments of the left engaging in shorter disputes, while governments of the right fight longer disputes.

Do governments of the left attract more terrorism than governments of the right? We examine how the political orientation of governments affects the probability of states being the target of terrorist attack. We develop a series of related theoretical linkages between partisan orientation, policy choice, and terrorist behavior to explain why governments of the left should be more likely to see higher numbers of terrorist attacks than governments of the right. We test our expectations using two different datasets; the Database of Political Institutions and the Party Manifesto data against the ITERATE terrorism dataset between the years 1975 and 1997. The results suggest that governments of the left are more likely to be the targets of terrorism than governments of the right and that the causal mechanisms behind this outcome might be context dependent.